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## TWENTIETH CENTURY APOSTLE



THE task of the apostle of Christ remains essentially the same in every age. Men are to be brought to God, and God to men; heaven is to be sampled beforehand through the establishment of the kingdom of God in the hearts of men; that kingdom is to be eternally possessed in the courts of heaven. Whatever the age, whatever the risks and difficulties, whatever his labors, the apostle comes to the end of the road knowing himself an unworthy servant; the fruits of his apostolate are always so evidently much more God's than men's. The apostle's harvest field is the heart of a man; only God can enter there to sow and till and reap.

Still, the Almighty, with divine graciousness, has given the apostle a part in the accomplishment of the happiness of men. In the ordinary Providence of God, there are things to be done by the apostle, indispensable things, things for which he must answer under penalty of his own eternal life with God. Consequently the apostle must use his human powers to the utmost

for men, not because God needs him but because, through the mercy of God, men need him. He must evaluate and develop the gifts which God has given him; a matter which will be between himself and God, with help normally limited to his confessor, his directors, his superiors, and his friends. As he grows in wisdom, he may even get much help in this line from his enemies.

There is, too, the whole objective field of his labors to be considered: the world he lives in, the men of his time, the difficulties peculiar to, and opportunities for, his work offered by the defects and perfections of his age. In estimating this aspect of his labors, the sources of help to the apostle are almost unlimited. From this angle, his work is a public affair, any man of his time may contribute to it. The importance of a reasonably correct objective estimate hardly needs argument: knowing his time, his contemporaries, the instruments ready to his hand, and the obstacles that will be raised against him, the apostle is in a position to escape that dread which haunts the truly apostolic heart—the waste of time and effort.

It is to this objective view of the apostolic field that this study will be directed. An obvious guide, and constant corrective, to such a survey is a sharp contrast with the original apostolic field into which the twelve chosen ones of Christ stepped from the sheltering companionship of their Master and ours. That will be the procedure in this paper. In the full assurance of the extravagant gifts of divine grace to our times, we shall concentrate on some of the human aspects of our age that differentiate the apostle's labors, and on the apostle who labors among the constantly increasing unbelievers of the America of our day.

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The Apostles might have looked out over their world and have wondered how to prevent the obliteration of the infant Church by the crushing weight of paganism, as a modern apostle might wonder how to avert the submergence of the Church today under the growing waves of unchristian thought

and practice. In actual fact, this was not the problem of the Apostles. Their problem was how to convert a world; not avert, then, but convert. It could not be otherwise, for the first is a purely human point of view, edging fearfully towards despair under the weight of the overwhelming probabilities of defeat; the second is beyond the reach of a man unless he stand on the shoulders of God, a prospect alive with hope, with challenge, and vibrant with courage.

The strategy of that original band of Apostles was never purely defensive because it was never purely human; it was definitely offensive. It was not negative but positive. They were not fighting off something nearly so much as they were bringing something home: happiness to unhappy men, joy to sad pagans, strength and hope to beaten fighters, relief to men so miserable they had forgotten there was anything but misery. Their program was not so much one of reform as of relief, not so much corrective as informing and inspiriting.

Granted the apostolic heart, it could not have been otherwise. From the side of the Apostles themselves, they possessed, or were possessed by, a happiness too big to be imprisoned by a human heart, even by a divinely enlarged human heart. This is not, of course, the whole story. While happiness is both open-handed and contagious, it is also sensitive to disapproval and jealous in guarding its precious sources from misunderstanding and mockery. Add to their happiness the possession by the Apostles of a secret too good and too incredible to be kept, then this thing had to break out of them. Its words could not be other than would resound down the roads of the world, words that would be a blending of discovery, long-sought relief, challenge, and battle.

They were men aflame with a fire that was no less than a conflagration. It would have been a waste of breath to urge coolness, calm, prudent restraint lest the fire spread. The Roman Empire risked its prestige and vast resources in the attempt to extinguish or at least control the fire; Moses was wiser to take off his shoes and pray before the burning bush. For both fires were lighted by God.

Still, happiness can shrink from too much contact with despair, secrets can be smothered by scorn, and fires can die down if fuel is not fed to them, even divine fires if they burn in the hearts of men. Put all these together, however, and add one last factor and it becomes clear that there can be no such thing as a defensive apostle. That last element was the relentless pressure of the divine command: "Go teach all nations." The Apostles were driven men, driven to a task too big for the fleeting moments of a lifetime. It was no wonder Paul's restless feet should pace off the lengths of the long roads of Rome, that Dominic's impatient sleep should be taken grudgingly and before the altar, that Thomas should drive his mind at a pace far too fast for his body, and for the minds and bodies of later centuries. Men so prodigal of life cannot live defensively.

On the other hand, the plight of the men of their time would add no comfort to a moment's leisure. In bringing happiness to men, they were coming to the relief of human misery. The tired, hopeless, helpless men of their world were in desperate straits from which only the Apostles could relieve them. This rescue mission of the Galileans was not to be compared to feeding the starving, staunching the flowing blood of the wounded, or cooling the fever of the sick. This condition of men could be stated only in terms of eternity; humanly speaking, the eternal loss or eternal gain of men rested on the shoulders of the Apostles.

However breathlessly they drove themselves, their help would be too late for some. Whatever approach they used, in every failure they must reproach themselves for the things that might have been done differently. Nothing purely human in their own lives could be set up as a rival to this rush to the relief of the needs of men. Their problem was one of communicating a divine message to the minds and hearts of men. There is no more heart-breaking work; the message is so weighty, time so pressing, and the distance so great as it is between man and man.

Their procedure could not be defensive. The possibilities of

offensive strategy, on the other hand, are obvious. The Apostles could bring their message to men by shouting it, by writing it, or by living it. All three they did, exhausting the possibilities for the spreading of truth, as the Church must always do. But all three were not used with the same emphasis. And this, in the light of the special difficulties of our time, may be of prime importance for the consideration of the modern apostle.

The written word was used most sparingly by the Apostles. There was, of course, the example of the Lord Himself still vivid before their eyes. He, we are told, began to do and to teach; but, as far as we know, He never wrote a line beyond the mysterious scribbling for the benefit of the accusers of the adulteress. And that was done on sand. Certainly the Apostles were subject to the inexorable pressure of limited time. The slow plodding labor of writing could be done by others whose memory was not bulging with crowded images of the Son of God made man. The Apostles had seen the Lord; their words had to show Him to others. Words just do not come out of a pen fast enough for so lively and pressing a story.

Undoubtedly the time and labor that must go into the writing of a manuscript and its slow, faulty circulation by tedious copying were factors determining the limitation of the writing of the Apostles to a few scattered letters and some of the Gospels. The very low proportion of literacy among the men of their time, together with the ineffable character of their message, would obviously tend to put the written word among the lesser of the apostolic instruments.

The spoken word was a much sharper sword and they used it, one might almost say, mercilessly. They spoke to individuals, to small earnest groups, to cynical thousands; they spoke from high hills, in the depths of cellars, in synagogues, and before judgment seats. Given the slightest opening, they spoke; often enough, no doubt, where no opening was offered, they made their own openings. Men within reach of their voices would not escape without the message of Christ ringing in their ears.

Even though the spoken word could not, of itself, boast of such permanency as is proper to the written word, it was obviously valued much more highly by the Apostles. It has, even today, virtues that set it apart for apostolic work. There is so much more of complete life in it that it is never merely the unveiling of another man's intellectual treasures. In it the whole man speaks, heart and hands, soul and eyes, face and the whole vitally alive figure of a man desperately in earnest. To resist this word is to do much more than reject an idea; it is to fight off all that the idea has done to this man.

The supreme power of the spoken word of the Apostles is better seen when we remember that that word was not an apologetic defense but a display in word of temporal and eternal peace to a world that had broken open the outer shell of worldly peace and found it to be an empty husk. The naked power of such a word was supported by such confirmatory material, from all sources, as was already familiar to the audience. It was driven home by the thundering expositions of divine power in miracle after miracle worked to attest to the truth of the word and to shock the minds and hearts of men out of their complacent or despairing stagnation.

The apostolic speech, then, was a divinely confirmed exposition of the message of Christ at work in the lives of the speakers. For there is nothing so close to life as the word that springs from it; there is no moment of closer approach to the imaging of the Godhead from which we sprang than when a word proceeds from us; no act in our lives more closely approaches the creative act of God than that by which we breathe the spiritual life of meaning into the physical vessel of sound. Our words are the closest image of ourselves, as we are the physical universe's closest image of God; of all the fruits of our genius, this word is the closest to being endowed by us with the breath of the spirit.

The very basis of the nobility of the spoken word betrays its limitations, as our imaging of God shows forth the infinite perfection of the original of that image. The most powerful

expression of what has laid hold of the mind and heart of a man is not what he writes or says, but what he does and is. This, then, was the supreme apostolic weapon of the original Apostles—their very lives and actions. Short of the grace of God, it was their life-exposition of the message of Christ that made the western world Christian. The only limit set to the use of this instrument was dictated by the Master of life in setting a time for death. If their words portrayed temporal and eternal peace on a fascinating canvas, their lives and deeds put the same message in three dimensions, in a form that men could view and handle from all angles, a sculpture carved so harmoniously from the stubborn and diverse material of human lives as to leave no doubt of the divine genius of the Sculptor. Men read and doubted, they heard and argued, but when they saw, they fell on their knees. What was true then has been confirmed in every age; it is not literature, nor oratory, but sanctity that can bring happiness to men. Sanctity can give savor to literature, a graciousness and piercing strength to words, but it is *seen* only in men.

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The life to which God's generosity has destined men was not meant as a substitute, a replacement, or a reversal for the life for which man's natural powers fit him. It is designed as a perfection of that natural life. That grace perfects rather than destroys nature is a profound and absolutely accurate truth, all of the corollaries of which must be taken in their full, literal implications. The supernatural life of men on this earth presupposes the soundness of nature within men. In fact, if there be decay or degradation of nature, that decay must be rooted out, that degradation corrected before there is any possibility of erecting supernatural life. No life, least of all a supernatural life, can be built upon rotting foundations; and nature is the foundation of the supernatural life in men. On this score, humanly speaking, the Apostles were rather well off.

To reduce the natural prerequisites of supernatural life (the goal of apostolic labors) to the absolute minimum, we could

say that they amounted to a wholesomely sound grasp of the nature of God and of man. In Roman times, the chief defects centered about the first of these. It must be remembered that while those times were thoroughly pagan, they were not atheistic. The universal underlying belief of that age did not include the notion that God was unnecessary. Why this was so is quite another question; it may have been because of the experimental knowledge of man's insufficiency, or, more likely, because the human race was simply not yet old enough in the west to have reached that level of corruption. The fact is that rather than eliminating the divine being, the age sinned by multiplying divinities beyond all reason. But the germ of the idea of a superior and spiritual being was universal in the Roman world. The concept was corrupted often to the point of absurdity (but then every corruption of the idea of divinity results in absurdity); yet the truth was there, ready to be uncovered, to be healed, given new life by the words of the Apostles.

As to the nature of man, there was, it is true, that essential contradiction to the humanity of man which is the institution of slavery, accepted without serious question throughout the Roman world. The contradiction had been seen by the Greek philosophers long before and met by the simple, and completely false, stratagem of denying full human nature to the men who were slaves. They could not be men and be treated in this fashion, so they were declared to be somehow less human than their masters. The philosophical difficulties probably did not seriously trouble the slave-owners of apostolic times; the important point, however, is that this thing of slavery was not so much a corrupted notion of man's nature as a totally unjust denial to some men of the possession of human nature.

Those who were considered fully human (the ruling group, owners of slaves, and, generally, all those who were not actually enslaved) were estimated quite soundly. Thus, it was not doubted that the mind of a man could attain to truth, grasp it firmly by reasoning processes, and be sure that it would not

somehow cease to be true tomorrow or next year. To these men, there were absolute, unchanging truths which the mind of man could learn and by which he could direct his life and his world. It was seen that these absolute truths did not stop short at the borders of the moral world; that there was an unchanging right and an unchanging wrong, a just and an unjust thing, virtue and vice. Generally speaking, the free will of man—the immediate consequence of this kind of knowledge—was not called into serious question. Consequently the moral responsibility of the individual was not scoffed at or rejected but rather was one of the cornerstones of the justice on which Roman judges prided themselves. That there was some sort of life after death, with its implications of the spiritual nature of the soul of man, was generally agreed upon. All of this pointed plainly to finality for human life; to the fact that there was some meaning to living, some goal to which a man attained or short of which he fell and so failed in his living. Authority might be rebelled against, be bitterly abused by tyrants, soundly cursed by its victims; but the necessity of authority's exercise in military and civil life was considered a fact beyond serious question. In an empire as widely spread as was that of Rome, there could hardly be any practical doubts on authority as a source of knowledge; other men's word had to be taken by men far removed from the provinces if there were to be any knowledge of these far-flung outposts at all.

All in all, the prerequisites from the side of nature were fairly ready to hand for the Apostles: a notion of God and an insistence on a superior and spiritual being; absolute truth, moral as well as metaphysical; the mind and will of man; his spiritual soul; life after death; personal responsibility; finality; authority. These are no small things, as an apostle of our own age can well testify. They are absolute essentials for the establishment of the supernatural life of men here on earth. Granted there was much corruption in these ideas, granted that their application suffered as much in this age as in any other, or even more, the point is they were there to be built on. The

Apostles could begin their incredible task with very little delay in putting down the foundations, very little labor in removing the obstacles to the beginning of their building.

In the strictly moral order, there are some completely indispensable dispositions for the supernatural life; so essential, in fact, that if the apostle does not find them present, he must establish them before his work can really begin. Again staying within the limits of the absolute minimum, we might name these as: 1) courage, at least that spark of courage which is willingness to face the fact of personal responsibility; 2) hope, at least that shadow of hope that escapes both from completely smug satisfaction with the present and from utterly despairing abandonment of the future; 3) moral life, at least that ghostly silhouette of it that consists of an admission of the desirability of it for the happiness of men.

On this score, the field was by no means well prepared for the Apostles. True, Rome had always boasted of courage as it did of justice. In apostolic times, that courage had actually degenerated into a purely physical thing as apt to be brutal stolidity as anything else. On the moral side, personal responsibility was faced, not so much as a matter of courage as a matter of resignation in the face of the obvious and inescapable; it had not occurred to most men to escape it by waving a denial in its face, any more than they would have set out to build a road, waving aside the mountains by denying their existence. As for hope, certainly these tired pagans had little illusion about the grandeur of their world and their lives. Their weakness in this regard was not nearly so close to smug satisfaction with the present as to despairing abandonment of the future and the effort it demanded of them. Weakest of all would be the moral life of that time as far as apostolic efforts were concerned; pagan corruption had made the most of centuries of unchallenged decay in the lives of men. Still, the dream was not entirely dissipated, the ideal was not totally discarded; however low men might sink, the stars were not completely out of reach of their eyes though they might be hopelessly beyond the reach of their hands.

The Apostles faced the tremendous obstacles of unmitigated sensuality and its inevitable offspring of cowardice; the victims of such vices as these cannot but look on God as a threat to all to which their lives have been dedicated. But, at least, these men were not proudly self-sufficient, secure in their power to achieve happiness and perfection of life without external assistance. In that case, God would have seemed unnecessary. As it was, they were tired, disillusioned, bitter, sure that they were not capable of bringing fullness of life, the abundance of joy, the success of living, to themselves; and not at all sure that anything or anyone else could make life and its world less drearily hopeless than it so obviously was to them. They were weary, disillusioned pagans. Nothing less than infinite power could come to their rescue. In a blurred, tired way, they realized that this was so.

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Superficially, it would seem that the modern apostle starts off with many of these apostolic difficulties erased through the smooth organization of a well established and worldwide Church. In actual fact, however, the power, organization, and influence of a worldwide Church is as little comfort to the modern apostle as the feeble impotency of the infant Church was a discouragement to the original Apostles. For apostolic eyes are on the harvest to be reaped, not on the crops already threshed and safely under cover; the apostle looks now, as he did in the first century, at the fields outside the present cultivation of the Church.

As the eyes of the twentieth century apostle scan these horizons, he cannot but find them much more humanly hopeless than were the horizons that stretched before the eager, always impatient eyes of Peter. The twentieth century apostle has a road which is much longer than the length of all the roads of Rome, he has much farther to go, because within his time men have gone much farther afield and now it is such an intolerable distance from man to man. Indeed, it is quite possible that his apostolic life will be consumed in doing little more than estab-

lishing a starting point. If apostles could be discouraged, surely this would be grounds enough for refusing to start the labors that will take the repose out of life: that heart and soul, mind and body should be worn out only to give men a bare foothold and, perhaps, to teach them to take the first or second stumbling step on the long road home.

The audience of the modern apostle is almost totally lacking in the natural prerequisites for supernatural life. Sound notions of God and man are either already gone or moving rapidly to the last stages of decay. These are large statements. But look at them, conclusively if briefly, from the triple angle of the modern difficulty, using "modern" here only in the sense that these were not major hazards faced by the original Apostles: the difficulty of the intellect, of the will, and of the physical universe.

On the side of the intellect, there is the staggering denial of the validity of the proper rational processes which is contained in the modern axiom of the sole certitude of experimental knowledge, or knowledge obtained by scientific observation. Axiom is precisely the proper word, for this point of view is so taken for granted that a challenge to it seems almost an anachronistic insult to science. Since the whole purpose of the perfection of scientific instruments is to lengthen the senses of man, a limitation of man's knowledge to the fruits of his science is necessarily a declaration that his knowledge cannot surpass the sensible world. What is said, believed, maintained in any way beyond that field of scientific observation, must, on the face of it, be no more than an assumption, a hypothesis, or an emotionally dictated point of view; it may be very necessary for the living of human life, but nonetheless surely devoid of certitude.

The full implications of this modern axiom become apparent in the denial of, or agnostic indifference to, the spiritual in man. The word has not yet escaped from our vocabularies. But it has been debased to mean little more than the "not immediately visible"; cats, dogs, and angle-worms are made to feel at home

under the broad shadiness of its spreading branches. What has been meant by the word "spiritual," i. e., the immaterial which is beyond the reach of the senses, is in fact denied. Thus the intellect itself, along with the whole world of its proper operations, is denied. There is, by way of confirmation, the explicit insistence on the non-qualitative indifference of man from the animals. It is true that this denial may sometimes look like a benign extension of intellect to the animals; but, from the very nature of intellect, if it is to be a property of brutes, man has lost his claim to spirituality, he has lost his mind.

These fundamental attacks on the very nature of man are left cheerfully in obscurity because they are much too shocking to be faced boldly by the mind of man. Yet they are made clear in the not at all obscure rejections of such things as absolute, unchanging truths, with the consequent enthronement of relativism.

Sense knowledge is indeed a limited thing. In its specialized, detailed observations it is a relative thing constantly subject to correction through the perfection of the instruments of observation. If it were true that this is man's only source of knowledge, then it would also be true that man has no absolute knowledge; that his life must be built on shifting sands. To-day's truths are only the material for tomorrow's correction. If he must build, then he must build on sand; under such circumstances, the man is a fool indeed who insists upon the labor of building.

Another such modern rejection lies in the field of finality. Clearly, if there is no absolute truth, there can be no unchanging goal for a man's life; if there is no spiritual world, there is nothing for a man to aim at above the flow of matter that is the current carrying his daily life to its inevitable disaster of death. There can be no end that gives personal meaning to the individual's life; or if there can be, it lies outside of knowledge that is limited to scientific observation. This, of course, would mean that a man is faced with the chaotic spectacle of meaningless existence, that is, of life really gone mad. To escape such

a thing (for indeed it cannot be faced) there is the sickly substitute of mass goals for personal ones. It was clear from the beginning of the modern madness that such sops as "living in posterity," "living on in one's children," "enduring through one's works," and so on, really said no more than "when you are dead you are dead and that's the end of you." The mass goals—of a race, a party, a class, or a nation—really do little more for the individual. All of them insist on the tragic emptiness of individual life, all of them admit that the individual's life is personally meaningless because it has no personal goal.

The third most pertinent modern rejection from the side of the intellect is the denial of the truth of man's life after death. Such a life is possible, of course, only on the basis of the immaterial (i. e., the spiritual) in man. If that be rejected, then man's life is rigidly fenced in within the bounds of conception and death. What he can cram into that space is all that he will get out of life; the loss or surrender of anything that might have been fitted into that small space is a needless and irreparable loss on some quaintly quixotic grounds that will not bear hard-headed inspection. Sacrifice is a word that should pass out of the vocabulary and the practice of men. With the assurance of complete oblivion at death, men have a guarantee of frustration at the inception of every action, a precept against hope in every effort, a foretaste of death in the very vigor of life.

On the side of the will, the condition of the modern apostle's audience is hardly less desperate; indeed, it could hardly be other than equally desperate, since the picture of the will of man is a consequence of the caliber of his intellect and the knowledge of which it is capable. For the work of the will is not to know, but to desire and reach out for the things that are offered to it by means of knowledge.

It is not surprising, then, that there should be almost an eagerness to deny freedom of will in men today; to emphasize biological drives, subconscious influences, and animal parallels in the examination of human behavior. If man's knowledge is

limited to the sensible order, if his soul is not spiritual and immortal, there is no point in talking about free will; there cannot be such a thing. Hospitals and animal training centers should take the place of courts of justice and of schools which make a pretense of moral training.

There is a rather paradoxical attitude in this matter of freedom that is the result of an inherent contradiction rather than of any mysterious truth. For while there is a strong resistance against freedom of will (i. e., against the denial of intrinsic necessity), there is also a strong insistence on freedom from external regulation. It is a kind of combination of insistence on respect of rights and a conviction of helplessness in the exercise of those rights. Men insist that they are not intrinsically free, and demand that they be extrinsically free. Strictly speaking, the idea of external regulation by law should be an impossibility if there is no intrinsic freedom in man. Instead, the idea of regulation by authority is seen as a kind of insult to man; on the ground alleged, it is an absurdity. Man is pictured as the victim of forces within himself rather than as a master ruling the kingdom of his soul. The claim really is that we cannot rule ourselves, since we are not free; we should not be ruled by others. We are not amenable to rule from the outside, yet we are blind to the possibilities of rule from the inside.

The consequences for morality, at least for the theory of morality, are fairly obvious. Since there is no freedom, there can be no personal responsibility. Since there is no personal goal, there is nothing for which to be personally responsible; without a personal goal there is nothing contributing to the attainment of that goal or defeating its attainment, there is no right and wrong. Morality becomes a shifting thing of social custom whose violation is a matter of taste rather than of tragedy; morality has ceased to be the measure of the humanity of the action of a man and has become the statement of its social acceptability. The social goal has supplanted the personal goal, to the obliteration of the person.

All this, mind you, may be just theory. With the Romans, the theory of morality remained fairly intact, though the practice had sunk to the lowest levels of degradation; with us, the theory is gone but we have a long way to go before we catch up with the Roman practice. It would not be nearly so strange were our theories an attempt to rationalize a degradation that had already set in. The strangeness of our situation is that we have laboriously erected a framework to make complete corruption look like a rational and acceptable thing; but, as yet, we have not been able to talk ourselves into utter corruption. A combination of natural goodness and the vestiges of a Christian heritage has made us, thus far, see the conclusions of our wild reasoning as too foul to be introduced into our actual living.

Another paradox in the modern moral field is the strange marriage of a resentment of authority to a slavish eagerness to have more and more of our lives taken over by authority. In sharper terms, we have come to resent more and more strongly the exercise of human authority (the moral authority that operates through law on the supposition of the mature responsibility of its subject); yet we are becoming more and more enthusiastic about the extension of an irrational, and so inhuman authority (the authority that is exercised through force on the assumption of the incapacity of its subjects to take care of themselves). This latter authority is tyrannical when it is selfish; even when it is benign, it is paternal and under it men cannot be men but must remain forever children.

Probably the modern apostle's audience will not have sunk to the level of complete sensuality that was common in the days of the original Apostles. The modern apostle will not, on the whole, be faced with sensuality's offspring of cowardice, nor with the frame of mind—the logical consequence of sensuality and cowardice—that looks on God as a threat to all that life holds. On the other hand, the audience of this modern apostle is not made up of tired, disillusioned, nearly hopeless pagans who have learned the hard way something of the insufficiency

of man. Rather, it is made up of men and women who, at least in their younger, more vigorous years, are very sure of themselves indeed. They have a long list of scientific triumphs to bolster their confidence; and each of those triumphs have opened up horizons that, to young eyes, seem limitless.

The material progress, and the promise of material progress, is enough to turn the heads of men standing on much more solid ground than do our moderns. The millenium seems just around the corner; the possibilities of progress infinite. In the exciting maze of detailed progress, no one has time to ask fundamental questions; there is so much for a man to do and so little time for the doing, why should anyone stop to ask reasons for the doing of the things that crowd a man's life today? To such men—young, vigorous, sure of themselves, riding a wave of triumph, stretching towards ever brighter and farther horizons—God is not a threat, He is an unnecessary encumbrance. It is pride, not fear, that will be the apostle's great enemy.

With this intellectual and moral background, the audience of the modern apostle will look out on the world with far different eyes than did the men and women of the Roman world. The idea of a superior and spiritual being will not be universal among these men; rather, it will quite likely be totally extraordinary. To a great extent, the idea of a Creator will be a religious luxury and a scientific absurdity. The world, to thousands of the modern apostle's contemporaries, will seem a self-sufficient, self-explanatory world, though the explanation still eludes the more violently curious who pester themselves with such unscientific questions. Men will not be tempted to look for the reasons of a beginning of things that are so fascinatingly diverse in their present manifestations.

The vague dismissal of the beginning is matched by the vague but general disinterest in the goal. The fact of order in the world men study is not likely to be denied; but attempt at its explanation, its meaning, will be shrugged off with considerable impatience. For this order is an order without intelligence;

an order extending to minutest details but not to the ends or goals which would give meaning to the whole. It is order, then, without meaning, without purpose; so it is the most chaotic thing that has entered into the ken of man—an order that is yet chaotic and utterly mad.

In completely brief summary, it should be evident that the world facing the modern apostle is much less ready for his message than the world of the original Apostles was for theirs, that the natural prerequisites for supernatural life are almost totally missing in the modern world. The wholesome grasp of the notion of God and of man has been so wholly lost that a proud, young, self-sufficient world feels it can do without God and can still base its pride on a caricature of men.

This still does not tell the whole story of the unprepared state of the audience of the modern apostle. There is yet another factor that might easily have been expected, since it follows so logically, but which is often overlooked in theoretical discussion; it is, however, immediately apparent in the concrete if any justice is done to the mind of the audience.

This factor is the effect on the minds of men of a steady diet of distorted notions of man and his powers. Thus, a completely honest man with an exclusively scientific background will present an intellectual stone wall to the message of the apostle, not because he will not listen but because he simply cannot follow that message. He has developed a blind spot that makes it next to impossible for him to follow the ordinary rational processes employed in philosophical or theological discussion. Even where the steps are made so small as to be almost mincing, and where he apparently follows each one, he is incapable of taking the last step to a certain conclusion, convinced that, since this is not a process of scientific observation, it must end in a mere assumption.

Something of the same nature will be true of very many others who have not such concentration on scientific methods as a source of the one-sided development of their minds. Unchallenged misinformation will have built up such a complete

wall against any other picture of man, or any means other than the experimental of arriving at truth, that they, too, are really incapable of following the apostle's message. Among the less educated, these intellectual blind spots will probably not exist. But the same result is effectively accomplished by a blind faith in pseudo-scientific philosophies and their sweeping dogmas, along with a very natural resentment at the discipline involved and the renunciations demanded for the wholeness of human life which the apostle is championing.

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From the point of view of the audience to be addressed, then, the twentieth century apostle in America faces a much more difficult task than met the eyes of the original twelve when they started out to conquer the world for Christ. What of the human instruments this modern apostle, like his original predecessors, must use: the written word, the spoken word, and the life-exposition of his message? The assumption of our times has been that the triumphs of science have so perfected these instruments of apostolicity that they more than balance the disadvantages that spring from the defects of the modern audience. Has that assumption any basis in fact?

Beyond question, the apostolic instruments have been tremendously improved since the days of the original Apostles. The written word can now be circulated cheaply, quickly, accurately, and in almost limitless volume. Nothing has been done, or can be done, to eliminate the slavish labor of writing; but everything has been done to do away with the limitations the age of the Apostles placed on the dispersal of the written message.

By means of the radio, the apostle's voice can penetrate to the farthest corners of the earth, into the deepest recesses of the homes of men, and with speed that is almost angelic. through recordings of the original broadcasts, the same wonder can be repeated again and again with no further effort; the apostle's voice can be made to ring out though he be thousands and thousands of miles away from the broadcasting station;

indeed, even after he is dead, his living voice can be made to resound throughout the limits of the world. All the limitations of the spoken word under which the original Apostles labored have been done away with except the obviously persistent obstacle of the diversity of language.

Even the life-exposition of his sacred message can be caught to some extent by the camera and exposed to the eyes of millions to whom the apostle could not possibly have come in person. His earnestness, his sincerity, the ringing conviction of his voice, the flash of his eyes, the power of his gestures can now be known directly by men and women to whom it was physically impossible for the apostle to come in person.

Yet, the actual condition of the audience to whom the modern apostle must speak and write has very nearly nullified these improvements in the instruments he will use. These apostolic weapons have been, in effect, reduced to defensive rather than apostolic, and so offensive, instruments. It is true that the spoken word today can hardly be escaped by the men of our time; but the completeness of the corruption of natural truths has rendered men, to all practical purposes, invulnerable to that spoken apostolic word. To the modern, it must seem that the apostle is speaking a totally foreign language. There hardly seems sufficient reason, in the modern's eyes, for the serious effort necessary to understand; besides, he is young, eager, hurried about a thousand details, and the future is so bright!

Undoubtedly this last war has opened the eyes of many a Catholic to the wall that stands between his mind and that of his educated contemporaries. Under the grim necessities of war, the fundamental questions of human life were pushed again and again before the minds of men; under those same grim demands, the Catholic was uprooted from his parochial life, his parish friends, and dropped into the midst of men to whom he was a stranger indeed. He discovered in astonishment that a simple, utterly logical, and essential truth cannot penetrate the fog that has descended on the minds of men; that honest, sincere, educated men surrender the terrific struggle to under-

stand a book that would be no more than slightly serious reading to freshmen in Catholic philosophy. It is not a matter of stubbornness, of insincerity, of prejudice, but of positive inability which is the fruit of the modern distortion of the minds of men.

The written word, despite the ease of its production and circulation, obviously faces the same difficulty of positive incomprehension. Moreover, it is easily escaped. Surely, there is nothing easier than turning one's back on a particular book where one is surrounded by millions of books on almost as many subjects; and books that are so much simpler to read because they have so little of profundity to make plain. Indeed, the proudly vigorous modern would almost have to be tied down to be made to read the kind of book he so badly needs. The apostle's written word is not read by the audience to whom he addresses it; the apostle's spoken word, if listened to, cannot, for the most part, be understood by the audience to whom he speaks.

The one apostolic instrument that has come down to us with its effectiveness comparatively unimpaired, perhaps even increased, is that of the life-exposition of the message of Christ by the apostle. It is still true that doubt and argument are difficult things to foster in the face of the factual evidence of this man's life. In fact, there is in the heart of every man a champion of all the apostle is advocating; for the apostle's life is a fulfillment of the desires that are at the root of all the efforts, the hopes, the struggles of men. Men know what they want when they see it before their very eyes in the life of another man. There is no obscurity about the desirability of such joy, such tranquillity, such invulnerable happiness, whatever repugnance there may be to the effort of such achievement.

The shock of the contrast between the life of this man and his contemporaries, between the orderly and eager pursuit of a goal worthy of the powers of a man and the meaningless round of routine days to no personal purpose, demands attention and inquiry. Even a deliberate effort to ignore this

startling thing, to brush it out of the mind, will hardly be successful for any length of time; it says too many things too deeply, things too much in accord with all a man desires, to be easily dodged. There is little or no escape from the drumming of its message. For an American, it has the supreme appeal: it actually works, for the full happiness of man.

By the same token, never before has an unworthy Catholic life done so much damage or faced such an accounting before the Judge of men. The Catholic whose morals are no better than those of the men of his time is, more than ever before, a diabolic agent achieving the very opposite of the apostle's goals. For the life-exposition of evil on the part of one who above all people in the world has reason for being holy leaves a swath of disillusionment, despair, or hopeless surrender behind it, a harvest of which the devil himself might well be jealous. His contemporaries might be excused on grounds of ignorance that could easily be invincible; not so the Catholic. The fact that he moves with the crowd of the men of his time will be small comfort; he should be in that crowd, but, whether he likes it or not, he is an apostle, an apostle of good or of evil.

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If the evidence submitted in this study be valid and the reasoning correct, the conclusions should be quite clear, and of considerable importance to apostolic activity. Obviously, the modern apostle should concentrate on the most intense and widespread use of his most effective instrument, i. e., his life-exposition of his apostolic message. That would mean that his own life, made a vivid portrayal of that message by the utmost in sanctity it is given him to achieve, should really be paraded before men. He must go to men since men probably will not come to him. Much more of his time should be spent in the marketplace, in the union halls, in conference places, in the outer world where men live their lives, than has been true in the past. The rectory should be much more of a central office and place of refuge (made necessary by human limitations) than a fortress wherein the apostle lives securely. It is much

too easy to go on the defensive, to hide his light under a bushel, to do only what the express demands of men make necessary, than it is for the apostle to go out among men, meet their constant rebuffs, amused tolerance, contemptuous misunderstanding, and even pity. Yet, it is precisely to men who will meet him thus that the apostle is sent.

Next, he must, obviously, multiply that life-exposition as far as lies in his power. He cannot be in two places at once, he cannot multiply his own life; but he can multiply that life-exposition of the divine message in the lives of the laity. He must, then, urge, indeed demand, an apostolic life from the Catholic laity. He must refuse to be content with, or condone, a defensive, mediocre, lukewarm Catholic life; he must not be apologetic in his wholehearted condemnation of the diabolic disasters wrought on the lives of others by unworthy Catholic lives. The very existence of such things is a graphic statement of failure in the past, for its roots are not to be found in defects of the laity so much as in their undernourishment by their pastors. For, surely, if there is apostolic life among the laity, it will be because, through the grace of God, some apostle has built it there, moulded that life by ceaseless labor and the intelligent modification of the very means which were used in building his own.

The apostolic written word has not, in our time, been limited in its genius, its persistence, or its volume. Rather, it has shown clear results of the hard labor which the divine love inspiring it dictated. Nevertheless the limitations of the written word in our time must be honestly faced. The fact that these limitations are not the fault of the apostle, nor the direct limitations flowing from this apostolic instrument of writing, do not in any way lessen the seriousness of such limitations from the apostle's point of view. They are the results of the defects of our age. Granted. But the point is that the apostolic efficiency of this instrument has been seriously lessened.

In the direction in which it has been used—the obvious apostolic direction of the unbelieving—the written word has

become steadily less effective, not by reason of intrinsic defects but because of the extrinsic deficiencies of the twentieth century. For apostolic purposes, it is not the instrument it used to be when men understood each other. Why not, then, admit this fact and limit its use in relation to unbelievers to the essential minimum of an apologetic which will be a kind of holding action while the forces of the really effective offense are steadily mounted? Why not throw its full force in the one direction where men are prepared for its effectiveness, i. e., in the direction of the faithful in order that through them men might really be reached? By such a stratagem, all of the faithful, all of them, could have opened to them the full richness of their Catholic heritage. They could thus have the full story of the triumphs and failures of the long life of the Church, and as a familiar, almost a homely, possession. They could know more intimately of the gallant risk of Catholic life, the depth and inviolability of the serene happiness of sanctity, the full labor and delight of prayer. The essential character of meditation and spiritual reading for full Christian living could then be given them as thoroughly as the Commandments are now. College graduates could have the same scientific grasp of their religion as they have of other college disciplines; they could, in other words, be equipped with the intellectual habit, the science, of theology and thus be prepared to think with the principles of their faith, and to educate themselves in still more intense and profound study of what is ultimately the principal interest of their lives. What is this, after all, but a multiplication of the apostle's life in the life of the laity, the multiplication of his most effective apostolic instrument?

The same thing should hold for the spoken word. We are not facing the facts if we pretend that the full power of the apostolic instruments has been turned in the direction of the faithful. Why not let this be the immediate object of the spoken and written word which serve it so well? Let the spoken word be a brand to set the faithful on fire rather than a spark to be snuffed out by the modern fog. Let it enflame the faithful

that in the light of their consuming love even the blind may see.

This is by no means a demand that we abandon the spoken and written word, nor that we in any way underestimate their importance. It is a demand that we evaluate them from the point of view of apostolic efficiency. It is a demand for a change in their direction, for a stop to the tremendous waste of apostolic effort and to the smug illusion of great things done because great efforts have been put forth. For the great things are not being done if, in our time and country, the nation becomes materialistic in masses while we have a trickle of converts.

It might be more truly objected that such a program as this reduces two of the prime apostolic instruments to secondary, even to indirect, roles. Let it be understood, however, that even this involves no change in the prime object of apostolic labors, no abandonment of the millions who have not heard of Christ, no turning the eyes away from the fields that await the harvester. Quite the contrary. If these apostolic instruments of the spoken and written word are in fact ineffectual as direct apostolic instruments in our time precisely because of the defects of our age, why should they continue to be used as though they were effective direct instruments? Is it more apostolic to cherish means which no longer achieve the end so effectively? Why not concentrate on an instrument which will better penetrate the armor of the twentieth century? There is a thrill of power in the use of the spoken word, an aura of fame and glory in the written word, even when these things are ineffective. Perhaps that deceives us. On the other hand, in the life-exposition there is enough of pain and divine joy to protect the apostle from the false values of the world in which he must live and labor; and this apostolic instrument is at its highest effectiveness. The apostle is not dedicated to his instruments, but to the men for whom he burns out his life, whatever the instrument of the burning.

Recently, the written word has been singularly effective, not

when it exposed a doctrine, but when it portrayed a life. These apostolic instruments of the spoken and written word are of inestimable value to the apostle where they are used immediately as a means to multiplying his own life-exposition of the apostolic message in the lives of the faithful. Perhaps this conclusion could be stated more briefly, and no less adequately, by saying that in our century the apostolic mantle has fallen on the shoulders of the laity as well as of the clergy through the nullification of the means of communication of truth. The clerical apostle labors as much through the faithful as through his own life. It is his special duty in his twentieth century labors to make that mantle fit the shoulders of the laity more perfectly that it may be worn proudly, even gaily.

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## THE CASE FOR CONFIRMATION

660

**T**HAT a sacrament should need defense is not a matter for leisurely discussion but for immediate attention. It was just such practical attention which the sacrament of Confirmation received from the Fathers at the Council of Trent. There the first complete and definitive case for Confirmation was written. Against the attacks of the reformers, the Council defined Confirmation to be a sacrament of the New Law, instituted by Christ, which confers grace upon the recipient who places no obstacle to grace; it likewise impresses a character upon the soul.<sup>1</sup> All this was clear enough. It definitely declared the doctrine of the Church. Yet it did leave room for and, in time, even a demand for another kind of defense. This case would be directed not against those outside the Church but to those within. It would be directed not against denial but rather against indifference. Its aim would not be retraction but rather appreciation. That is exactly the case presented for Confirmation by the Church today.

Let us put it in another way. If—by an impossible hypothesis—it were within the power of men to fix the number of the sacraments, and if, in such a case, it were thought necessary to drop one of the seven sacraments, an overwhelming vote would nominate Confirmation to bow out of the sacramental system. It seems that this is the sacrament which men could do most easily without. The absolute necessity of Baptism and Penance, and the utility of Extreme Unction are borne in upon Catholics in their daily lives. They are almost bound to appreciate the intrinsic beauty and value of the Eucharist, of Matrimony and of Holy Orders. But Confirmation leaves them more than a little nonplussed and unappreciative. The ordinary Catholic can well appreciate the reception of Christ in the

<sup>1</sup> Cf. Denziger, *Enchiridion Symbolorum* (Freiburg i. Br: 1932), 849, 852.

Holy Eucharist but is more than a little vague about the reception of the Holy Ghost in Confirmation.

This outlook is not due to the fact that Christ did not confer Confirmation, but promised the Paraclete to His apostles and disciples. It is not because this sacrament did not receive its proper name until the fifth century, nor merely because the matter and form of the sacrament are not to be discovered in the pages of Sacred Scripture. It is rather because this sacrament is aimed at making apostles, that its very aim is the apostolate; and there are so very few apostles. The reason why the average Catholic is unappreciative of the grace of this sacrament is because he has not found it necessary to call upon it to come surging into his soul. The reason why he has not found it necessary is that he had not found himself at odds with the world and its spirit; because the enemies of Christ and His Church have had no reason to look upon him as an adversary. In other words, his way of life has not been Catholic enough or Christlike enough for him to see the real opposition between himself and the world, whereas Christ had practically ordered him to find not only opposition, but even contradiction and persecution.

There is something very special about this sacrament. It was promised by Christ as a sort of spiritual culmination of the gifts the apostles had already received.<sup>2</sup> It was a very solemn promise, solemn in time, in manner, and in its absolute importance. Moreover the preparation demanded by Christ was much more formal than for any other of His gifts to them. It certainly was placed as a crisis in their lives, a sort of turning point in their careers. Fear and cowardice were forgivable in them during Christ's passion, but hardly after His Ascension. The whole world hung in a balance while they huddled together in the upper room waiting and praying. Would they go out of their retreat willingly, even boldly, to do work they had been given to do, or would the Jews have to track them down, haul them out, and put them to death for being the friends of the

<sup>2</sup> *Acts*, iv, 8; *John*, xvi, 13.

crucified Christ? The Holy Ghost settled that issue as He settled many another for them. It was then and only then that they began to merit their glorious title of "apostles." There is no avoiding the issue that the descent of the Holy Ghost on Pentecost was clearly and definitely tied up with the mission of the whole Church—the apostolate.

Nor was this gift intended only for the Apostles. The effects of the descent of the Holy Ghost were to be as common in the Church as the sacrament of Confirmation. St. Thomas teaches this explicitly and his doctrine is confirmed by the Church: "Christ, by the power which He exercises in the sacraments, bestowed on the apostles the reality of this sacrament, i. e., the fullness of the Holy Ghost, without the sacrament itself, because they had received the first fruits of the Spirit (Rom. viii, 23). . . . Again the Holy Ghost came down on the apostles in the shape of a tongue. Which refers to the same signification as balm: except in so far as the tongue communicates with others by speech, but balm, by its odor; because, to wit, the apostles were filled with the Holy Ghost, as teachers of the Faith; but the rest of the believers, as doing that which gives edification to the faithful."<sup>3</sup> There were none of the faithful who escaped the fiery tongues, none who escaped this power from on high, none who avoided the obligation consequent upon this gift—the apostolate. This was the birthday of the Church, and it was marked by the mobilization of the infant Church to battle.

From the early patristic ages, the exact function of this sacrament provided matter for speculation and controversy. Since it was ordinarily conferred immediately after Baptism, this question bothered the Fathers: "What effects should be attributed to each of the sacraments of the Christian initiation?"<sup>4</sup> If Baptism is completely efficacious in producing the new man, what need is there for Confirmation? Even in the analogy of

<sup>3</sup> *Summa Theol.*, III, q. 72, a. 2, ad 1um.

<sup>4</sup> Tertullian, *De Baptismo*, vii, in *PL* I, 1206-07; Cyprian, *Epistolae*, in *PL*, III, 1115; Augustine, *Sermo CCXXVII*, in *PL* XXXVIII, 1100; *De Baptismo* iii, 16, in *PL* XLIII, 149; Cyril of Jerusalem, *Catech.*, xxi, 3, in *PG* XXXIII, 1091-92.

St. Thomas there seems to be a decided limp when he describes the effects of Confirmation. "Now the life of the body is perfected directly in three ways. First by generation whereby a man begins to be and to live: and corresponding to this in the spiritual life there is Baptism, which is a spiritual regeneration. . . . Secondly, by growth whereby a man is brought to perfect size and strength: and corresponding to this in the spiritual life there is Confirmation, in which the Holy Ghost is given to strengthen us."<sup>5</sup> In other words, it seems that there is an element of extravagance here. For the child, once it has life, will grow and become strong if given healthful food and the proper care. All that this sacrament should confer is what would be achieved just as well through frequent reception of the Holy Eucharist. If this sacrament merely confirms and strengthens the spiritual organism received in Baptism, it does seem to be a bit of divine extravagance.

Yet we know that what appears to be extravagance on the part of God is never really so; it is only our own inability to grasp the wide horizons of God's providence and His aims for His spouse, the Church. St. Thomas gives us the roots of a solution. But they are just that, roots, solid, practical and living. They still require no little care and cultivation in order to bring them to the full flower of their splendor. The maturing of these roots has been provided by the many papal encyclicals which demand that the faithful begin to recognize their duties.<sup>6</sup>

<sup>5</sup> *Summa Theol.*, III, q. 65, a. 1.

<sup>6</sup> Leo XIII, Encyclical *Sapientiae Christianae*, Jan. 10, 1890: The ministry of preaching, or teaching, belongs by divine right to the Masters 'whom the Holy Spirit has constituted Bishops, to govern the Church of God'; but none the less let no one think that it is forbidden to private persons to cooperate diligently with this ministry. . . . When occasion demands it, these cannot indeed play the 'doctor' but can communicate to others the truths that they have learned, and become as it were the echo of the voice of their Masters. Cf. *Summa Theol.*, II-IIae, q. 3, a. 2, ad 2um; Pius X, Encyclical *Il Fermo Proposito*; Pius XI, Encyclical *Ubi Arcano*; Letter addressed to Cardinal Bertram, A. A. S. 1928, p. 384; Letter addressed to Cardinal Segura, A. A. S. 1929, p. 664; Letter addressed to the Bishops of Argentine, *Bonne Press Collection*, p. 393; Letter addressed to the Patriarch of Lisbon, A. A. S. 1934, p. 628; Pius XII, Encyclical *Mystici Corporis*.

The key is found in the following passage of the *Summa Theologica*:

The sacraments of the New Law are ordained unto special effects of grace: and therefore where there is a special effect of grace, there we find a special sacrament ordained for the purpose. But since sensible and material things bear a likeness to things spiritual and intelligible, from what occurs in the life of the body, we can perceive that which is special to the spiritual life. Now it is evident that in the life of the body a certain special perfection consists in man's attaining to the perfect age, and being able to perform actions of a man; hence the Apostle says (I Cor. xiii, 11): When I became a man, I put away the things of a child. And thence it is that besides the movement of generation whereby man receives life of the body, there is a movement of growth, whereby man is brought to the perfect age. So therefore does man receive spiritual life in Baptism which is spiritual regeneration; while in Confirmation man arrives at the perfect age, as it were, of the spiritual life.<sup>7</sup>

In this transition from childhood to adulthood St. Thomas finds two definite changes, the putting away of some things and the acceptance of others. That the confirmed is more perfectly likened to Christ is apparent from his comparison of the confirmed in a special way to Christ, the Head of the Mystical Body. Since the Head is full of grace and truth, the confirmed bear a special resemblance to Him, for their portion is a fullness of grace.<sup>8</sup> But even this distinction between the baptized and the confirmed is by no means clear. An increase in grace can be received in the reception of the other sacraments, thus bringing the member to a closer conformity to his Head. We have yet to see what the baptized puts away when he becomes a spiritual adult. What is there that is an essential part of the man but has no place in the child? St. Thomas finds the answer in breadth of outlook, responsibility, and action.

In this sacrament the fullness of the Holy Ghost is given for the spiritual strength which belongs to the perfect age. Now when

<sup>7</sup> *Summa Theol.*, III, q. 72, a. 1.

<sup>8</sup> *Summa Theol.*, III, q. 72, a. 1, ad 4um: Illi qui confirmationem accipiunt, quae est sacramentum plenitudinis gratiae, Christo conformantur, in quanto ipse a primo instanti suae conceptionis fuit plenus gratiae et veritatis.

man comes to perfect age he begins at once to have intercourse with others; whereas until then he lives an individual life, as it were, confined to himself.<sup>8a</sup>

But it is evident, from a comparison with the life of the body, that the action which is proper to man immediately after birth is different from the action which is proper to him when he has come to perfect age. And therefore by the sacrament of Confirmation man is given a spiritual power in respect of sacred actions other than those in respect of which he receives in Baptism. For in Baptism he receives power to do those things which pertain to his own salvation, forasmuch as he lives to himself; whereas in Confirmation he receives power to do those things which pertain to the spiritual combat with the enemies of the Faith.<sup>9</sup>

It is a mistake too often made, to attempt to describe the actions proper to children and adults in the spiritual sense, apart from the mystical body of Christ. It is only in the light of that doctrine that we can begin to evaluate their respective spheres of operation with any clarity. Otherwise we easily fall into the false position of considering the confirmed as a special, elect and select group in the Church. This is a mistake.

In describing the mystical body of Christ, St. Thomas has this to say: "The difference of states and duties in the Church regards three things. In the first place it regards the perfection of the Church. For even as in the order of natural things, perfection, which in God is simple and uniform, is not to be found in the created universe except in a multiform and manifold manner, so too, the fullness of grace, which is centered in Christ as head, flows forth to His members in various ways, for the perfecting of the body of the Church."<sup>10</sup> Because the confirmed have received a certain fullness of grace, they are most closely likened to Christ, the Head of the Body. This fullness is not possessed by the baptized and hence this basic difference, which will always be present in the Church, manifests its beauty. There will always be the men and the boys, the women and the girls in the supernatural family, just as there are in the natural

<sup>8a</sup> *Summa Theol.*, III, q. 72, a. 2.

<sup>9</sup> *Summa Theol.*, III, q. 72, a. 5.

<sup>10</sup> *Summa Theol.*, II-II, q. 183, a. 2.

family. And this very diversity contributes to the perfection of the Church.

While these two states exist in the Church and will continue as long as the Church, yet they are really not opposed, any more than the man is opposed to the boy, or the woman to the girl. They are different only in the way in which childhood and manhood, dependence and independence, weakness and strength can be opposed in the same individual.<sup>11</sup> The confirmed do not compose a small, select group in the Church, as do the ordained clergy, but are rather the normal majority in that body. As the child looks forward to growing up, so too the baptized is on his way to becoming a man, for it is the intention of nature to bring each one to its normal perfection in age and strength, even though this intention is sometimes hindered by reason of the corruptibility of the body. Yet, even more so, it must be God's intention to perfect the body of the Church by bringing its members to that spiritual age which is perfect.<sup>12</sup> Confirmation is not intended for the few, but for all. The mystical body must have a majority of mature members who have the fullness of Christ, through the reception of this sacrament. Even if the mystical body were completely made up of the spiritually mature there would still be a diversity of operation among its members, as St. Paul clearly says.<sup>13</sup>

The essential difference between the confirmed and the bap-

<sup>11</sup> *Summa Theol.*, III, q. 72, a. 8, ad 1um; Hoc sacramentum datur ad quamdam excellentiam, non quidem unius hominem ad alium, sicut sacramentum ordinis, sed hominis ad seipsum, sicut idem perfectus vir existens habet excellentiam ad se puerum.

<sup>12</sup> *Summa Theol.*, III, q. 72, a. 8: Per hoc sacramentum promovetur homo spiritualiter in aetatem perfectam. Hoc autem est de intentione naturae ut omnis qui corporaliter nascitur, ad perfectam aetatem perveniat; sed hoc quandoque impeditur propter corruptibilitatem corporis, quod morte preevenitur. Multo autem magis de intentione Dei est omnia ad perfectionem perducere ex cuius imitatione hoc natura participat.

<sup>13</sup> *Summa Theol.*, II-II, q. 183, a. 2: Oportet autem ad diversas actiones diversos homines deputari, ad hoc quod expeditius et sine confusione omnia peragantur. Et hoc est quod Apostolus dicit (Rom. xii, 4, 5) "Sicut in uno corpore multa membra habemus, omnia autem membra non eundem actum habent; ita multi unum corpus sumus in Christo!"

tized seems to be in the social character of the outlook, responsibility, and action of the confirmed and the individual character of outlook, responsibility, and action in the baptized. Since the baptized lives more for himself, his attention will hardly go far beyond his individual needs. That is exactly what we expect from children; they spend their childhood in receiving. But what is expected in children, and what in no way impedes the the perfection of the family, would be lethal if carried on into adult years. The family and the state would be peopled by grown-up babies, who either could not or would not accept responsibility. If they should exist in a sufficient number, the family and the state would come to the verge of collapse. There would be no peace because no order; and there would be no order because there would be no regard for others.

The drastic change in outlook that must come to the adult derives from the fact that he becomes perceptive of others and of their rights and above all of the common good of the community. He begins to see his own life and his own rights in their almost constant contact with and influence on the lives of others. He becomes in a very definite manner a public individual inasmuch as he begins to take an active interest in the common good. In the supernatural community, this order and peace is conserved by the Holy Spirit. "Just as in the natural body the various members are held together in unity by the power of the quickening spirit, and are dissociated from one another as soon as the spirit departs, so too in the Church's body the peace of the various members is preserved by the power of the Holy Spirit, Who quickens the body of the Church."<sup>14</sup>

To conceive the body of the Church as made up of a predominance of spiritual children would leave us only one conclusion—that the body would suffer. The Holy Ghost will not allow this condition to become a reality for it is not the normal condition of the body. If, as St. Thomas says, the baptized live primarily for themselves, the multiplication of the

<sup>14</sup> *Ibid.*, ad 3um.

baptized would lead only to a schism of individualism in the body of Christ. It would mean that, although bound to Christ and to His body by the ties of faith and charity, the members of the Church would live on in the Church as children. They would definitely lack that mature and seasoned outlook that is proper to the adult, the responsible citizen. The citizen must not seek his own good apart from the common good but he should love his individual good in subordinating it to the common good. St. Thomas compares the mystical body to the state in describing the effects of selfish action on the part of the members. "A man departs from this unity of spirit when he seeks his own; just as in an earthly kingdom peace ceases when citizens seek each man his own. Besides, the peace both of mind and of an earthly commonwealth is better preserved by a distinction of duties and states, since thereby the greater number have a share in public actions."<sup>15</sup> It is precisely to give the members of the body a share in public actions that Confirmation was instituted, for this is one of the effects attributed to it. The consecration of Confirmation is a certain deputation to public acts.<sup>16</sup>

It is one of the most striking characteristics of lack of maturity, expected in children but not in adults, that they are incapable of or unwilling to accept responsibility. There is no room for such in the mystical body of Christ; it is strictly a community, a supernatural family, whose whole character is militant. It has no desire nor intention of sending boys on the errands of men. That is why the consecration of Confirmation is perfective of the whole body of the Church. That is why every reception of Confirmation is in a very true sense a renewal of Pentecost, not only for the recipient but for the whole Church; it should pull a man out of himself and dedicate him to the common good, to the apostolate, not as a matter of oppor-

<sup>15</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>16</sup> *IV. Sent.*, d. 7, q. 2, q. 1, ad 3um: *Potestas characteris hujus est potestas activa, non ad conferendum spiritualia quod est ordinis, sed magis ad conferendum publice; et ideo confirmatus non constituitur in gradu alicujus ordinis, quia nullus ei subjicitur in receptione divinorum ab ipso.*

tunity or predilection, but rather as a matter of obligation. It is, then, only in the terms of the whole mystical Christ, and the continuation of the aims of the Incarnation through that body, that Confirmation becomes clearly intelligible, not as a mark of Divine extravagance, but as a sacrament which produces mature members of the mystical body. Pope Pius XII has summed all this up in a few words: "By the chrism of Confirmation, the faithful are given added strength to protect and defend the Church, their Mother, and the faith she has given them."<sup>17</sup>

Faced with the wreckage of modern paganism, an almost unbroken line of Popes have issued call after call to the laity to enter into the battle for Christ.<sup>17a</sup> As Pope Pius XI himself admitted, his definition of Catholic Action<sup>18</sup> was arrived at not without divine inspiration. In this, a new order was established; the course was set first, and then the theologians began to consider the dogmatic foundations for this apostolic activity on the part of the laity. Certainly, from the Council of Trent until the time of Pope Leo XIII there was little real interest evidenced by theologians in this sacrament. It was even charged that Confirmation was playing a continually diminishing role in the sacramental hierarchy of the Catholic Church. Today there is no room or occasion for making such an assertion. Today this sacrament is coming more into its own because today the real spirit of the Church, the militant spirit, is being reawakened. Today the confirmed are less inclined to see their consecration merely in the terms of their own private warfare against the world, the flesh, and the devil, and are more inclined to recognize their responsibility to the Church.

<sup>17</sup> Pius XII, Encyclical *Mystici Corporis* (N. C. W. C. ed.), p. 14.

<sup>17a</sup> Cf. fn. 6 above.

<sup>18</sup> In a discourse to the Young Women's Section of the Catholic Action of Italy, March 28, 1927, the Holy Father affirmed that his definition of Catholic Action as "the participation of the laity in the apostolate of the Church's hierarchy" was given "after due thought, deliberately, indeed, one may say, not without divine inspiration." Cf. Civardi, *Manual of Catholic Action*, p. 6.

That the sacrament of Confirmation has a double effect was defined by the Council of Trent. These effects are intimately connected with the office and obligation of the confirmed. Through an analysis of these effects, sacramental grace and the character, the precise value and importance of this sacrament in the Christian life may be more lucidly demonstrated.

It is perhaps one of the most profound truths of Catholic doctrine that the faithful are bound to Christ not merely by the corruptible bonds of faith and charity, but also by a purely objective and incorruptible bond, called the "character." This effect, a certain indelible sign imprinted upon the soul, is peculiar to those sacraments which constitute the recipient in a certain and definite state. These sacraments are Baptism, Confirmation, and Holy Orders. According to St. Thomas the character is the *sacramentum et res* of these sacraments. These are distinctive marks but, more than that, the character is a certain spiritual power ordained unto things pertaining to divine worship.<sup>18a</sup> The character of Baptism marks the recipient and sets him apart from the non-baptized, and moreover it confers upon him the power to receive the other sacraments of the Church. This power is passive as is in keeping with the condition of the baptized—one but newly born to the divine life in the mystical body of Christ. The character of Orders, on the other hand, is active; it pertains to the sacramental agents. This is the instrumental power by which priests are set apart as "other Christs" with the power to confer the sacraments on others. In this character, men most perfectly are conformed to Christ, the Priest.

Secondly, each of the faithful is deputed to receive, or to bestow on others, things pertaining to the worship of God. And this, properly speaking, is the purpose of the sacramental character.

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<sup>18a</sup> *Summa. Theol.*, III, q. 63, a. 2: *Divinus cultus consistit vel in recipiendo aliqua divina, vel in tradendo aliis. Ad utrumque autem horum requiritur quaedam potentia; nam ad tradendum aliquid aliis requiritur quaedam potentia activa: ad accipiendo autem requiritur potentia passiva. Et ideo character importat quamdam potentiam spiritualem ordinatam ad ea quae sunt divini cultus.*

Now the whole rite of the Christian religion is derived from Christ's priesthood. Consequently, it is clear that the sacramental character is specially the character of Christ, to Whose character the faithful are likened by reason of the sacramental characters, which are nothing else than certain participations of Christ's priesthood, flowing from Christ Himself.<sup>19</sup>

Thus through this objective, almost cold-blooded order, of the character, St. Thomas saw the effects of Christ's passion being validly applied and validly received down the ages. As the Great High Priest, Christ offered Himself as the perfect victim on Calvary. It is by Baptism that men begin to be sharers in the first fruits of Christ's passion and death but, more than that, with Baptism they assumed certain obligations along with that passive power. For if the character of Baptism renders them capable of receiving the other sacraments, there is implied an obligation to receive them. Since the priest has power over the mystical body precisely because Orders gives him power over the real body of Christ, it is evident that this power flows in a particular way from the sacrificial death of Christ. The power to consecrate the real body of Christ is the root of the priestly powers, and in that act he continues the sacrifice of Calvary in an unbloody manner. All this is clear enough. These two spiritual powers, participations in the priesthood of Christ, continue each in its own way the work of Redemption. For the baptized the obligation is personal, for the priest it is public. The baptized lives more for himself, to receive the other sacraments validly and fruitfully and thus to grow in the body of Christ, but the priest does not possess the sacerdotal power or sacerdotal obligation for himself alone. He is strictly a public person, dedicated to public acts. He is a priest, not for himself, but for others. The spiritual welfare of the body of Christ is his obligation.<sup>20</sup> So the character of Baptism is a passive power; that of Orders an active one.

<sup>19</sup> *Ibid.*, a. 3.

<sup>20</sup> *Summa Theol.*, III, q. 65, a. 1; *Perficitur autem homo in ordine ad totam communitatem dupliciter:—uno modo per hoc quod accipit potestatem regendi multitudinem, et exercendi actus publicos; et loco hujus in spirituali vita est sacramentum ordinis.*

This seems to be a complete order, sufficient for the needs of the body of Christ. What power is yet to be given, what obligation resulting from that power is yet to be assumed? In other words, is there any real reason for the existence of still another character of Confirmation? That there is such a character is a matter of faith, but where does it fit into this scheme of things, into this broad plan of the economy of salvation? Again we meet an apparent mark of divine extravagance. If Baptism consecrates the layman and Orders consecrates the priest, what other state is left in the mystical body which demands a special, permanent power? What more is demanded according to the rite of the Christian religion which had its origin in the sacrifice of the Cross, which laymen can do with the definite stamp of Christ-like legality about it?

The solution to this problem should be more or less obvious from the foregoing analysis of the general effects of the sacrament. Baptism consecrates the child of God, not the man of God. This latter is the particular and special effect of the consecration of Confirmation. This is the fullness of power which the baptized is empowered and obligated to receive, if he is to take his rightful place in the Church. This is the perfect work, begun in Baptism and brought to consummation in Confirmation. The character which it impresses is not active in the sense that the character of Orders is active; nor is it passive in the sense that the character of Baptism is passive. The words of St. Thomas in different places indicate this. In one place he relates the character of Confirmation to that of Baptism: "While the sacrament of Baptism pertains to recipients. . . . In a way Confirmation also is ordained for the same purpose, as we shall see in its proper place."<sup>21</sup> In this way,

<sup>21</sup> *Summa Theol.*, III, q. 63, a. 6. Cajetan (*Commentarium in Summam Sancti Thomae*, III, q. 72, a. 5), concludes that the character of Confirmation is the perfection of the baptismal character and hence is as passive as that of Baptism. However this doctrine is opposed by most of the other commentators. Cf. Salmantenses, *Cursus Theologicus*, IX, "De Sacramentis tract. 22, disp. 5, dub. 2, no. 44; John of St. Thomas, *Cursus Theologicus* (Paris, 1886) IX, 153, 358; Gonet, J. B., *Clypeus Theologiae* (Cologne, 1677), VI, disp. 4, 86.

it is not difficult to see the passive character of Confirmation operating in this manner. It empowers the confirmed not merely to receive Penance, the Eucharist, Matrimony, but it empowers them in a special way, which is in conformity with the mature member of the body of Christ.

However it is the active aspect of this character which seems to be the more important. Here St. Thomas relates this character to that of Orders inasmuch as both are conferred by the Bishop: "By Order and Confirmation the faithful of Christ are deputed to certain special duties; and this can be done by the prince alone. Consequently the conferring of these sacraments belongs exclusively to a bishop, who is, as it were, a prince of the Church."<sup>22</sup> The special duties to which the confirmed are deputed and which are outside the province of the baptized are summed up by St. Thomas in the rather terse words, "in Confirmation a man receives the power to do those things which are related to spiritual warfare against the enemies of the faith."<sup>23</sup> So, Confirmation does more than merely prepare the baptized to live more fully the sacramental life of the Church; it turns his attention outside himself. He is now a mature citizen; now he must begin to communicate with others in his actions. He may no longer be concerned only with his own spiritual welfare. A new and larger horizon has been opened. Now he must seek his own good in subordination to the common good of the whole community.

The consecration of the confirmed is really the consecration of the soldier of Christ, but not in the sense that the soldiers are a select group. The whole character and spirit of the Church, the body of Christ, is militant. Every adult member is by the fact of membership, called to be a soldier. And of course, no soldier is a private citizen—he is a representative of the whole community. He is made a soldier not to better defend his own life, but rather to even invite destruction to himself in order to protect the whole community. His defense

<sup>22</sup> *Summa Theol.*, III, q. 65, a. 3, ad 2um.

<sup>23</sup> *Ibid.*, q. 72, a. 5.

of himself is ordered to the good of the community. This is the office of the soldier, who has received his consecration in Confirmation. This is to be his life and his work, to which he is dedicated irrevocably by the character of the sacrament. He bears in his soul both the power and the obligation. His military work bears an official stamp about it—the stamp of the priesthood of Christ. “All the sacraments are protestations of faith. Therefore just as he who is baptized receives the power of testifying to his faith by receiving the other sacraments; so he who is confirmed receives the power of publicly confessing his faith by words, as it were *ex officio*.”<sup>24</sup> Yet it is a common mistake of limited vision to reduce this confession of faith solely to that made under the threat of death. St. Thomas indicates the breadth of its scope: “The confession of faith does not consist only in protestation by word, but also in protestation by deed.”<sup>25</sup>

It is a fact of the Christian life, that all members of the body of Christ are obliged to wage spiritual warfare against the invisible and personal enemies of faith and salvation. This is an elemental test of membership in the body of Christ; this is required even of the baptized. But if public profession of faith is required of the baptized, it still lacks the official stamp. Even here he acts as a child, even though as a thoroughly courageous one. He must accept such a challenge even at the cost of his life, for this external profession is a test of his loyalty to Christ. He must judge that even death in union with Christ is preferable to life without that friendship. This would be primarily a personal battle, forced upon the child, who must grab for the best arms available. It is quite different from the studied and planned program of attack in which the soldier participates. St. Thomas sums all this up briefly: “All have to wage the spiritual combat with our invisible enemies. But to fight against visible foes, *viz.*, against the persecutors of the faith, by confessing Christ’s name, belongs to the confirmed, who have already come spiritually to the age of virility. . . . And there-

<sup>24</sup> *Ibid.*, ad 2um.

<sup>25</sup> *Ibid.*, II-II, q. 14, a. 1, ad 1um.

fore the character of Confirmation is a distinctive sign, not between unbelievers and believers, but between those who are grown up spiritually and those of whom it is written: "As new-born babes (I Pet. ii, 2)." <sup>26</sup> Thus the distinctive quality that distinguishes the confirmed from the baptized is the official character with which they carry out their duties. The confirmed are public persons, whose primary obligation is the common good; the baptized, when forced to perform actions which are outside their normal competence act primarily for themselves. Thus even in the protestation of faith found in the reception of each sacrament, the primary intent of the baptized is his own spiritual welfare, and secondarily its effect on the common good of the whole body.

If the character of Confirmation establishes the members of the Church as official warriors in the defense of the faith, then it must be the work of the sacramental grace of this sacrament to make them competent spiritually to fulfill their obligations to the body of Christ. There can be no doubt that this sacrament brings to the members of Christ a great increase in sanctifying grace.<sup>27</sup> Moreover it has, like all the sacraments, its own specific grace, called sacramental; this is the fullness of grace which is the heritage of all members. This particular grace has a two-fold effect. It is aimed first of all at the removal of the "occupational weakness" which is found in all the newly born —the baptized.<sup>28</sup> But, further than this, like all sacramental grace, it is ordained to the perfection of the soul in those things which pertain to the worship of God in regard to the Christian religion.<sup>29</sup> It is not difficult to see that since the character is a

<sup>26</sup> *Summa Theol.*, II, q. 72, a. 5, ad 1um.

<sup>27</sup> *Ibid.*, a. 7: *Missio seu datio Spiritus Sancti non est nisi cum gratia gratum faciente. Unde manifestum est quod gratia gratum faciens confertur in hoc sacramento.*

<sup>28</sup> *Ibid.*, q. 65, a. 1: *Ex his etiam patet sacramentorum numerus, secundum quod ordinantur contra defectum peccati. . . . Confirmatio contra infirmitatem animi, quae in nuper natis invenitur.*

<sup>29</sup> *Ibid.*, q. 62, a. 5: *Gratia sacramentalis ad duo praecipue ordinari videtur; videlicet ad tollendos defectus praeteritorum peccatorum . . . et iterum ad per-*

certain participation of the priesthood of Christ and since by His Passion Christ inaugurated the Rite of the Christian religion, this sacramental grace is directed toward the perfecting of the soldier of Christ. This ensures him that strength and courage necessary to confess his faith in the sign of his redemption. This is not merely a peripheral change but a radical transformation. This sacrament reaches deep into the soul to give it a seasoning and hardening effect which transforms the youth into the soldier. It makes fortitude and bravery in the Christian life a general, a normal condition. This bravery takes on something of the divine courage manifested so splendidly by Christ on the Cross. It is in the likeness of Christ crucified, that the confirmed must carry on his apostolate.<sup>30</sup> In this it is not difficult to see the cross as the touchstone of the confirmed. By His victory on the cross Christ came into His Kingdom;<sup>31</sup> with that same sign of the cross made upon his forehead by the bishop, the Catholic is conscripted as a true soldier of His crucified King.

St. Thomas relates the sacrament of Confirmation to the virtue of fortitude. Yet it seems that since the confirmed is brought into such a warfare for the cross of Christ something of that splendid divine courage must be a part of his supernatural equipment. This would be achieved through the gift of fortitude. "The truth of the matter is that in conquering the difficulties and in surmounting the dangers and perils which

ficiendam animam in his quae pertinent a cultum Dei secundum religionem vitae christianaee.

<sup>30</sup> *Ibid.*, q. 72, a. 4, ad 3um: Sed hoc sacramentum non solum ordinatur ad hoc quod sanctificetur in seipso, sed exponitur eidam pugnae exteriori; et ideo non solum fit mentio de interiori sanctificatione, cum dicitur: Confirmo te chrismate salutis, sed etiam consignatur homo exteriorius quasi vexillo crucis ad pugnam spiritualem, quod significatur cum dicitur: Consigno te signo crucis; cf. *Summa Contra Gentes*, IV, cap. 60: Et quia pugnantes sub aliquo principe ejus insignia deferunt, hi qui confirmationis sacramentum suscipiunt, signo Christi insigniuntur, videlicet signo crucis, quo pugnavit et vicit; Alexander of Hales, *Summa Theologica*, IV, q. ix, m. 2, a. 2; Pius XII, *Mystici Corporis*, No. 77, p. 48.

<sup>31</sup> *Summa Theol.*, III, q. 42, a. 1: Quia Christus per crucis victoriam meruit potestatem et dominium super gentes.

surround the pursuit of eternal life, virtues founded on human standards would fail because of the weakness of the individual. Accordingly, the gift of fortitude is necessary for acting in a higher way and for using divine power as one's own.”<sup>32</sup> Certainly St. Thomas teaches that the gifts of the Holy Ghost are received in Baptism,<sup>33</sup> and Pope Leo XIII taught this as at least the more probable doctrine.<sup>34</sup> Yet, Confirmation is the sacrament which confers the plenitude of the Holy Ghost. It is, then, not at all rash to see in this fullness of grace a great enlivening and enlightening through the activity of the Holy Ghost, with a resultant a marvellous increase in the gifts themselves.

The effects of this sacrament have been very graphically sketched in the Acts of the Apostles. How can one better explain the effect of the divine fire from heaven upon the Apostles and disciples on that first Pentecost, than through the fact that they were using divine power in place of their own? This too must be the gift which marks the reception of Confirmation as a renewal of Pentecost for the Church and for the recipient. The most extraordinary effects accompanied the reception of the Holy Ghost in apostolic times. These were known as the “charisms.” They were glaringly manifest as effects of the descent of the Holy Ghost, on Pentecost; they were evident when the Apostles imposed hands upon the new Christians. They seemed then to be standard equipment for the apostolate. Thus these Christians bore upon their work a divine

<sup>32</sup> John of St. Thomas, “The Gifts of the Holy Ghost,” *THE THOMIST*, IX (1946), p. 290.

<sup>33</sup> *Summa Theol.*, I-II, q. 68, a. 5: *Sicut virtutes morales connectuntur sibi invicem in prudentia, ita dona Spiritus Sancti connectuntur sibi invicem in charitate: ita scilicet quod qui charitatem habet, omnia dona Spiritus Sancti habeat, quoram nullum sine charitate haberi potest.*

<sup>34</sup> Pope Leo XIII, in encyclical *Divinum Illud*: *Certum quidem est, in ipsis etiam hominibus justis qui ante Christum fuerunt, insedisse per gratiam Spiritum Sanctum, quemad modum de prophetis . . . quippe in Pentecoste non ita se Spiritus Sanctus tribuit, ut tunc primum esse sanctorum inhabitator inciperet, sed ut copiosus inundaret, cumulans sua dona, non inchoans, nec ideo novus opere, quia ditione largitatem!*

stamp of approval which all could witness. The charisms are strictly public property in the sense that they were not given for personal sanctification, nor as a reward for individual merit, but only for the common good. St. Thomas lucidly explains the purpose of these graces, and shows how each of them fulfilled in a very special way its task of assisting in the apostolate.<sup>35</sup>

Yet these gifts were extrinsic and accidental to the essential effects of the sacrament. The confirmed do not leave the altar rail these days speaking with tongues or prophesying. Yet neither has the character of the Church, or its mission changed in the least. The apostolic work is as much required now as it was then. The Holy Father, Pius XII, writes that members of the Church gifted with charismatic powers will never be lacking in the Church.<sup>35a</sup> Yet the powers are certainly not as profusely given now as they were in the apostolic times. Still we have no guarantee that they could not be given more profusely than they are given at present. At least, there is one, not very striking in its manifestation, which seems to be exactly what the apostle of today needs and needs badly—the grace of words and wisdom.

The aim of all the charisms, according to St. Thomas, is the cooperation of the apostle in bringing others to God. Since only God can move another interiorly, it is left to His instruments, his apostles, to move them exteriorly by teaching or persuading. For this office of teaching three things are necessary.

Now as regards the first, three things are necessary, as may be seen in human teaching. For whoever would teach another in any science must first be certain of the principles of the science, and with regard to this there is faith, which is certitude of invisible things, the principles of Catholic doctrine. Secondly, it behoves

<sup>35</sup> *Summa Theol.*, I-II, q. 111, a. 4: *Gratia gratis ordinatur ad hoc quod homo alteri cooperetur, ut reducatur ad Deum. Homo autem ad hoc operari non potest interius movendo (hoc enim solius Dei est), sed solum exterius docendo vel persuadendo. Et ideo gratia gratis data illa sub se continet quibus homo indiget ad hoc quod alterum instruat in rebus divinis, quae sunt supra rationem.*

<sup>35a</sup> Pius VII, *Corporis Mystici*, No. 17, p. 12.

the teacher to know the principal conclusions of the science, and hence we have the word of wisdom, which is knowledge of divine things. Thirdly, he ought to abound with examples and a knowledge of effects, whereby at times he needs to manifest causes; and thus we have the word of knowledge, which is knowledge of human things. . . .<sup>36</sup>

Whatever is necessary for the Church, the Holy Ghost supplies. And so it is completely within the power and intent of the Holy Ghost to supply those things which are necessary for its mission—even a course in speech.

Now the knowledge a man receives from God cannot be turned to another's profit, except by means of speech. And since the Holy Ghost does not fail in anything that pertains to the profit of the Church, He provides also the members of the Church with speech; to the effect that a man not only speaks so as to be understood by different people, which pertains to the gift of tongues, but also speaks with effect, and this pertains to the grace of word.<sup>37</sup>

This is the grace of the gracious word, the ability to attract others, not by the clever, the startling, the shrewd, but by supernaturally gracious words, words that merely clarify and prove that the spirit of the Apostle is not of this world. This is not merely the intellectual and apologetic apostolate. It is rather the manifestation of hearts that have known the love of God in contemplation and are poured forth in word and action upon their fellow-men. The intellectual approach is insufficient—only God-filled men and women can be true apostles of the body of Christ. How will the Holy Ghost use them in defensive and offensive action for the cause of Christ?

This happens in three ways. First, in order to instruct the intellect, and this is the case when a man speaks so as to teach. . . . Secondly, in order to move the affections, so that man willingly hearkens to the word of God. This is the case when a man speaks so as to please his hearers, not indeed with a view to his own favor, but in order to draw them to listen to God's word. . . . Thirdly, in order that men may love that which is signified by the word, and desire to

<sup>36</sup> *Summa Theol.*, I-II, q. 111, a. 4.

<sup>37</sup> *Summa Theol.*, II-II, q. 177, a. 1.

fulfill it, and this is the case when a man so speaks as to sway his hearers. In order to this effect the Holy Ghost makes use of the human tongue as an instrument; but He it is Who perfects the work within.<sup>38</sup>

There is no limitation of this gift to priests or bishops. This may very well become the means of even the lay apostle, as it was in the early Church. Even women may enjoy it in a restricted field.

Speech may be employed in two ways: in one way privately, to one or a few, in familiar conversation, and in this respect the grace of the word may be becoming to women; in another way, publicly, addressing oneself to the whole church, and this is not permitted to women. First and chiefly on account of the condition attaching to the female sex, whereby woman should be subject to man as appears from Genesis (iii, 16). Now teaching and persuading publicly in the church belong not to subjects but to the prelates (although men who are subjects may do these things if they be so commissioned, because their subjection is not a result of their natural sex, as it is with women, but of some thing supervening by accident).<sup>39</sup>

The confirmed has a right to the graces necessary for the apostolate. Yet he has no claim on any or all of the charisms. They are gifts beyond the hopes or merits of men. Of all the gifts, that of the grace of word seems the closest to the apostolate; it is, moreover, the one which can best be prepared for by the apostle. First of all, the fullness of the Holy Ghost must be consciously appreciated. This is impossible without some earnest effort at leading an interior life. This is the formation which Pius XII demanded not as preparation for but rather as an essential part of Catholic Action.<sup>40</sup> For activity even in behalf of the

<sup>38</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>39</sup> *Ibid.*, a. 2. Cf. Cajetan's commentary on this article in which he points out the scope still allowed to those who are not prelates according to the mind of St. Thomas.

<sup>40</sup> Pius XII, *Speech to the Directors of Catholic Action of Rome*, April 19, 1931: Catholic Action must consist of two things—it must fall into two parts not necessarily successive ones; two divisions, ideal and moral. A work of formation, in any case. Catholic Action must have as preliminary the individual sanctification

Church is bound to be worth little more than the air it disturbs unless that activity flows from the Head through the members in the spirit of love. That is the activity which men and women must carry into every aspect of their daily lives; we cannot expect the charisms, but we can strive mightily to live by the gifts of the Holy Ghost. It is possible to become a better apostle, by study and prayer; the study of Theology is not out of place in the apostle, but very much in place. John of St. Thomas even hints that through it one may, in a human way, make up for the absent charism of the gracious word:

For the charism of knowledge is ordered to the defense of the faith and the instruction of others. It does not require that a person be in the state of grace. Loving knowledge, experiencing, as it were, the things of salvation, is not its end. Such knowledge is the function of the gift. According to St. Thomas who follows St. Augustine, it is evident that it is one thing to know how much a man should believe to attain the blessed life which is eternal (this is the knowledge of the gift). It is quite another to know how to use this to aid the faithful and to defend the Faith against those without it. This latter then seems to be what the Apostle means by the term knowledge. This knowledge is either a charism or theology.<sup>41</sup>

There is no direct connection between the charism and the gifts of the Holy Ghost. Yet they are the gifts of the same Spirit, Who is the Soul of the Mystical body, that body which is armed and aimed at conquest for Christ. The supernatural life through the gifts must be the soul of the apostolate. Whether the charisms, or at least one particular charism, will

of each one of its members: so that the supernatural life abounds and super-abounds within them. But after this first and formative element, comes the second—the distribution of this life, the action of apostolate, which means putting into practice, in all its extension and in all its possibilities, the first apostolate of all, that of the Twelve Apostles;

*Letter to Cardinal Bertram:* Catholic Action does not consist in attending exclusively to one's own perfection, though this must be its first and supreme intention, but also in a true and genuine apostolate.

<sup>41</sup> John of St. Thomas, "The Gifts of the Holy Ghost," THE THOMIST, IX (1946), p. 446.

be given in profusion for the apostolate depends upon God's will. Yet we are sure that "The Holy Ghost does not fail in anything that pertains to the profit of the Church."<sup>42</sup>

This is the case for Confirmation. Even in this crude and imperfect exposition it should be obvious to the reader that like all the sacraments, Confirmation is another stirring manifestation of divine wisdom and love. It is only because men have failed to catch something of the marvellous aims of Christ and His Church that they have failed to see the importance of this sacrament. It has been due to the failure of Catholics to see the Church continuing the mission of Christ. They have not seen that by incorporation into that mystical body, they have assumed rights and obligations in the mission of the Church. In the twelfth century an old bishop bewailed the fact that in spite of the marvellous graces accorded to the confirmed, hardly any of their effects were to be seen in the lives of men.<sup>43</sup> It was almost as if St. Paul's question to the Ephesians was being repeated, and the same answer was being given: "Paul having passed through the upper coasts, came to Ephesus, and found certain disciples. And he said to them: Have you received the Holy Ghost since ye believed? But they said to him: We have not so much as heard whether there be a Holy Ghost."<sup>44</sup> It is almost as true in the twentieth century as it was in the twelfth, that Catholics, who have both heard of and received the Holy Ghost, still act as if they had not.

The lament of William of Auvergne might well have been voiced today were it not for the fact of Catholic Action. This was not merely a call for the laity to do what they were consecrated to do by Confirmation; they were called to share in the apostolate of the hierarchy itself, to share as members in an

<sup>42</sup> *Summa Theol.*, II-II, q. 177, a. 1.

<sup>43</sup> William of Auvergne, *Summa Operum*, I, fol. x: Nec mirum est si virtus ejus et efficacia apud hujusmodi homines aut parva sit aut nulla. Inest quidem spectem Christianae religionis et ipsum nomen et signa omnia sanctitatis non solum erubescant sed etiam formident. Rarissimi enim sunt qui non erubescant atque formident facere bona aut loqui vera etiam in conspectu hominum Christianorum.

<sup>44</sup> *Acts*, xix, 6.

organized, hierarchical and mandated apostolate.<sup>45</sup> This is an organized apostolate. The members of Catholic Action share in the mandate of the bishop, as organized groups. This is the demand of our day. The clergy are insufficient and are incapable of winning the world to Christ.<sup>46</sup> The confirmed have been consecrated for just such an opportunity. Pius XII insists upon its necessity.

And so we desire that all, who claim the Church as their mother, should seriously consider that not only the sacred ministers and those who have consecrated themselves to God in religious life, but other members as well of the mystical body of Jesus Christ have the obligation of working hard and constantly for the upbuilding and increase of this body. We wish this to be remembered especially by members of Catholic action who assist the bishops and priests in their apostolic labors—and to their praise be it said that they do remember.<sup>47</sup>

Yet the numbers who have heeded this call have been comparatively few. Catholics will not heed this call until they begin to find it necessary to call upon that strengthening grace of Confirmation frequently and fervently. They will not heed the call as long as they see the Christian warfare as a defensive fight against the pagan influences of the world. They will not heed that call until they begin to understand that the Christian life is not a part time occupation or a hobby but a life, complete and entire to be lived every hour of every day. They will not heed that call until they begin to appreciate the truth that has been given them through faith, that it is the spark for a revolution which can remake the fabric of society into the seamless robe of Christ, the King. And they will heed that call only when they begin to recognize the voice of the Holy Spirit calling them to do their duty.

<sup>45</sup> Michael Moran, *L'action Catholique*, p. 52 seq.

<sup>46</sup> Pius XI, *Letter to Cardinal Segura*: You see clearly the manner of times in which we are living, and what they demand from the Catholic forces. On the one hand, we deplore a society growing ever more pagan. . . . On the other hand, we grieve because the clergy are quite insufficient to cope with the necessities and needs of our times.

<sup>47</sup> *Mystici corporis*, no. 96, p. 61.

St. Thomas caught something of this vision when he described this sacrament and its effects: "A good name is manifested in the balsam on account of its odor. This is a necessity for those who converse with worldlings for the purpose of publicly confessing Christ, sprung into the very center of the battle from the secret loins of the Church."<sup>48</sup> From the secret chambers of the mystical body there are coming forth real apostles to go forth into the camp of the enemy, into every stage and condition of society. They do not meet hostility as much as indifference, and yet they are prepared for both. The plan of battle, the weapons of warfare are geared for a 20th century apostolate but the consecration, the spirit are the same as on that very first Pentecost. The Spirit is Love, and weapons, although different in shape, are still the weapons of Love and Love alone.

It is necessary that the dedicated soldiers should know what manner of warfare they are entering. They must know the plan of campaign. They must be instructed in the ways of warfare. That is the very reason St. Thomas found for sponsors.

This sacrament is given to man for strength in the spiritual combat. Now, just as one newly born requires someone to teach him things pertaining to ordinary conduct . . . so they who are chosen for the fight need instructors by whom they are informed of things concerning the conduct of the battle, and hence in earthly wars, generals and captains are appointed to the command of others. For this reason he also who receives this sacrament, has someone to stand for him, who, as it were, has to instruct him concerning the fight.<sup>49</sup>

It is of the utmost importance that the confirmed begin to realize that there is a fight, and that they have been equipped for that battle. They are mature members of a military community. They must put off the things of the child, and begin to recognize their responsibility. They must stop acting like children and begin to act like Christian men and women.

Because Confirmation brings to the soul nothing less than the

<sup>48</sup> *Summa Contra Gentes*, iv, cap. 60.

<sup>49</sup> *Summa Theol.*, III, q. 72, a. 10.

gift of Pentecost, the Holy Spirit, it will remain a complete mystery except for those who live by that Spirit. That is their obligation as apostles. Yet there will always remain much to be clarified in this beautiful yet profound mystery. The whole Church has been unmistakably impressed by the recognition of its necessity—by granting pastors power to confer this sacrament upon the dying.<sup>50</sup> It still remains a stupendous task for theologians. The Holy Father appreciates this and has invited theologians to the task: “We are well aware that many a veil shrouds this profound truth of our union with the divine Redeemer and in particular the Holy Spirit’s dwelling within our souls and impedes our power to understand and explain it. This mystery is enveloped in a darkness, rising out of the mental limitations of those who seek to grasp it. But we know too that well-directed and earnest study of this doctrine and the clash of diverse opinions and their discussion, provided love of truth and due submission to the Church be the arbiter, will open rich and bright vistas, whose light will help to progress in kindred sacred sciences.”<sup>51</sup> From such investigation will arise clarity and appreciation. But the real case for Confirmation will be written by a living apostolate made fresh by the breath of the Holy Ghost.

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<sup>50</sup> *Acta Apostolicae Sedis*, vol. 38, pp. 349-358.

<sup>51</sup> Pius XII, *Corporis Mystici*, no. 78, p. 49.

## THE BEAUTY OF GOD

680

**T**HEOLOGICAL literature is not greatly concerned with divine beauty. The familiar manuals of dogmatic theology limit their treatment of this subject to a few paragraphs in the tract on the divine attributes, and in some texts even this casual treatment is omitted. The older works in theology take no great pains to present a complete development of the subject.

Among the works of St. Thomas there is little in the nature of an *ex professo* treatise on the beauty of God. His one effort in this line is contained in a portion of one chapter of the *Exposition of the Divine Names of the Pseudo-Denis*. Throughout the *Opera Omnia* there are other references to beauty which contain the principles of the Thomistic esthetic, but these are scattered passages which are not presented as an orderly synthesis. In this article an endeavor will be made to integrate these various references and to present the teaching of St. Thomas on the divine beauty.

### I. SOURCES

An obstacle to the synthesis of the true doctrine of St. Thomas' esthetics has existed since 1869. In that year Uccelli, an authority on the works of the Angelic Doctor, published a portion of a *Commentary on the Divine Names of the Pseudo-Denis* under the title, *De Pulchro et Bono*, and ascribed it to St. Thomas. The original text of this commentary was thought to be a manuscript in the handwriting of St. Thomas, and the discovery was hailed as a boon to the Thomistic esthetic. The interesting history of this manuscript is given by Père Mandonnet:

At the time of the French occupation, the convent of St. Dominic at Naples possessed a manuscript reputed to be the autograph of

St. Thomas Aquinas. It was kept in the cell of the saint and was offered for veneration on his feast-day, mounted in a precious reliquary. When the Occupation laid the heavy hand on objects of value, the reliquary was stolen, and the manuscript was thrown among the books of the library which were sold. At the sale, the Reverend P. Andres, a Jesuit, recognized its value, bought it for fifty *sous* and presented it to the king, Joachim Murat, who put it in the National Library where it yet remains. The manuscript is written on parchment in the hand, as they think, of the Angelic Doctor in a barely legible cursive script.<sup>1</sup>

The opusculum *De Pulchro et Bono* is ascribed to St. Albert the Great by Mandonnet and by Grabmann. If it is really the autograph of St. Thomas, it only proves that St. Thomas attended the school of St. Albert where he undertook to study and copy the works of his master.<sup>2</sup>

Mandonnet and Grabmann concur in placing the opusculum *De Pulchro et Bono* among the spurious works wrongly ascribed to St. Thomas. Their opinion is thus summed up by Grabmann:

The only explanation left is that St. Thomas transcribed in his own hand the commentary of Albert the Great on the works of the pseudo-Areopagite. William of Tocco reports that St. Thomas in his student days had listened to lectures on the writings of the pseudo-Areopagite at the feet of Albert the Great.<sup>3</sup>

Futher on he states: ". . . the actuality of *De Pulchro et Bono* as a statement of the Esthetic of St. Thomas must be firmly rejected. Mandonnet has also rejected this Commentary as being pseudo-Thomistic."<sup>4</sup> Earlier authors, such as Vallet,

<sup>1</sup> P. Mandonnet, O. P., *Des Ecrits Authentiques de S. Thomas D'Aquin* (Fribourg: 1910), p. 154, nos. 127-130.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.* Si le manuscrit en question est réellement de saint Thomas, nous aurions une preuve directe de l'étude que le disciple a faite des œuvres de son maître, et il aurait vraisemblablement copié ces écrits pendant qu'il était à son école.

<sup>3</sup> M. Grabmann, *Die Echten Schriften Des Hl. Thomas Von Aquin*. (Munster: 1920), p. 231: Es bleibt dann nur die eine Erklärung dass Thomas mit eigener Hand die Kommentare Alberts d. Gr. zu den Werken des Pseudo-Areopagitica abgeschrieben hat. Wilhelm von Thocco berichtet, dass Thomas in seinen Lernjahren zu den Füßen Alberts d. Gr. gerade auch dessen Vorlesungen über die Schriften des Pseudo-Areopagiten angehört hat.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.* . . . da die Verwertung des Kapitels De bono et pulchro für die Darstel-

Lepore, Krug, and others who trusted the authenticity of Uccelli's discovery, have included much of St. Albert's esthetic in their works. They labored under the impression that they were developing the doctrine of St. Thomas. Consequently, some of the work in the field of Thomistic esthetics must be carefully studied if the true doctrine of St. Thomas is sought therein. The present study draws only from the authentic *Exposition of the Divine Names*. No reference is made to the opusculum *De Pulchro et Bono*.

Apart from his *Exposition of the Divine Names*, St. Thomas' teaching on beauty is contained in fifteen references throughout his works. This number may not be complete, but the chief texts which furnish the principles used by most commentators are included therein. Of the fifteen texts cited, two are from the *Commentary on the Psalms of David*, and of the remaining thirteen, eight are in answers to objections. Thus, throughout the *Opera Omnia* there are only five references to beauty in the *corpora articulorum* which ordinarily contain the more important aspects of St. Thomas' doctrine. Apparently the Angelic Doctor discussed beauty principally when urged to do so by the remarks of others on the subject.

Because of the incompleteness of St. Thomas' tract on beauty, it is difficult to understand the universality of the principles of his Esthetics. A theory so well founded seems to deserve a more thorough treatment, and appears worthy of inclusion in the consideration of the divine attributes in the First Part of the *Summa Theologica*. An answer to this difficulty can be sought in the metaphysical character of St. Thomas' esthetics and in the close relationship of beauty to goodness and truth. Given the definitions of beauty and the three objective elements of beauty, together with the references to the psychology of the esthetic experience, a complete and workable theory of esthetic can be evolved from the general doctrine of St. Thomas' metaphysics and psychology. The same answer may be given

lung der Ästhetik des hl. Thomas mit Entschiedenheit abgelehnt werden muss. Es hat Mandonnet diesen Konentar als pseudo-thomistisch abgelehnt.

when one wonders why St. Thomas did not treat extensively of God's beauty in the *Summa Theologica*. The doctrine on goodness and truth is there and so are the principles regarding beauty; it has been left for others to draw the conclusions.

## II. PRELIMINARY NOTIONS

Any valid conclusions about the divine beauty must be based upon the principles of esthetics and upon knowledge of God. Esthetics furnishes many conclusions about the nature of beauty, but the logical application of these conclusions to the divine nature must wait upon the presentation of the fundamental notions of God's nature and attributes and of the manner in which men know these truths. Before taking up the matter of divine beauty it will be necessary to consider St. Thomas' teaching on beauty; on man's knowledge of God; on the perfections and attributes of God; and, finally, the doctrine on the nature of God.

### 1. ST. THOMAS' THEORY OF ESTHETICS

#### 1. *The Notion and Perception of Beauty*

Like truth or goodness, beauty may be studied under a twofold aspect, either as a quality of a certain object which gives rise to the esthetic experience, or as the esthetic experience itself. A study of the quality of the beautiful object is a consideration of the metaphysical or objective aspect of esthetics; a study of the esthetic experience itself is a consideration of the psychological aspect of esthetics.

The psychological aspect of esthetics was considered by St. Thomas when he defined beauty in terms of its effects in the following passages: "Those things are called beautiful which please when seen." ". . . that, the very apprehension of which pleases is called beautiful."<sup>5</sup> Pleasure is posited as the first effect of beauty. Further statements expand the original definitions beyond the realm of the senses into the domain of the

<sup>5</sup> *Summa Theol.*, I, q. 5, a. 4, ad 1um; I-II, q. 27, a. 1, ad 3um.

intellect where the esthetic experience finds its cause and produces its principal effects. ". . . beauty adds to goodness a certain ordination to the cognitive faculty, so that whatever gratifies the appetite *simpliciter* is said to be good, only that which causes pleasure in being apprehended is called beautiful."<sup>6</sup>

This emphasis on the intellectual character of the esthetic experience does not exclude the concomitant and less specific sensory pleasure, but rather indicates that the principal effect of perceiving beauty is to be sought in the intellectual order. The cognitive nature of the perception of beauty admits of varying degrees of knowledge which contribute to the esthetic experience. The definition of beauty as "that which pleases when seen" includes the Latin word *videre* which properly refers to the function of the sense of sight, but the meaning of this term may be extended in view of the following:

It is fitting to speak of any name in two ways: first, according to the primary signification; secondly, according to the use of the name. For example the name of sight which was first employed to signify an act of the sense of sight, but because of the dignity and certainty of this sense, its name was extended . . . to include all the knowledge of the other senses. We say "See how it tastes, or smells, or how hot it is." The name was further applied to intellectual knowledge, "Blessed are the clean of heart for they shall see God." (Mt., v, 8) <sup>7</sup>

In the definition of beauty, the word *videre* refers to all the cognitive faculties of man, both sensitive and intellectual.

The senses are not equally cognitive and all do not minister equally to the formation of the concept of beauty. In perceiving beauty there is a definite hierarchy of importance among the senses.

Those senses which are most cognitive are principally concerned with beauty, especially sight and hearing which chiefly minister to the reason. We speak of beautiful sights and beautiful sounds, but in reference to the objects of the other senses we do not use the term "beautiful," e.g., we do not speak of beautiful odors or flavors.<sup>8</sup>

<sup>6</sup> *Ibid.*, I-II, q. 27, a. 1, ad 3um.

<sup>7</sup> *Ibid.*, I, q. 67, a. 1.

<sup>8</sup> *Ibid.*, I-II, q. 27, a. 1, ad 3um.

Here again is emphasized the role of reason in appreciating beauty. Sight and hearing are the principal esthetic sense-functions, but their preeminence is due to their proximity to reason. This same emphasis on the intellectual nature of esthetic experience finds different expression in the tract on the moral virtues.

Beauty consists in a certain clarity and due proportion. Now both of these are found radically in the reason to which pertains both the light manifesting beauty and the establishing of due proportion in other (things). So beauty is found *per se* and essentially in the contemplative life, which consists in an act of reason; whence the Book of Wisdom (8/2) says of the contemplation of wisdom: "I became a lover of her beauty." Now among the moral virtues, beauty exists by participation inasmuch as they share in the order of reason; and especially in temperance which represses those desires which chiefly becloud the reason. So it is that the virtue of chastity best prepares man for contemplation, because venereal pleasure draws the mind most strongly to sensible things.<sup>9</sup>

The teaching that "beauty consists in due proportion" places the esthetic experience beyond the senses because, "sense knowledge does not extend sufficiently far that it can consider the proportion of one thing to another. This pertains properly to the reason."<sup>10</sup> However, this teaching does not exclude the senses from their proper role in the genesis of the concept of beauty, but they are not the chief factors in the esthetic experience. When it is said that "those senses which are most cognitive are principally concerned with beauty," it must not be inferred that the less cognitive senses are completely excluded. In considering St. Thomas' treatment of the objective conditions of beauty, it will become clear that all the cognitive faculties must be employed for the full appreciation of beauty. Formally, the perception of beauty consists in an act of abstraction by which the intellect knows its proper object (i. e. the form or quiddity of material things) from among the particular data supplied by the senses. This knowledge itself

<sup>9</sup> *Ibid.*, II-II, q. 180, a. 2, ad 3um.

<sup>10</sup> *Ibid.*, II-II, q. 58, a. 4.

delights the will, and thus the esthetic response is completed. No exclusion of sense pleasure is implied, but this doctrine places the formality of the esthetic experience in the reason.<sup>11</sup> "Beauty is found essentially and *per se* in the contemplative life, which consists in an act of reason."<sup>12</sup>

Experience manifests that not every act of knowledge pertains to esthetic experience. There must be some quality in esthetic knowledge which distinguishes it from ordinary cognition. The distinctive note of esthetic knowledge is facility or suavity. Beauty pertains essentially to the contemplative life, the chief act of which is ". . . a simple intellectual view of truth, superior to reasoning and accompanied by admiration."<sup>13</sup> This quasi-intuitive and facile perception of the esthetic experience is quite different from the laborious procedure of discursive knowledge which is the ". . . knowledge of a thing previously unknown at which we arrive from something known beforehand."<sup>14</sup> Once this note of facility is lacking, there can be no question of esthetic knowledge; beauty is recognized at once and suavely, or not at all.<sup>15</sup>

## 2. *Delight in the Esthetic Experience*

Although the perception of beauty pertains primarily to the intellect, there is an element of delight in knowing the beautiful. Pleasure or complacence is the proper effect of beauty in the psychological order; beauty is that which *pleases* when seen. There is some special relation of causality between the apprehension of beauty and this consequent delight. This relationship is explained in the following texts: Since the good is what all desire, it belongs to the nature of goodness that it allay the

<sup>11</sup> Cf. J. L. Callahan, O.P., *A Theory of Esthetic* (Washington, D. C.: 1927), pp. 39 ff.

<sup>12</sup> *Summa Theol.*, II-II, q. 180, a. 2, ad 3um.

<sup>13</sup> R. Garrigou-Lagrange, *Christian Perfection and Contemplation* (St. Louis: 1939) p. 45. Cf. *Summa Theol.*, II-II, q. 180, aa. 1, 6.

<sup>14</sup> *Ibid.*, I, q. 58, a. 3, ad 1um.

<sup>15</sup> Ad pulchrum enim non sufficit quaelibet cognitio, sed requiritur quaedam visio, seu intuitio qua objectum quasi comprehendatur (E. Hugon, O.P., *Cursus Philosophiae Thomistae* (Paris: 1907) V, 139.

desires of the appetitive faculty; but it is the nature of beauty to allay desire merely by being seen or known.”<sup>16</sup> “Beauty is desirable only insofar as it shares the nature of goodness, and truth is desirable in the same way. . . .”<sup>17</sup> Beauty must be known as a good of the intellect if it is to be desired, and this desire must find its fulfillment in the very knowledge of the beautiful object.

There are certain kinds of knowledge which do not beget pleasure,<sup>18</sup> and there are certain intellectual pleasures which have nothing to do with beauty. Esthetic delight is a special pleasure which is chiefly intellectual because its cause is in the intellect and its end is in knowledge. The delight concomitant with the perception of beauty is both intellectual and emotional but the intellectual delight is known by analogy with sense pleasure. Any emotion is a modification of the sense appetite,<sup>19</sup> and emotions are not found properly in the intellect.<sup>20</sup> Yet there is a certain intellectual delight found in the esthetic experience and this intellectual delight is accompanied by a corresponding reaction in the sense appetite because both faculties are delighted in the attainment of their proper objects.<sup>21</sup> In view of the emphasis upon the intellectual nature of the esthetic response, the pleasure which is posited as the effect of the preception of beauty must be primarily the *gaudium*, or delight, which follows intellectual knowledge. At the same time,

<sup>16</sup> *Summa Theol.*, I-II, q. 27, a. 1, ad 3um.

<sup>17</sup> *I Sent.*, d. 31, q. 2, ad 4um.

<sup>18</sup> Operationes sunt delectabiles in quantum sunt proportionatae et connaturales operanti. Cum autem virtus humana sit finita, secundum aliquam mensuram operatio est ei proportionata. Unde si excedat illam mensuram jam non erit proportionata nec delectabilis, sed magis laboriosa et attaedians. Et secundum hoc otium et ludus et alia quae ad requiem pertinent, delectabilia sunt in quantum auferunt tristitiam quae est ex labore (*Summa Theol.*, I-II, q. 32, a. 1, ad 3um).

<sup>19</sup> Passio proprie invenitur ubi est transmutatio corporalis, quae quidem invenitur in actibus appetitus sensitivi (*Ibid.*, I-II, q. 23, a. 3).

<sup>20</sup> Ratio passionis magis proprie invenitur in actu appetitus sensitivi quam intellectivi (*Ibid.*, I-II, q. 22, a. 3).

<sup>21</sup> Delectamur enim et in his quae naturaliter concupiscimus, ea adipiscentes, et in his quae concupiscimus secundum rationem (*Ibid.*, I-II, q. 31, a. 3); cf. *Ibid.*, I-II, q. 31, a. 4; *Ibid.*, I-II, q. 26, a. 3.

the doctrine demands the presence of *delectatio*, or sense pleasure, which is concomitant with its more noble companion. The superiority of intellectual delight over emotional pleasure is aptly summed up in the statement that ". . . we experience delight in the intellective appetite in which we are one with the angels."<sup>22</sup>

There are two causes for delight in the apprehension of beauty. The first is love, i. e., love taken in its broader sense to signify the inclination of a faculty towards its proper object.<sup>23</sup> This love or inclination causes both the senses and the intellectual faculties to unite with their proper objects.<sup>24</sup> The union of faculty and object causes joy or delight, which is pleasure in the possession of some good. A similarity or proportion between the faculties which perceive beauty and their proper objects begets the inclination of these faculties towards their objects.<sup>25</sup> This similarity or proportion which inclines the faculty towards its object ultimately produces delight.<sup>26</sup> Beautiful things are proportioned to the faculties which they delight; beautiful things are easily apprehended because they are suited to the powers of the cognitive faculties.<sup>27</sup> Likewise, when the

<sup>22</sup> *Ibid.*, I-II, q. 31, a. 4, ad 3um.

<sup>23</sup> In unoquoque autem horum appetituum amor dicitur illud quod est principium motus tendentis in finem amatum. In appetitu autem naturali principium hujusmodi motus est connaturalitas appetentis ad id in quod tendit, quae dici potest amor naturalis; sicut ipsa connaturalitas corporis gravis ad locum medium est per gravitatem, et potest dici amor naturalis; et similiter coaptatio appetitus sensitivi vel voluntatis ad aliquod bonum, id est, ipsa complacentia boni, dicitur amor sensitivus vel intellectivus seu rationalis. Amor igitur sensitivus est in appetitu sensitivo, sicut amor intellectivus in intellectivo appetitu; et pertinet ad concupisibilem, quia dicitur per respectum ad bonum absolute, non per respectum ad arduum, quod est objectum irascibilis (*Ibid.*, I-II, q. 26, a. 1).

<sup>24</sup> Amoris autem proprium objectum est bonum quia . . . amor importat quamdam connaturalitatem vel complacentiam amantis ad amatum; unicuique autem est bonum id quod est sibi connaturale et proportionatum (*Ibid.*, I-II, q. 27, a. 1).

<sup>25</sup> Similitudo, proprie loquendo, est causa amoris (*Ibid.*, I-II, q. 27, a. 1).

<sup>26</sup> *Ibid.*, I-II, q. 37, a. 7, *sed contra*.

<sup>27</sup> Pulchrum autem respicit vim cognoscitivam; pulchra dicuntur quae visa placent; unde pulchrum in debita proportione consistit, quia sensus delectantur in rebus debite proportionatis, sicut in sibi similibus, nam sensus quaedam ratio est et

intellect attains its object, which is the quiddity of material things, it apprehends the form of that object (which is the objective source of beauty,<sup>28</sup> and is delighted by the very act of knowing.<sup>29</sup>

The activity of the faculties which apprehend beauty is the second cause of the joy of the esthetic experience. Operation or activity is at the root of all delight, and the most delightful operations of both senses and intellect are those which are most perfect, i. e. those operations of intellect and sense which are perfectly disposed for the reception of their most perfect objects.<sup>30</sup> Consequently, the delight of the esthetic experience is the perfection of those faculties which apprehend beauty.<sup>31</sup>

### 3. *The Objective Aspect of Esthetics*

Every effect must have a proportioned cause, and the esthetic experience is no exception to the general rule. The psychological explanation of the esthetic experience has its roots in the operation of man's faculties, but this explanation shows only a part of the picture. The explanation of esthetic delight finds its completion in an analysis of the beautiful object which man contemplates. Three elements are to be found in every beautiful object; integrity or perfection, proportion, and clarity or resplendence. Each must be examined separately to determine their nature and importance.

Integrity or perfection is the first of the objective elements of beauty. Anything is said to be perfect when it lacks nothing according to the measure of its perfection.<sup>32</sup> Everything created is composed of parts which are either actual, virtual or potential.

omnis virtus cognoscitiva. Et quia cognitio fit per assimilationem, assimilatio autem respicit formam; pulchrum proprie pertinet ad rationem causae formalis (*Ibid.*, I, q. 5, a. 4, ad 1um).

<sup>28</sup> Cf. *Ibid.*

<sup>29</sup> Cf. *Ibid.*, I-II, q. 32, a. 1, ad 3um.

<sup>30</sup> Omnis delectatio aliquam operationem consequatur (*Ibid.*, I-II, q. 32, a. 1).

<sup>31</sup> Unumquodque autem perfectum est in quantum est actu, nam potentia sine actu imperfecta est (*Ibid.*, I-II, q. 3, a. 2).

<sup>32</sup> Perfectum dicitur cui nihil deest secundum modum suae perfectionis (*Ibid.*, I, q. 4, a. 1).

Those parts which are required for the natural completeness of anything are its integral parts. Integrity is a species of perfection, and perfection is the form of the whole being which results from the integrity of the parts.<sup>33</sup>

This note of completeness, integrity or perfection must grace every beautiful object, but it must not be understood in a purely negative or in an over-extended sense. While it is true that deformed or imperfect things, as such, are ugly and displeasing<sup>34</sup> it must not be concluded that the mere presence of integral parts fulfills what is demanded by the integrity of beauty. The perfection characteristic of pulchritude is "a positive fullness, completeness, a richness of perfection such as can call forth the attention of the cognitive faculties and provoke a lively pleasure."<sup>35</sup> A rose-bud, although having the perfection of a rose-bud, evokes only passing attention even from the flower-lover. Later, the same bud, having become a flower with its myriad tints and rich hues coupled with its fragrance, arrests the gaze of all, even of the uncouth and the rude. The added life and vigor of the flower constitutes the integrity or perfection necessary to furnish the esthetic stimulus.

The integrity of beauty must not be understood in an over-extended manner. Perfection is twofold: primary, and secondary. The former consists in the form of the whole resulting from the integrity of the parts; the latter consists in an end which is either an operation or the result of an operation. Primary perfection causes that which is secondary, because the form is the principle of operation.<sup>36</sup> The integrity or perfection of

<sup>33</sup> Quae quidem perfectio est forma totius quae ex integritate partium consurgit (*Ibid.*, I, q. 73, a. 1).

<sup>34</sup> Quae enim diminuta sunt, hoc ipso turpia sunt (*Ibid.*, I, q. 39, a. 8).

<sup>35</sup> J. L. Callahan, O.P., *op. cit.*, p. 58).

<sup>36</sup> Duplex est rei perfectio, prima et secunda. Prima quidem perfectio est secundum quod res in sua substantia est perfecta; quae quidem perfectio est forma totius quae ex integritate partium consurgit. Perfectio autem secunda est finis; finis autem vel est operatio, sicut finis citharistae est citharizare; vel est aliquid ad quod per operationem pervenitur, sicut finis aedificatoris est domus, quam aedificando facit. Prima autem perfectio est causa secundae, quia forma est principium operationis (*Ibid.*, I, q. 73, a. 1).

beauty is teleological, and the requirements of a given object establish the measure of its integrity. Thus, the Venus of Milo, while only fragmentary in its present state, is considered to be truly beautiful. The figure lacks much of the integrity required in a woman, but retains perfection sufficient for a statue. Perfection or integrity must be understood in a most formal sense. In the realm of beauty, integrity has no absolute significance and must be understood in relation to the end of manifesting a form existing in matter.

The second of the objective elements of beauty is proportion, and this quality is noted more than the others.<sup>37</sup> Proportion consists in the due disposition of the parts of an action or object among themselves, and of the individual parts to the whole. Of all the elements of order, proportion is the most striking because it signifies the perfection of order. This concept of order includes other qualities of beauty. Variety or multiplicity of diverse things is the material cause, unity the formal cause and proportion the efficient cause of order. It is proportion which unifies and coordinates diverse elements in a manner most perfectly suited to manifest the perfection of the whole.

The importance of proportion as an element in beauty and in the esthetic experience can scarcely be exaggerated. There must be a twofold proportion, the first in the components of the beautiful object and another between the object and the faculties which apprehend it. Beauty is appreciated precisely because it is proportioned to the cognitive faculties. "Beauty is related to the cognitive faculty and that which pleases when seen is said to be beautiful. Wherefore, beauty consists in due proportion, because the senses are delighted in duly proportioned objects as in things like unto themselves, for the senses and every cognitive faculty is a kind of proportion."<sup>38</sup> Like

<sup>37</sup> *Ibid.*, I, q. 39, a. 8; I-II, q. 145, a. 2; II-II, q. 180, a. 2, ad 3um; *In de Div. Nom.*, c. 4, lect. 5; *Summa Theol.*, I, q. 5, a. 4, ad 1um.

<sup>38</sup> St. Thomas' last statement, ". . . sensus quaedam ratio est et omnis virtus cognitiva," is a citation from Aristotle, as is evident from the commentary on the *De Anima* (lib. 2, lect. 2, no. 598) where St. Thomas observes, "A sense is delighted in proportioned objects as in things like unto itself because a sense is a kind of

integrity, proportion is to be understood in a relative and teleological sense; "Beauty consists in *due* proportion."<sup>39</sup> Only that proportion which is best suited to manifest the form of the object is true esthetic proportion.

Resplendence or clarity is the third objective element of beauty. Practically all of the ancients reckoned clarity as a quality of beauty, but with St. Thomas, this element assumes a new importance and a new significance. The hiatus between the percipient subject and the beautiful object is spanned by the clarity of the object. Without clarity an object cannot provide esthetic stimulus. The beauty of any object is in direct proportion to its clarity. The word clarity was first employed to denote the light which renders objects visible to the sense of sight. This primary signification was extended to include whatever quality manifested an object to any cognitive faculty. It is consistent with usage to predicate clarity of intellectual knowledge. This teaching is applied in the statement that corporeal beauty consists in "due proportion of the members with a suitable clarity or color," while the beauty of human acts (which is something spiritual) results from "due proportion of words or deeds in which the light of reason shines forth."<sup>40</sup>

The lives of many saints are filled with painful and humiliating experiences, of which Our Lady's flight into Egypt and the sufferings of St. Paul are apt illustrations. Viewed from a natural standpoint such abasement may seem unreasonable and even revolting, but the true beauty of these sufferings

proportion (*sensus est proportio quaedam*)."<sup>41</sup> And again (lect. 24, no. 556), "A sense is a kind of reason, that is, proportion (*Sensus est quaedam ratio*, i.e., *proportio*). The improper interpretation of this one term, *ratio*, can be of grave consequence. If this term is interpreted incorrectly, the foundation of one of the basic principles of Thomist esthetic is weakened. This principle is that there is a twofold proportion in beautiful things; one intrinsic, of the parts among themselves and to the whole; the other extrinsic, of the objects to the faculties which perceive it; cf. M. de Munnynck, O.P., "L'Esthetique de S. Thomas d'Aquin," reviewed in *Bulletin Thomiste* (Janvier, 1925) no. 178, by J. Webert, O.P.

<sup>39</sup> *Pulchrum in debita proportione consistit (Summa Theol., I, q. 5, a. 4, ad 1um).*

<sup>40</sup> *In I Cor.*, lect. 2.

becomes apparent when one understands that they were motivated by Charity. Charity—the love of God and neighbor—is the form of the infused virtues, and its resplendence lends beauty to the very depths of human misery. The clarity of beauty is the resplendence or effulgence of the form of the object. The form is the prime constituent of the essence of a being; it is that by which a thing is and by which a thing is known. Resplendence of the form is the splendor of the essence and this splendor manifests the object to the cognitive faculties. To return to the idea of light or clarity mentioned previously, the form may be conceived as the light which makes the object known. All the properties of an object enjoy a degree of clarity proportionate to their participation in the essence from which they flow.

The essence is the cause of the primary clarity of an object and also causes its beauty fundamentally. Consequently, an object will enjoy a place in the gradations of beauty proportionate to its position in the hierarchy of forms. In every being there will be as many diverse kinds of beauty as there are different radiations of the form or forms. St. Thomas touches upon this point when he mentions the various gradations of beauty, viz., (1) corporeal beauty: "We call those men beautiful who have well-proportioned members and a splendid color or complexion."<sup>41</sup> (2) intellectual beauty: "Beauty is found *per se* and essentially in the contemplative life which consists in an act of reason."<sup>42</sup> and (3) supernatural beauty: "Inasmuch as He (Christ) is the perfect Word of the Father, He has a clarity which shines forth upon all, and in which all things are resplendent."<sup>43</sup> The clarity of even natural forms is derived from the divine essence as a kind of analogus participation; and it is for this reason that Aristotole considered the form as something divine.<sup>44</sup> Thus, created beauty is a sensible manifestation of the divine splendor which causes all beauty as

<sup>41</sup> *I Sent.*, d. 31, q. 2, a. 1.

<sup>42</sup> *Summa Theol.*, II-II, q. 180, a. 2, ad 3um.

<sup>43</sup> *I Sent.*, d. 31, q. 2, a. 1.

<sup>44</sup> *In Lib. I Metaphysic.*

is a similitude of divine pulchritude. It follows, then, that all things are beautiful with the beauty of God.

#### 4. *The Definition of Beauty*

The only definition of beauty formulated by St. Thomas is expressed in terms of the proper effect of beauty, "Beauty is that which pleases when seen." Emphasis here is on the effect of beauty on the apprehending subject, and the objective reality is mentioned only by implication (*Pulchrum est id quod visum placet*). The qualities of this objective reality are described in different places. First, three qualities are mentioned: "Three things are required for beauty; first, integrity or perfection, for defective things are for this reason ugly; secondly, due proportion or harmony; and, finally, clarity, consequently, those things which are brilliantly colored are said to be beautiful."<sup>45</sup> In other places, two qualities are noted: "Clarity and due proportion concur in the nature of beauty."<sup>46</sup> "Beauty consists in a certain clarity and due proportion."<sup>47</sup> "And he (Pseudo-Denis) shows wherein the nature of beauty consists by saying that God causes beauty inasmuch as He is the 'cause of harmony and clarity' in all things."<sup>48</sup> Finally, only a single element is given: ". . . beauty consists in due proportion."<sup>49</sup>

From the simple definition of beauty in terms of its effects combined with the idea of the objective elements of beauty a more comprehensive definition can be elaborated. This ultimate definition will be expressed in terms of an improper genus and species, because beauty is outside the genera and species. Moreover, this definition must reckon with the fact that beauty, like truth or goodness, may be considered from three aspects, viz., subjective, formal and objective. Subjectively, beauty is the complacence or delight in a rational subject consequent upon the apprehension of an object which provides the proper stimulus. Formally, beauty is something rationally distinct

<sup>45</sup> *Summa Theol.*, I, q. 39, a. 8.

<sup>46</sup> *Ibid.*, II-II, q. 145, a. 2.

<sup>47</sup> *Ibid.*, II-II, q. 180, a. 2, ad 3um.

<sup>48</sup> *In de Div. Nom.*, cap. 4, lect. 5.

<sup>49</sup> *Summa Theol.*, I, q. 5, a. 4, ad 1um.

from the beautiful object. It is a relation of conformity existing between a perfect, duly proportioned and resplendent object and the intellect which contemplates it. Objectively, beauty is a being, perfect, proportioned and resplendent to a degree that makes it a stimulus for the esthetic experience; it is the resplendence of the form in a perfect and proportioned object. When these various definitions are unified, it becomes clear that beauty is the perfection, proportion and resplendence of a being which will delight the beholder when it is seen. This definition is well suited to represent the content of St. Thomas' thought and can be harmonized with the definitions elaborated by his commentators.

### *5. Beauty, Goodness, and Truth*

Beauty has a relation to the cognitive faculties as well as to the appetites. The term "good" expresses the relation of being to the appetites, while the word "truth" expresses the relation of being to the intellect. Because beauty is an attribute of being, it follows logically that if there was a special faculty for apprehending the beautiful, beauty would consist in being precisely as related to that faculty. But beauty is the object of the cognitive and appetitive faculties conjointly, and, consequently, there is a close relationship between beauty and the objects of these faculties, viz., the good and the true. Beauty and goodness are objectively identical yet rationally distinct; they are two aspects of one reality.<sup>50</sup> Both are dependent upon the form of the object, but in different ways. The form of an object considered as good is that which can allay the appetite, while the same form of the same object considered as beautiful enjoys a certain splendor which makes the very knowledge of the object a source of delight for the beholder. Beauty adds to goodness a relationship to the cognitive faculties. Beauty must share in the nature of the good in order to be desirable, because the end and perfection of every other faculty are contained in

<sup>50</sup> Pulchrum est idem bono, sola ratione differens (*Ibid.*, I-II, q. 27, a. 1, ad 3um).

the object of the appetitive faculty (i. e., the good) as that which is proper is included in that which is common.<sup>51</sup>

Beauty is likewise identified objectively with truth and is ordained to the same subject, the intellect, although to different operations thereof. When the cognitive faculties are applied to certain objects, they apprehend the same object under a twofold aspect; they perceive the adequation of the so-called "naked entity" of the object with the intellect, and they apprehend the entity of the object as possessing the integrity of its nature as well as the proper proportion of parts manifested through the resplendence of the form. In the former case the intellect attains truth; in the latter, beauty. Beauty demands that the object enjoy a certain resplendence of the form, a peculiar clarity which renders it desirable as the special good of the cognitive faculties, which also renders the object suitable for quasi-intuitive assimilation by the contemplating subject.

The good and the beautiful are materially identical and formally diverse. The good is the end of the appetite; it pertains to the final cause. The beautiful is a special good of the cognitive faculties, "and because cognition is by way of assimilation which regards the formal cause, beauty properly pertains to the nature of a formal cause."<sup>52</sup> In the possession of good there is complacence but not contemplation; in the apprehension of beauty there is both complacence and contemplation. The good pleases when possessed; the beautiful pleases when seen. Beauty does not beget the desire for dominion. "To consider (or, contemplate) pulchritude is delightful in itself."<sup>53</sup> The love of beauty is of its very nature disinterested. Every faculty has a certain complacence in its proper object, and hence there must be a special delight in the apprehension of the beautiful to distinguish it from the complacence of the intellect in the true. Truth is the good of the intellect, and the intellect finds

<sup>51</sup> *Ibid.*, I-II, q. 11, a. 1, ad 2um.

<sup>52</sup> . . . et quia cognitio fit per assimilationem, assimilatio autem respicit formam; pulchrum proprie pertinet ad rationem causae formalis (*Ibid.*, I, q. 5, a. 4, ad 1um).

<sup>53</sup> . . . considerare pulchritudinem est delectabile secundum seipsam (In I Polit., lect. 8).

its perfection in attaining truth. Beauty, like truth, is apprehended by the intellect and not only perfects the intellect, but adds a relation to the will which apprehends the knowledge of the beautiful as a good and is delighted in this knowledge. The normal operation of the intellect lacks this special reference to the appetitive faculty.

## 2. GOD AND MAN'S KNOWLEDGE OF HIM

### 1. *Man's Knowledge of God*

The foregoing synoptic view of the principles of esthetics must be complemented by a consideration of the doctrine about man's knowledge of God and about God Himself, before any conclusions can be drawn regarding the divine beauty. Like all of man's knowledge, his concepts of the divine nature have their origins in sensible reality. Due to this dependence upon matter, merely human knowledge never can attain the essence of God directly, because the divine power infinitely surpasses created effects. The knowledge of these created effects in the light of the divine causality can lead to a knowledge of God's existence and even to a knowledge of certain aspects of His nature. Man can know the divine nature by analogy, that is by knowledge based on the relation existing between two or more things.

Analogous knowledge is relative or comparative. The analogous term is predicated of different objects in a sense which is neither the same, nor yet entirely different, but according to a certain proportion or proportionality. Thus, when it is said that a man has a healthy complexion, we have an example of the analogy of proportion or attribution. Health is formally in the man; it is in his complexion only by extrinsic denomination, because his complexion is an effect of his health. When the name "dog" is predicated of an animal and of a constellation, we have an example of analogy of proportionality in the metaphorical sense. "Dog" is predicated formally only of the animal; it is predicated of the stars metaphorically because of a resemblance which is independent of causal relationship. On the other hand, "cognition" can be predicated of both sensa-

tion and intellection proportionately and properly, because sensation is to the sensible what intellection is to the intelligible, and both are species of cognition according to a proportionate meaning of the term. It is this last species, the analogy of proper proportionality, that gives us our knowledge of God, for there is no determined proportion between the analogues. Existence, goodness, truth, being, beauty, all of these can be predicated both of God and of creatures because the realities signified by the terms are found formally both in God and in creatures, and because beauty, for example, exists in creatures in a manner proportionate to that in which it exists in God.

Our ability to know God from His creatures is aptly expressed by St. Paul: "For since the creation of the world His invisible attributes are clearly seen . . . His everlasting power also and divinity . . . being understood through the things that are made."<sup>54</sup> Thus does man arrive at a knowledge of God. It must be noted that there is more diversity than similarity in analogous knowledge. The natural knowledge of which we have been speaking will embrace the existence of God and something about His nature, but it never attains to a quidditative knowledge of God nor does it illumine the mysterious manner in which the various perfections exist harmoniously in the divine essence. Man in understanding the works of nature by his natural reason attains to a knowledge of what God is not, rather than of what He is. The knowledge of the inner life of God which has been freely given to man comes to him through divine revelation and the gift of faith. By these means man's natural knowledge of God is vastly enlarged and greatly perfected. The knowledge of Faith is the initiation into that beautific knowledge which is the portion and the inheritance of the just throughout eternity.

## *2. The Perfections and Attributes of God*

In the world of nature there exist two kinds of perfections; the absolutely simple perfections, such as goodness, beauty, and truth which contain no imperfection in their formal concepts;

<sup>54</sup> *Romans*, i, 20.

and the mixed perfections, such as sensation, or reasoning which include some imperfection in their formal concepts. These mixed perfections cannot exist formally in God because no imperfection can be predicated formally of God and imperfection pertains to the formal concept of mixed perfections. On the other hand, the absolutely simple perfections are those which include no imperfection in their formal concept and which it is better to possess than to lack. The absolutely simple perfections of God are what are known as the divine attributes; they exist necessarily, formally and eminently in Him and are deducible from what we conceive as the divine essence.

### *3. The Essence of God*

Man knows the perfections of creatures and he attributes these perfections to God by the process of analogy. The cumulation of all perfections existing in their cause in an infinite degree and with utmost simplicity constitutes what we call the physical essence of God.

Among the many attributes of the divinity there is one which is the source of all other perfections and which serves to distinguish God from all other beings. Such an attribute is what constitutes the metaphysical essence of God. This radical perfection which is God's essence is self-subsisting being. God named Himself in terms of self-subsisting being when He said to Moses: "I am Who am";<sup>55</sup> "Who Is" is God's proper name in the strictest sense.

The essence of God is distinct "not really, but logically" from the divine attributes and Persons. In the terminology of later theologians, this doctrine is stated by saying that there is a minor virtual distinction between the divine essence and the attributes and Persons. A minor virtual distinction is a plurality conceived by the mind and founded imperfectly in reality. That is to say, while God's essence is absolutely simple, His perfections are such that they escape the intellect of man and must be conceived as multiple and distinct. The simplicity

<sup>55</sup> Exodus, iii, 14.

of the divine essence is sufficient foundation for the human mind to conceive of one attribute explicitly while prescinding from the others which enter the concept only implicitly.

#### 4. *General Conclusions about the Beauty of God*

The foregoing doctrine about the nature of God and about the human manner of knowing the divinity forms the groundwork for drawing certain preliminary and general conclusions about the divine beauty. It is a fact of experience that beauty exists in the material creation. St. Thomas closely allies beauty with perfection and allows for no admixture of imperfection in the beautiful, as the beautiful. Beauty, therefore, is an absolutely simple perfection.

By way of the analogy of proper proportionality beauty is predicated of God Who is the efficient cause of all created perfection. Or, beauty may also be predicated of God inasmuch as He is Self-Subsisting Being, to Whom nothing of the perfection of being can be lacking. The conclusion of both predications is the same: God is beautiful. In God, nature and supposite are one. Hence it may be said that God is Beauty. Further, the divine attributes exist in God both formally and eminently, and because of this eminent perfection, the divine beauty must be ineffably delightful and infinitely more perfect than any created beauty which at best is but a feeble reflection of that Beauty which is God.

### III. THE DOCTRINE OF ST. THOMAS' EXPOSITION OF THE DIVINE NAMES OF PSEUDO-DENIS

The first part of this paper presented a synthetic view of esthetics, the principles of which were gathered from varied places throughout the works of St. Thomas. This was followed by a consideration of certain aspects of the teaching on the divine nature. Both studies are prerequisite for the investigation of divine beauty which St. Thomas makes in his *Commentary on the Divine Names*. This commentary is the source of much of what is presented today as the "esthetics of

Thomism,"<sup>56</sup> and despite the fact that it is a great boon to the study of esthetics, there are certain difficulties inherent in the work which must be overcome. In the Prologue three of these difficulties are indicated: (1) A Platonic mode of expression is evident throughout the works of the Pseudo-Denis. Plato's theory of exemplarism is not consonant with faith or truth when applied to separated natural species, but this doctrine is true and in harmony with faith when applied to God Who is the first principle of things, and in Whose mind pre-exist the archetypes of all creation. (2) Frequently, the Pseudo-Denis adduces good reasons in support of his conclusions, but these reasons are stated in too few words, or are implied by one word, thus making for great difficulty of interpretation. (3) Certain parts of the text, while appearing verbose, contain much profound doctrine which can be culled therefrom only at the expenditure of much time and energy.

These difficulties pertain to the text of the Pseudo-Denis. We, who are chiefly concerned with St. Thomas' explanations of the text, encounter further difficulties which find their ultimate explanation in the work of the original author: (1) The lucid order and presentation characteristic of the independent work of St. Thomas are not always present in this commentary, because the explanation follows the order, and sometimes the phraseology, of the original work. (2) It is frequently difficult to ascertain how much of the commentary is the independent thought of St. Thomas and how much is an amplification of the opinions of the Pseudo-Denis. (3) A lack of any authoritative commentary on that part of St. Thomas' exposition which deals with beauty renders the beginner prone to many errors, against which his only defense is a constant and tedious comparison of the doctrine of the exposition with the body of Thomistic thought. The following summary of the doctrine of the *Exposition of the Divine Names* is taken entirely

<sup>56</sup> Cf. G. Lepore, O. S. A., *Lectiones Aestheticae* (Viterbo: 1905); J. Maritain, *Art and Scholasticism* (New York: 1937); Gerald B. Phelan, "The Concept of Beauty in St. Thomas Aquinas," *Aspects of the New Scholastic Philosophy* (New York: 1932).

from that work and is presented in the order followed by St. Thomas. It is not intended as a complete statement of his teaching on all points treated; this is a synoptic view of the doctrine presented in one of the lesser works of the Angelic Doctor. The summary may be verified by referring to the Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth and Ninth Lectures of the Fourth Chapter.<sup>57</sup> No more explicit citation will be made, for the sake of brevity in the notes.

God Who is Super-substantial Goodness is beautiful; in fact, He is Beauty. Although the abstract and concrete terms "beauty" and "beautiful" are predicated of creatures in different ways, both are united as one in the simplicity and perfection of God. The beauty of creatures is a similitude or reflection of God's beauty, and the abstract term "beauty," when predicated of creatures, signifies a participation in the First Cause Who renders all else beautiful. The term "beautiful," when predicated of creatures, signifies a thing which participates in created beauty. Beauty, therefore, is an analogical concept.

God is Beauty because He is the efficient cause of the diverse created beauty which is granted to creatures in a way proper to each, that is, according to the peculiar nature of each. Here the teleological nature of created beauty is stressed, for beauty is caused in creatures in proportion to the needs or capacities of their natures. God is the cause of pulchritude inasmuch as He is the cause of consonance or proportion and clarity in all things. The proper nature (*ratio*) of beauty consists in consonance and clarity. In the mention of these two elements the existence of the third element, i. e., integrity or perfection, is implied. An example taken from the order of material beauty manifests the idea of St. Thomas that in beautiful objects the form shines forth through properly disposed matter. This teaching is to be understood formally, for beauty exists whenever a thing has duly proportioned parts and the clarity proper to its own genus, whether that be spiritual or corporeal. God is the cause of all beauty because the clarity of creatures is a participa-

<sup>57</sup> S. Thomae Aquinatis, *Opuscula Omnia* (Paris: 1927), II.

tion by way of similitude of the clarity of God Who is the Font of Light. In a somewhat metaphorical tone, St. Thomas speaks of the participations of the luminous divine rays which are causative of beauty in things.

God is Beauty inasmuch as He is the cause of harmony in creation, for He orders all things to Himself as to a final end, either immediately or through the mediation of creatures which are ordained to each other and ultimately to God. God is Beauty, but God may be called "beautiful," and this is by excess. Excess is twofold: one type which is contained within a genus—this is expressed by the comparative or superlative degree of an adjective; another kind which is outside the genera—this is expressed by an adjective to which has been prefixed the adverb *super*. This twofold excess cannot be predicated of creatures, but we can truly say that God is most beautiful and super-beautiful, not as though the Divinity were reduced to a genus, but because all perfections of whatever genus are attributed to Him.

God is most beautiful. In this predication we indicate the absence of all defect in concept of the divine beauty. Beauty in creatures suffers a twofold defect: first, the beauty of creatures is variable; it can begin to be, or cease to exist; it can increase or diminish; secondly, the beauty of creatures is limited and particularized just as the natures of creatures are particularized. This twofold defect found in creatures is excluded from God when He is said to be most beautiful. God is unchangeably beautiful without any limitation whatsoever.

God is super-beautiful. Beauty exists eminently in His simple nature which is the source of all beauty, and in which there pre-exist uniformly all created beauty and all things beautiful after the manner in which multiple effects pre-exist in their cause.

Next follows a consideration of the causality of divine beauty. All being derives from divine beauty. This can be stated in the form of a syllogism: Clarity pertains to the nature of beauty. But every form by which a thing has its being is a participa-

tion of divine clarity; (each thing is beautiful according to its proper nature, i.e., according to its proper form); therefore, all being is derived from Divine Beauty. Furthermore, all relations among creatures, whatsoever they may be, are reducible to the causality of divine beauty, to which pertains harmony or consonance. God, Who is the perfect cause, works in a perfect manner. Unlike creatures, who work to attain an end which they do not possess, God acts for an end which He *is*, i. e., God works for the sake of His beauty which He wishes to communicate to creatures by way of similitude. The divine beauty is the efficient cause of everything inasmuch as all being and motion and the conservation of both proceed from the divine pulchritude. Divine beauty is the final cause of all things, for creation is made to imitate God's beauty. Finally, because all things are distinguished according to God's beauty, the divine pulchritude is the exemplary cause of things.

Next, the commentary reiterates the objective identity of beauty and goodness while maintaining their rational distinction. The reasons for the objective identity of goodness and beauty are, first, that all desire beauty and goodness as a cause, and, secondly, that all things share in goodness and beauty because everything is good and beautiful according to its proper form. A striking example is adduced to demonstrate the latter reason. Because of its simplicity, even prime matter has a similarity with the divine goodness and beauty because the beauty and goodness of God are simple. However, the simplicity of prime matter is by way of defect, while the simplicity of divine goodness and beauty is by way of excess inasmuch as God exists super-substantially. The third reason for the objective identity of goodness and beauty is that clarity and harmony, which pertain to the essence of beauty, are contained in the notion of good. The formal distinction between goodness and beauty consists in this, that to be what it is, i. e., to be constituted in its own proper nature, beauty adds over and above the notion of good an order to the cognitive potency.

This marks the end of the general observations on beauty,

and, more especially, on the divine beauty, which are contained in St. Thomas' *Exposition of the Divine Names*. The following four lectures of the Fourth Chapter deal with particular applications of the above doctrine and add nothing new to the principles already seen. For the sake of completeness, it may be remarked that the next four lectures show examples of the universal causality of the divine beauty which causes all substance, relations, rest and motion which exist in creation. Further, the divine pulchritude is manifestly the final cause of all things because it is most lovable, not only by creatures, but also by God Himself.

#### IV. A SUMMARY OF ST. THOMAS' TEACHING ON BEAUTY

In the first part of this paper, the basic principles of the Thomistic esthetic were discussed. There followed a consideration of St. Thomas' teaching on the divine nature and of man's knowledge of the divinity which served as an introduction to the presentation of his doctrine on the beauty of God as treated in the *Exposition of the Divine Names*. Now, before taking up the applications of this doctrine in the realm of created things, it will be useful to present a brief summation of the basic tenets of St. Thomas' esthetics and of their applications in the *Exposition of the Divine Names*.

1. St. Thomas' concept of beauty is moderately realistic, taking its stand between gross materialism on the one hand, and esoteric idealism on the other. Beauty is fundamentally in things and formally in the mind.

2. Beauty is commensurate with being; and ugliness, like evil and error, is reducible to non-being. Hence, the absolute perfection of that beauty which is God rests on the infinite plenitude of self-subsisting Being. The imperfect beauty of creatures is explained in terms of their corruptible and particularized natures, that is, in terms of their deficiencies in the order of being.<sup>58</sup>

<sup>58</sup> . . . pulchrum et bonum sunt idem subjecto (*In de Div. Nom.*, cap. 4, lect. 5); . . . bonum et ens sunt idem secundum rem (*Summa Theol.*, I, q. 5, a. 1); . . . ad

3. Beauty has a necessary relation to a percipient subject and is defined in the light of this relation.<sup>59</sup> The mind is made to delight in beauty as much as it is made to love goodness and to know truth. The part played by the senses in the appreciation of beauty is ministerial to the act of the intellect<sup>60</sup> wherein the esthetic experience is formally completed.<sup>61</sup>

4. The metaphysical relation of truth and the metaphysical relation of beauty are intimately connected; both pertain to the order of formal causality.<sup>62</sup> Despite this fundamental likeness, truth and beauty are formally diverse. Truth is that by which things are known; beauty is that by which a known thing delights the contemplating subject. Truth is an adequation; beauty renders this adequation delightful. Truth is known; beauty is both known and loved.<sup>63</sup>

5. Beauty and goodness are identical in the subject of which they are predicated. Beauty and goodness delight those who apprehend them, but they are enjoyed in diverse ways, by possession in the case of the good, by contemplation in the case of the beautiful. Beauty and goodness are logically distinct.<sup>64</sup> The good pertains to the order of final causality inasmuch as it is the proper object of the will and is desirable in every realm

pulchritudinem tria requiruntur.—Primo quidem integritas, sive perfectio; quae enim diminuta sunt, hoc ipso turpia sunt (*Ibid.*, I, q. 39, a. 8): cf. *Ibid.*, I, q. 49, a. 1.

<sup>59</sup> . . . pulchrum autem dicatur id cuius ipsa apprehensio placet (*Ibid.*, I-II, q. 27, a. 1, ad 3um).

<sup>60</sup> . . . unde et illi sensus praecipue respiciunt pulchrum qui maxime cognoscitivi sunt, scilicet visus et auditus rationi deservientes (*Ibid.*).

<sup>61</sup> Et ideo in vita contemplativa, quae consistit in actu rationis, per se et essentia- aliter invenitur pulchritudo (*Ibid.*, II-II, q. 180, a. 2, ad 3um).

<sup>62</sup> . . . pulchrum proprie pertinet ad rationem causae formalis (*Ibid.*, I, q. 5, a. 4, ad 1um); *Q. D. de Ver.*, q. 1, a. 2.

<sup>63</sup> Cf. *Summa Theol.*, I, q. 5, a. 4, ad 1um; *Q. D. de Ver.*, q. 1, a. 2.

<sup>64</sup> . . . pulchrum et bonum in subjecto quidem sunt idem . . . sed ratione differunt; nam bonum proprie respicit appetitum, est enim bonum quod omnia appetunt; et ideo habet rationem finis, nam appetitus est quasi quidam motus ad rem. Pulchrum autem respicit vim cognoscitivam: pulchra enim dicuntur quae visa placent (*Summa Theol.*, I, q. 5, a. 4; ad 1um).

of being. Beauty is properly the object of the intellect and is the cause of delight in the order of apprehension and contemplation. The good delights when possessed; the beautiful pleases when seen or known.<sup>65</sup> Beauty has a goodness all its own, a goodness realized in the contemplation of a beautiful object. If the beautiful is desired as an end to be possessed, it must conform to the nature of the good. Properly, the desire for the good can include the desire for beauty, but the beautiful is desirable in itself as the delight of the contemplating subject whose desire is to know and to be delighted, exclusive of a desire to possess.<sup>66</sup>

6. St. Thomas gives three essential constituents of beauty: integrity or perfection; due proportion or consonance; and clarity.<sup>67</sup> These three elements are intimately connected with being, and are conclusive proof of the metaphysical nature of the Thomist esthetic. Integrity or perfection, in its primary meaning, signifies being itself.<sup>68</sup> Proportion concerns order to an end;<sup>69</sup> clarity pertains to intelligibility and truth. Christ the Word, the Truth of the Father, is said to possess clarity.<sup>70</sup> The following schema represents these conclusions graphically.<sup>71</sup>

Quae	Id cuius	Integritas sive perfectio	Ens	Pulchrum
Visa	Apprehensio	Claritas	Verum	
Placent	Placet	Proportio sive consonantia	Bonum	

<sup>65</sup> . . . de ratione boni est quod in eo quietatur appetitus. Sed ad rationem pulchri pertinet quod in ejus aspectu seu cognitione quietetur appetitus (*Ibid.*, I-II, q. 27, a. 1, ad 3um).

<sup>66</sup> Appetitum terminari ad bonum et pacem et pulchrum non est terminari in diversa (*Q. D. de Ver.*, q. 22, a. 2, ad 12um); . . . pulchrum autem dicatur id cuius ipsa apprehensio placet (*Summa Theol.*, I-II, q. 27, a. 1, ad 3um).

<sup>67</sup> Ad pulchritudinem tria requiruntur. Primo quidem integritas sive perfectio . . . et debita proportio sive consonantia . . . et iterum claritas (*Ibid.*, I, q. 39, a. 8).

<sup>68</sup> Duplex est integritas; una quae attenditur secundum perfectionem primam quae consistit in ipso esse rei . . . (*IV Sent.*, d. 26, q. 2, a. 4).

<sup>69</sup> Et ex hoc quod omnia in omnibus inveniuntur ordine quodam, sequitur quod omnia ad idem ultimum ordinentur (*In de Div. Nom.*, cap. 4, lect. 5).

<sup>70</sup> Et inquantum est verbum perfectum Patris, habet claritatem quae irradiat super omnia et in quo omnia resplendent (*I Sent.*, d. 31, q. 2, a. 1).

<sup>71</sup> Gerald B. Phelan, *op. cit.*, p. 143; Intellectus autem per prius apprehendit ipsum ens, et secundario apprehendit se intelligere ens, et tertio apprehendit se

7. Beauty is an absolutely simple perfection caused in creatures by God,<sup>72</sup> and predicated of the divine essence by analogy of proper proportionality. Beauty exists in God formally and eminently, as multiple effects pre-exist in a simple cause.<sup>73</sup>

8. God is beauty, and He causes all beauty inasmuch as He causes all clarity and proportion in nature. He does this out of love for His own beauty which He desires to see reflected in His creatures.<sup>74</sup> Further, divine beauty is the efficient, final, and exemplary cause of all things.<sup>75</sup>

9. The universal causality of divine pulchritude extends to the being, relations, motion and rest, and distinctions of whatever kind that exist in creation.<sup>76</sup>

10. Divine goodness and beauty are the final cause of all being and action.<sup>77</sup>

#### V. THE DIVINE BEAUTY IN ITSELF

Certain applications of the doctrine already seen will now be made in order to manifest the full import of the principles of St. Thomas' esthetics. We will first consider the conditions for beauty in relation to the divine essence; and, secondly, the divine beauty in the Most Blessed Trinity.

appetere ens. Unde primo est ratio entis, secundo ratio veri, tertio ratio boni (*Summa Theol.*, I, q. 16, a. 4, ad 2um).

<sup>72</sup> Pulchritudo enim creaturae nihil est aliud quam similitudo divinae pulchritudinis in rebus participata (*In de Div. Nom.*, cap. 4, lect. 5).

<sup>73</sup> In ipsa enim natura simplici et supernaturali omnium pulchrorum ab ea derivatorum, praeeexistunt omnis pulchritudo et omne pulchrum, non quidem divisim, sed uniformiter, per modum quo multiplices effectus in causa praeeexistunt (*Ibid.*).

<sup>74</sup> Omnia enim facta sunt ut divinam pulchritudinem qualitercumque imitentur (*Ibid.*).

<sup>75</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>76</sup> *Ibid.*, cap. 4, lect. 6, 8. The proper interpretation of this teaching requires certain distinctions made in the light of the whole synthesis.

<sup>77</sup> . . . omnia ex desiderio pulchri et boni "faciunt et volunt quaecumque faciunt et volunt" (*In de Div. Nom.*, cap. 4, lect. 9).

### 1. THE CONDITIONS FOR BEAUTY VERIFIED OF THE DIVINE ESSENCE AND ATTRIBUTES

Integrity or perfection is the first essential constituent of beauty noted by St. Thomas.<sup>78</sup> A thing is perfect when it lacks nothing that is required for its perfection. Now God is most perfect because He has all things required for His infinite perfection.<sup>79</sup> Further, God, Who is Pure Act, is absolutely perfect, because a thing is said to be perfect inasmuch as it is in act.<sup>80</sup>

Proportion or harmony is the second constituent of beauty.<sup>81</sup> Proportion is a species of order, and order requires some kind of distinction, either real or logical. Order further requires a certain compatibility on the part of those things which are to be ordered, because insociable parts cannot partake of a mutual order.<sup>82</sup> In the perfect unity and simplicity of the divine essence there is no real distinction, no actual division into parts. However, the created intellect can conceive of distinction in God, and it is because of this virtual distinction that we can speak of the order in the divine nature. Thus we speak of the distinction of the divine essence from the divine intellect and will, when, in the reality of God's nature, these three are really one in the perfect unity of identity. When we conceive of God as existing and as knowing and willing things other than Himself we are face to face with the mystery of great diversity existing in perfect unity, and we catch a glimpse of that perfection of order which is harmony in God.

Clarity, the last element of beauty,<sup>83</sup> is a kind of light which may be either spiritual or corporeal. The clarity of God is most strikingly evident in His knowledge of Himself and of things other than Himself. God's knowledge is identical with His sub-

<sup>78</sup> *Summa Theol.*, I, q. 39, a. 8.

<sup>79</sup> Perfectum autem dicitur cui nihil deest secundum modum suae perfectionis (*Ibid.*, I, q. 5, a. 5).

<sup>80</sup> In tantum est autem perfectum unumquodque, in quantum est in actu (*Ibid.*, I, q. 5, a. 1).

<sup>81</sup> *Ibid.*, I, q. 39, a. 8.

<sup>82</sup> E. Dubois, *De Exemplarismo Divino* (Rome: 1899) IV, 235.

<sup>83</sup> *Summa Theol.*, I, q. 39, a. 8.

stance,<sup>84</sup> and the "knowledge of approbation" in God is the cause of creatures.<sup>85</sup> As St. John rightly says: "God is Light, and in Him there is no darkness."<sup>86</sup> The Church, too, calls God "Light" when she chants in the Nicene Creed, "Light of the Light," and applies this name to the Word Who proceeds from the Father by intellectual generation.<sup>87</sup> The light of divine knowledge and the Light which is the Son give us some idea of the clarity of God which is the source of all light and clarity in creation.

Having verified the three conditions for beauty of the divine essence in itself, we now consider the beauty of the divine attributes. All of the attributes are reducible either to the divine being (the source of the entitative attributes) or to the divine intelligence or will (the sources of the operative attributes). Thus, for example, unity, simplicity, and eternity pertain to the being or essence of God; knowledge, life and truth pertain to the divine intelligence; holiness, justice, and love to the divine will; beauty, providence, and predestination pertain to the divine intellect and will conjointly.<sup>88</sup> In the ordination of the divine attributes all the conditions for beauty can be verified. In the divine attributes we find infinite perfection commensurate with the infinite perfections of God which are free of all imperfection. The attributes exist formally in God, but they are not formally distinct. So great is the harmony and unity of the divine attributes that they mutually include one another actually and implicitly. The harmony or proportion of God's attributes is so perfect that it is founded on the real identity of them all as they are conceived as virtually distinct. The clarity of the divine essence is seen throughout the divine

<sup>84</sup> Necessum est dicere quod intelligere Dei est ejus substantia (*Ibid.*, I, q. 14, a. 4).

<sup>85</sup> Deus per intellectum suum causat res, cum suum esse sit suum intelligere. Unde scientia Dei secundum quod est causa rerum, consuevit nominari scientia approbationis (*Ibid.*, I, q. 14, a. 8.).

<sup>86</sup> *I John*, i, v.

<sup>87</sup> Processio Verbi in divinis habet rationem generationis; procedit enim per modum intelligibilis actionis (*Summa Theol.*, I, q. 27, a. 2).

<sup>88</sup> R. Garrigou-Lagrange, O.P., *op. cit.*, p. 165; *Summa Theol.*, I, qq. 3, 14, 25.

attributes, and is the light in which God comprehends Himself and by which He sees all things in His essence. The spiritual clarity of the divine attributes is most perfect.<sup>89</sup>

## 2. THE BEAUTY OF THE MOST BLESSED TRINITY

The three persons of the Trinity are really distinct from each other. Unlike the divine attributes which are only virtually distinct, the persons in God are really distinct from each other although they are one in nature.<sup>90</sup> This distinction of the persons is founded on the opposition of real and mutual relations which obtain among the persons. Because of the opposition of paternity to filiation, and of active to passive spiration, there are three really distinct persons in the Blessed Trinity; the Father, Son and Holy Spirit. The two processions in God i. e., that by which the Son proceeds from the Father and that by which the Holy Spirit proceeds from both Father and Son, are virtually distinct from the divine nature which is the remote principle of both processions.<sup>91</sup> The proximate principle of the first procession is the divine intellect, connoting the relation of paternity; the proximate principle of the second procession is the divine will, connoting the active spiration common to the Father and the Son.<sup>92</sup>

<sup>89</sup> E. Dubois, *op. cit.*, IV no. 241.

<sup>90</sup> . . . oportet quod in Deo sit realis distinctio, non quidem secundum rem absolutam, quae est essentia, in qua est summa unitas et simplicitas, sed secundum rem relativam (*Summa Theol.*, I, q. 28, a. 3); Sicut igitur ponitur pluralitas personarum in divinis, ita utendum est nomine trinitatis; quia hoc idem quod significat pluralitas indeterminate, significat hoc nomen, trinitas, determinate (*Ibid.*, I, q. 31, a. 1).

<sup>91</sup> . . . in divinis sunt duae processiones . . . processio Verbi . . . et praeter processionem Verbi . . . processio amoris (*Ibid.*, I, q. 27, a. 3); . . . relatio realiter existens in Deo est idem essentiae secundum rem, et non differt nisi secundum intelligentiae rationem . . . Patet ergo quod in Deo non est aliud esse relationis et essentiae, sed unum et idem (*Ibid.*, I, q. 28, a. 2).

<sup>92</sup> . . . processio Verbi in divinis . . . procedit enim per modum intelligibilis actionis . . . et a principio conjuncto . . . et secundum rationem similitudinis, quia conceptio intellectus est similitudo rei intellectae . . . unde processio Verbi in divinis dicitur generatio et ipsum Verbum procedens dicitur Filius (*Ibid.*, I, q. 27, a. 2); . . . cum in hoc quod est esse principium Spiritus Sancti, non opponuntur relative, sequitur quod Pater et Filius sunt unum principium Spiritus Sancti (*Ibid.*, I, q. 34, a. 4).

In this procession of the divine persons we find infinite beauty. The Father, Who is the principle of the Trinity, contains within Himself the infinite perfection of the divine nature with which He is identified.<sup>93</sup> In the Son, Who is the perfect image of the Father,<sup>94</sup> the Father understands all perfection, both created and uncreated. It is in the intellectual generation of the Word that the divine clarity shines forth. Harmony is evident in the Trinity from the manner in which the persons proceed from each other according to the order of nature and without priority.<sup>95</sup> Moreover, only the three persons comprehend and adequately love the infinite perfection of their own sublime nature. "There are three Who give testimony in heaven, the Father, the Word and the Holy Ghost. And these three are one."<sup>96</sup> In the innermost life of the Blessed Trinity, in the ineffable acts of knowledge and love which constitute this life, there is the contemplation of the divine beauty, the delightful comprehension of the effulgent and harmonious perfection which is the Triune God.

It should be noted here that St. Thomas takes pains to show how fitting is the appropriation of beauty to the Son. In the very nature of Christ and in the hypostatic union we find the three conditions of beauty verified in a most sublime manner.<sup>97</sup> The most perfect integrity is found in the hypostatic union because, as the Son, Christ has all the ineffable perfection of the divine nature of the Father together with a most perfect human nature which is, so to speak, a compendium of all created perfection inasmuch as it contains both spiritual and corporeal

<sup>93</sup> Cum Pater sit a quo procedit alius, sequitur quod Pater est principium (*Ibid.*, I, q. 33, a. 1); cf. *Ibid.*, I, q. 29, a. 2.

<sup>94</sup> Qui est imago Dei invisibilis (*Coloss.*, i, xv).

<sup>95</sup> In divinis dicitur principium secundum originem absque prioritate. Unde oportet ibi esse ordinem secundum originem absque prioritate. Et his vocatur ordo naturae, non quo alter sit prius altero, sed quo alter est ex altero (*Summa Theol.*, I, q. 42, a. 3).

<sup>96</sup> *I John*, v, vii. This is a citation of the *Joannine Comma*, concerning the authorship of which there has been much controversy. The inspiration and veracity of the pericope are beyond cavil, because this passage comprises part of the text as received into the canon.

<sup>97</sup> *Summa Theol.*, I, q. 39, a. 8.

perfection. In Christ are the highest possible degrees of the perfection of nature, grace, and glory. In Christ is also to be found the greatest clarity. The Word is the light or clarity of God substantially, and in Him is the most perfect created light, both natural and supernatural, which He has as man, ". . . in Whom are hidden all the treasures of wisdom and of knowledge."<sup>98</sup> In the hypostatic union is to be found the most sublime harmony, for as the perfect image of the Father, there is in Christ the perfect proportion of equality with the divine nature. Christ contains all the perfections of both divine and human natures and unites them substantially in His person. This union in the person is the greatest of all created unions.

## VI. THE DIVINE BEAUTY IN RELATION TO CREATURES

Beauty finds its ineffable perfection in the Blessed Trinity and its most perfect expression in the person of Christ. This beauty is appreciated perfectly only by the Trinity itself, for no created intellect can compass the divinity. However, we must not conclude that the esthetic of Thomism denies beauty to creatures. This ineffable beauty of God is reflected throughout creation.<sup>99</sup> We will consider certain examples of the reflection of the divine beauty in the orders of nature, created grace and glory. No attempt is made to exhaust the possibilities of applying the doctrine; our purpose is to demonstrate the application of universal principles in a few representative instances.

### 1. THE DIVINE BEAUTY REFLECTED IN NATURE AND ART

The world about us abounds with the beauties of nature and of art. Anyone who is properly disposed can find many works of human art to allay his thirst for beauty, and the beauties of nature are thrust, so to speak, upon the faculties of even those who would ignore them. The beauties of the universe wait to enlighten the mind and delight the heart of the beholder and,

<sup>98</sup> *Coloss.*, ii, iii.

<sup>99</sup> *Quia enim propriam pulchritudinem habet, vult eam multiplicare sicut possile est, silicet per communicationem sua similitudinis* (*In de Div. Nom.*, cap. 4, lect. 5).

eventually, to lead him to that beauty which is God. The beauty of the harmonious operations of the intellectual virtues, the beauty of the great intellectual monuments which are the products of reason and these virtues, the beauty discovered in the truth after long study—all these are reflections of the supreme beauty we call God.

Beauty is found also in the moral order. Inasmuch as the moral virtues share in the ordination of reason they share also in beauty.<sup>100</sup> By contrast, the beauty of the moral order can be appreciated in terms of moral evil which is manifest when human actions are devoid of the governance of reason.

## 2. THE DIVINE BEAUTY REFLECTED IN THE ORDER OF GRACE

The three theological virtues of Faith, Hope and Charity contain all the elements of spiritual beauty. Everything required for union with God in this life comes with the theological virtues, and in this consists their integrity or perfection. Theirs is the light of grace which, although dim in comparison with the light of glory, is, nevertheless, far superior to the clarity of unaided reason. The condition of proportion or harmony is admirably fulfilled in the twofold order of origin and of dignity which obtains among these three virtues.<sup>101</sup>

The infused moral virtues presuppose the theological virtues and enable man to discharge the duties incumbent upon him from the divine law and from his supernatural end. These virtues are had together or not at all, for their roots are in charity<sup>102</sup>; and their perfection consists in this, that they dispose and enable man to fulfill the duties of his supernatural moral life. The clarity of these virtues is the light of infused

<sup>100</sup> In virtutibus autem moralibus invenitur pulchritudo participative, in quantum scilicet participant ordinem rationis (*Summa Theol.*, II-II, q. 180, a. 2, ad 3um).

<sup>101</sup> Ordine quidem generationis . . . in uno et eodem fides praecedit spem et spes charitatem secundum actus; nam habitus simul infunduntur . . . ordine vero perfectionis charitas praecedit fidem et spem eo quod tam fides quam spes per charitatem formatur et perfectionem virtutis acquirit (*Ibid.*, I-II, q. 62, a. 4).\*

<sup>102</sup> . . . hujusmodi virtutes morales (infusae) sine charitate esse non possunt (*Ibid.*, I-II, q. 65, a. 2).

prudence perfecting the practical intellect supernaturally, and effecting the supernatural direction of the three appetitive potencies through the three virtues of temperance, justice, and fortitude.<sup>103</sup> The harmony of the infused moral virtues is seen in their mutual ordination to each other,<sup>104</sup> and in the perfect moderation and harmony of the human acts which they direct to their supernatural end. Thus the infused moral virtues, in their fulfillment of the conditions of beauty, are beautiful by participation in the beauty of God.

The gifts of the Holy Ghost which render men docile to the inspirations of the Spirit<sup>105</sup> are also an object of beauty in the order of grace. The perfection of these gifts lies in this, that they render man docile, not to the lesser motion of reason which operates through the virtues, but rather to that perfect motion which is from God.<sup>106</sup> The perfection of the gifts which dispose man to be moved by the Holy Spirit is greater than the perfection of the moral and intellectual virtues which perfect either the reason or other faculties in their relation to reason. Yet the gifts are less perfect than the theological virtues by which man is joined to God.<sup>107</sup> The clarity found in the gifts is the clarity of faith joined with the light of those gifts which perfect the intellect.<sup>108</sup> The harmony among the gifts has been aptly stated thus: "The seven Gifts make the soul resemble a seven-stringed lyre upon which the Spirit plays wonderful harmonies. The seven Gifts are ordained to the seven opera-

<sup>103</sup> *Ibid.*, II-II, q. 180, a. 2, ad 3um.

<sup>104</sup> *Ibid.*, I-II, q. 66, a. 4.

<sup>105</sup> *Dona Spiritus Sancti sunt quidam habitus quibus homo perficitur ad prompte obediendum Spiritui Sancto* (*Ibid.*, I-II, q. 68, a. 3).

<sup>106</sup> *Sed in ordine ad finem ultimum supernaturalem, ad quem ratio movet, secundum quod est aliqualiter et imperfecte informata per virtutes theologicas, non sufficit ipsa motio rationis, nisi desuper adsit instinctus et motio Spiritus Sancti . . . Et ideo ad illam finem consequendam necessarium est homini habere donum Spiritus Sancti* (*Ibid.*, I-II, q. 68, a. 2).

<sup>107</sup> Cf. *Ibid.*, I-II, q. 68, a. 8.

<sup>108</sup> *Omnia enim haec quattuor (sc. sapientia, intellectus, scientia et consilium) ordinantur ad supernaturalem cognitionem, quae in nobis per fidem fundatur* (*Ibid.*, II-II, q. 8, a. 6); *Prima autem unio hominis (cum Spiritu Sancto) est per fidem, spem et caritatem* (*Ibid.*, I-II, q. 68, a. 4, ad 3um).

tions of the soul which they sanctify; to the seven principal virtues which they strengthen; to the seven Beatitudes which they cause in this life; to the seven capital vices which they extirpate; to the seven Sacraments by which they are communicated; to the seven petitions of the Lord's Prayer by which they are besought; and to the seven gifts of glory which they merit.”<sup>109</sup>

### 3. THE DIVINE BEAUTY IN THE ORDER OF GLORY

St. Thomas' treatment of beatitude begins in a negative way. He first discusses those things which do not pertain to man's beatitude. Then he begins to set forth his doctrine positively. Man's beatitude consists formally in the vision of the divine essence.<sup>110</sup> The actual possession of beatitude consists in that operation which is the most perfect operation of man's most perfect faculty directed to the most perfect object which that faculty can attain.<sup>111</sup> The operation by which man attains his beatitude is an act of the speculative intellect by which he contemplates the divine essence. A cold, speculative vision of the divine essence would be insufficient for beatitude, because it would leave the appetitive side of man's nature without joy. Upon the act of the intellect seeing God's essence follows an act of the will delighting in the vision.

The relation of the intellect and the will in the possession and enjoyment of beatitude is thus described by St. Thomas:

It is fitting that the operation of the intellect, which is vision, should enjoy a preeminence over delectation. For delectation consists in a certain repose of the will; but that the will should rest in anything

<sup>109</sup> E. Dubois, *op. cit.*, IV 258; cf. *Summa Theol.*, I-II, q. 68, aa. 4 & 7.

<sup>110</sup> Ultimus hominis finis est bonum increatum, scilicet Deus, qui solus sua infinita bonitate potest voluntatem hominis perfecte implere (*Ibid.*, I-II, q. 3, a. 1).

<sup>111</sup> . . . si beatitudo hominis est operatio, oportet quod sit optima operatio hominis. Optima operatio hominis est quae est optimae potentiae respectu optimi objecti (*Ibid.*, I-II, q. 3, a. 5); Est enim beatitudo ultima hominis perfectio. Unumquodque autem in tantum perfectum est, in quantum est actu; nam potentia sine actu imperfecta est. Oportet ergo beatitudinem in ultimo actu hominis consistere. Manifestum est autem quod operatio est ultimus actus operantis; . . . Necesse est ergo beatitudinem hominis operationem esse (*Ibid.*, I-II, q. 3, a. 2).

is only by reason of the goodness inherent in the object in which it rests. If, therefore, the will should find repose in any operation, the repose of the will proceeds from the goodness of that operation. Nor does the will seek the good because of the repose; for thus the very act of the will would become its end which contradicts what has been said above. . . and thus it seeks its rest in an operation because that operation is its good. Whence it is manifest that the very operation in which the will finds its rest is more principally a good for the will than the repose of the will therein.<sup>112</sup>

Not only are the intellect and the will occupied in the fruition of beatitude, but the lower faculties are also employed. "The entire man is perfected in perfect beatitude, but in the lower faculties by redundancy from his higher faculties."<sup>113</sup> Man will be perfectly happy with the vision of God, for "the very sight of God causes delight and he who sees God can never be unhappy."<sup>114</sup> The ultimate perfection which is the object of man's desire will consist principally of contemplation in the future life.<sup>115</sup> St. Thomas previously remarked that beauty is found "*per se* and essentially in the contemplative life," and so beauty must have some part in man's ultimate beatitude.<sup>116</sup>

When St. Thomas says that in beatitude "the very sight of God causes delight,"<sup>117</sup> we hear echoes of his definition, "That whose very apprehension (or sight) pleases us is called beautiful."<sup>118</sup> The entirety of St. Thomas' tract on man's beatitude clearly indicates an unending contemplation of the divine beauty. The delight consequent upon the apprehension of formal beatitude is analogous to the esthetic experience, for only the divine beauty can simultaneously illumine the intellect and enrapture the will. In what other act of the intellect except that by which we see the essence of God could the will find its eternal complacence? Only in the contemplation of subsisting beauty can man find the fullness of his eternal happiness.

<sup>112</sup> *Ibid.*, q. 4, a. 2.

<sup>113</sup> *Ibid.*, q. 3, a. 3, ad 3um.

<sup>114</sup> *Ibid.*, I-II, q. 4, a. 1, ad 2um.

<sup>115</sup> . . . in contemplatione divinorum maxime consistit beatitudo (*Ibid.*, I-II, q. 3, a. 5).

<sup>116</sup> *Ibid.*, II-II, q. 180, a. 2, ad 3um.

<sup>117</sup> *Ibid.*, I-II, q. 4, a. 1, ad 2um.

<sup>118</sup> *Ibid.*, I-II, q. 27, a. 1, ad 3um.

And what of man in possession of this ineffable beauty? What happens to that creature who is so affected by the ecstasy resulting from contemplating lesser beauty? He is transformed. Were it not for the infused light of glory man would be purblind and unseeing in the face of divine beauty. Man must be elevated and strengthened to see God;<sup>119</sup> and, once elevated, must be sustained lest he lose the sight of that Beauty which ravishes his being. Without the constant presence of the infused habit of the light of glory, man could not continue to contemplate the vision which is his beatitude. In the face of the clarity of divine beauty, man's soul will glow and his body will become effulgent with the resplendence of his soul,<sup>120</sup> according to the promise of Christ, "Then shall the just shine as the sun in the kingdom of their Father."<sup>121</sup> From the infused habit of the light of glory, man's intellect will become proportioned to the object of his beatitude, and in the perfect operations of all his faculties he will be eternally happy in the contemplation of that beauty which is God.

## VII. CONCLUSION

Perhaps there never will be a completely satisfying explanation of the fact that St. Thomas did not develop scientifically the concept of divine beauty in the *Summa Theologica*. This apparent neglect undoubtedly strikes the modern mind much more forcibly than it affected the contemporaries of the Angelic Doctor. He lived in an age of faith and reason when men were devoted to a love of the good and the pursuit of truth. The blindness resulting from materialistic pursuits and the blight of uncreative activity was not then, as now, the lot of the people. The spiritual foundations of society were preserved and

<sup>119</sup> . . . lumen creatum est necessarium ad videndum Dei essentiam, non quod per hoc lumen Dei essentia intelligibilis fiat, quae secundum se intelligibilis est, sed ad hoc quod intellectus fiat potens ad intelligendum, per modum quo potentia fit potentior ad operandum per habitum (*Ibid.*, I, q. 12, a. 5, ad 1um).

<sup>120</sup> . . . claritas illa causabitur ex redundantia gloriae animae in corpus (*Ibid.*, Suppl., q. 85, a. 1).

<sup>121</sup> *Matt.*, xiii, 43.

strengthened by faith and reason, men cared for truth and goodness, and as Eric Gill once said, "beauty looked after herself." Beauty was accepted as something familiar, it was everywhere—in the churches, the public buildings, the ordinary articles of everyday life produced by the guilds. The concept of the beauty of God would be less of a puzzle in such an age than it is today when beauty is never sought on the production-line but is rather relegated to art-galleries and museums. The fine arts today are not the inheritance of the people, they are rather the playthings of an esoteric clique, which, when judged by its products, is so spiritually impoverished that its members cannot conceive, let alone express, the idea of divine beauty.

The esthetic of St. Thomas is essentially metaphysical. Its principles are as universally applicable today as when they were first enunciated. In the *Summa*, the sharp analysis of truth and goodness, coupled with the principles of esthetics furnish adequate equipment for developing the concept of divine beauty. In his *Exposition of the Divine Names*, he does no more than apply these principles to the teachings of Pseudo-Denis. Conclusions are always contained in principles, and it may well be that St. Thomas deliberately left the principles of esthetics to be applied by others while he busied himself about matters which were less familiar and more necessary to his age.

Theology, as has been said, offers little in the way of a complete treatment of divine beauty. Scholastic philosophy has not made itself felt in the field of esthetics. Yet both of these developments are necessary for the present day. Modern art is in a sorry state; it is highly materialistic and consequently devitalized. Much of it is an admission that people are "gutted of inspiration and robbed of belief." Consequently, much modern art vitiates the spirit because it is divorced from goodness and truth. The restoration of art is definitely in order, but there is an insufficient theological and philosophical development available to guide those who would undertake the task. Art should be enlisted on the side of the spirit, it should be an aid and not a hindrance to those who would enter the temple of God through "the gate called beautiful."

The restoration of art depends on the restoration of wisdom, which is to say, a restoration of Theology. It is only when men begin to think, judge, and act in accordance with divine truth that the integration of art and life and their ultimate direction to the final common good will be possible. The Theologian must labor unremittingly for the development and diffusion of his science.

In the moral order there is a need for the presentation of the divine beauty. Materialism and hedonism are the plague of the soul, and they are expressed negatively by a lack of temperance. Of all the moral virtues, temperance shares most fully in the nature of beauty, because temperance best prepares man for contemplation wherein beauty itself is to be found. The love of beauty is not possessive, and if men were led to a love of moral beauty there would be unfolded to them a way of life more in conformity with their spiritual nature, precisely because a true love of beauty frees man from the debasing results of materialistic and hedonistic pursuits. This, of course, demands that greater effort be made to develop the science of esthetics and to perfect our knowledge of the divine beauty.

St. Thomas' teaching about beauty, and about the divine beauty in particular, is only a beginning. Much remains to be done in the way of co-ordination and application of principles which are universal and timeless because they are metaphysical. To say that the Thomist esthetics is metaphysical ". . . is not to suggest that with St. Thomas everything has been said and there is nothing further to be done; on the contrary, the Thomist world view is not an end but a beginning: it means not that there is no further need of thought but that thought can be begun without fear of sterility."<sup>122</sup>

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<sup>122</sup> Gerald Vann, O. P., *Saint Thomas Aquinas* (New York: 1940), p. 34.

## THE CERTITUDE OF HOPE

*(Second Installment)*

640

### II. THOMISTIC DOCTRINE

#### I. EXISTENCE OF THE CERTITUDE OF HOPE

**I**N a consideration concerning the certitude of theological hope, just as in a consideration of anything, two fundamental problems immediately present themselves. The first concerns the very existence of this certitude of hope (*an sit*), while the second inquires still further into its very nature (*quid sit*). These two considerations, in fact, form an adequate division of this subject in the writings of St. Thomas Aquinas. For that reason we will employ the same division in this exposition of the Thomistic doctrine on the subject.

It should be borne in mind from the beginning that the existence of this certitude offered no great difficulty to the mind of St. Thomas, nor indeed, to most of the great theologians. Consequently the main part of most treatments of the subject deals rather with the problem of the nature of hope. However, three distinct arguments are apparent even in the discussion of its existence. The probative force of the first is founded upon the authority of Sacred Scripture, while in the second the authority of Aristotle is cited arguing from reason concerning the nature of virtue. The third is an argument of comparison between the primary principles of hope and faith in man.

From the third quarter of the twelfth century, the accepted definition of theological hope has been, "a sure expectation of future beatitude."<sup>51</sup> Nor was the concept of certainty added to the idea of expectation without reason. There is firm founda-

<sup>51</sup> *Summa Theol.*, II-II, q. 18, a. 4, *Sed Contra*, . . . certa expectatio futurae beatitudinis; Petrus Lombardus, *III Sent.*, d. XXVI.

tion for this in Sacred Scripture: "For I know whom I have believed, and I am certain that he is able to keep that which I have committed to him, against that day."<sup>52</sup> St. Paul thus expressed his firm conviction that he would not be confounded in his hope which emanated from the magnitude of God promising it, for God is able to preserve his Apostle until death.

Not only did the Apostle's hope contain certainty, for this is proper to the virtue itself regardless of him who possesses it: "And hope confoundeth not: because the charity of God is poured forth in our hearts, by the Holy Ghost, who is given to us."<sup>53</sup> Hope itself does not confound, that is, that by which we hope is not found wanting unless we separate ourselves from that principle of hope. Only he is said to be confounded by hope who separates himself from the omnipotent helping God in whom his hope rests. Thus "no one hath hope in the Lord, and hath been confounded."<sup>54</sup>

And the reason why the virtue of hope does not confound is "because the charity of God is poured forth in our hearts, by the Holy Ghost who is given to us."<sup>55</sup> It makes no difference whether we consider here the charity by which God loves us, or that by which we love God; both are poured forth in our hearts by the Holy Ghost. Moreover, charity is understood in both ways when it is said that hope does not confound. If we consider that charity by which God loves us it is manifest that He will not deny Himself to those whom He loves; "He hath loved the people and all the saints are in His hand."<sup>56</sup> Likewise, if we consider that charity by which we love God, it is manifest that He has prepared eternal goods for those who love Him: "He that loveth me, shall be loved of my Father: And I will love him and will manifest myself to him."<sup>57</sup> Because of this charity, then, hope does not confound, that is, hope is certain.

If this is not true, then, "why did Christ, when as yet we were weak, according to the time, die for the ungodly?"<sup>58</sup>

<sup>52</sup> *II Timothy*, i, 12.

<sup>53</sup> *Romans*, v, 5.

<sup>54</sup> *Eccl.*, ii, 11.

<sup>55</sup> *Rom.*, v, 5.

<sup>56</sup> *Deut.*, xxxiii, 3.

<sup>57</sup> *John*, xiv, 21.

<sup>58</sup> *Rom.*, v, 6.

Thus St. Paul supported this reason by the death of Christ, and gives us further proof for the existence of this certitude. Christ died for the ungodly. This is surely a great thing if we consider both the person who died, Christ, and those for whom He died, the ungodly. Furthermore, such a great event could not happen unless it is brought about for some sure and certain end, for “what profit is there in my blood, whilst I go down to corruption?”<sup>59</sup> This is like saying, there is no profit, if the salvation of mankind does not follow. St. Paul’s whole argument may be paraphrased in this way: Theological hope has certitude because the charity of God is poured forth in our hearts by the Holy Ghost, since that is why Christ died for us.

The second argument for the existence of this certitude may be stated briefly as follows: <sup>59a</sup> What is true of all virtues inasmuch as they are virtues is true of theological hope, because whatever is true of all is true of each one. But every virtue, inasmuch as it is a virtue, has certainty in its determination towards its end. Therefore theological hope, being a virtue, has certainty.<sup>60</sup> This argument is founded upon the philosophical doctrine of Aristotle that virtue is more certain than art. As can be seen at a glance, the burden of this proof rests upon the certainty here predicated of virtue by its very nature. Since this will be treated at length later it is sufficient here merely to indicate the general outline of the argumentation. Every virtue is essentially a perfect operative habit. But habits, since they are similar to a second nature, act after the manner of nature, that is, towards a sure and determined end, by means of sure and determined ways, and from a sure and determined inclination, which is the natural inclination of the natural agent towards its proper end. Natural agents thus determined are therefore said to have a threefold certitude, that is, of end, inclination and operation. Likewise this certitude is found in operative habits or virtues, and consequently in hope.<sup>61</sup> Thus,

<sup>59</sup> *Psalm*, xxix, 10.

<sup>59a</sup> St. Thomas, *Comm. in III Sent.*, d. 26, q. 2, a. 4.

<sup>60</sup> *III Sent.*, d. 26, q. 2, a. 4.

<sup>61</sup> Fr. Ramirez, “De certitudine Spei,” *La Cientia Thomista* (Sept. 1938), p. 195.

certitude not only exists in hope, but is an essential attribute of that virtue. Moreover, this certitude is predicated of hope in an even greater proportion since, according to St. Paul,<sup>62</sup> hope is an anchor of the soul, and consequently of the powers and virtues of the soul.

The final argument for the existence of the certitude of hope may be stated in the following manner: Just as faith adheres to first truth, so also hope adheres to supreme bounty, because it proceeds from grace. But just as first truth cannot deceive, so also bounty cannot fail. Therefore, just as there is certitude in faith so also there is certitude in hope.<sup>63</sup>

This supreme bounty is the omnipotent helping hand of God (*omnipotentia auxilians*), the moving principle of hope, and upon this omnipotent help rest not only our hope but also the certitude of that hope. Certainly there is no power strong enough to negate the omnipotent power of God. If then the will of God has determined to exercise this omnipotent help towards us nothing can be more certain and sure than our hope of eternal beatitude through this help. But the very life and works of the Son of God, and particularly His passion and death, demonstrate the bounty of God towards men. Consequently, hope of eternal beatitude through the omnipotent help of God, the supreme bounty, cannot be uncertain, but must be of the most certain order.

## II. THE NATURE OF THE CERTITUDE OF HOPE

In order to understand the complete doctrine of St. Thomas concerning the certitude of hope it is necessary to compare the two treatments of the subject in the *Commentary on the Sentences* and in the *Summa Theologica*. In the former work he lays down all the fundamental principles, while in the *Summa* he proceeds to further speculation. Consequently we will view these two works separately and attempt to point out the advancement made in the later work.

<sup>62</sup> *Hebrews*, vi, 19.

<sup>63</sup> Fr. Ramirez, *op. cit.*

### 1. *Commentarium in Sententias*

The influence of St. Albert on the thought of St. Thomas in this treatment of the certitude of hope is very marked. In fact, the fundamental notions contained in this treatment have been seen before in the writings of St. Albert. However, over and above what is contained in the works of St. Albert, St. Thomas adds the certitude of divine ordination. Moreover, this work is a refutation of other preceding scholars, and is strongly opposed to all those who taught that the certitude of hope is conditional. Thus in the first place we have a refutation of the theory of conditional certitude.

Without a profound understanding of the two concepts of certitude and of hope, the very idea of the certitude of hope might seem to be a contradiction in terms. Indeed, certitude properly speaking is predicated of the intellectual faculty, while hope as a virtue resides in the appetite. This is surely a major difficulty. Moreover, it has been pointed out that some who have hope of eternal life will never attain it. This too would seem to destroy the certitude of hope. Likewise, it is argued that no one will attain eternal life unless he possesses charity and grace. But since one does not know with absolute certainty whether he possesses these now or will have them at the end, there can be no certitude in our hope of eternal life.<sup>64</sup> These are the principal difficulties and all of them are the result of a misunderstanding of the true nature of the certitude of hope.

St. Thomas was thoroughly conscious of these difficulties when he undertook to propose a solution to this problem. Nevertheless, however insuperable these objections may seem to be, there must be an explanation since the Sacred Scriptures themselves attest the existence of the certitude of hope. Proceeding quite logically, the Angelic Doctor first examined the existing explanations and determined wherein they erred as well as their effectiveness to explain the difficulties in an adequate manner. Thus, in view of the apparently insuperable nature of

<sup>64</sup> *III Sent.* d. 26, q. 2, a. 4, obj. 1, 2, 5.

the first objection, some had held that hope has no certitude unless from faith, which is in the intellect. The difference between them, moreover, consisted in this, that the certitude of faith concerns the universal while that of hope concerns the particular. For that reason we are sure, by faith, that every good person will attain eternal life; but by hope we are sure that this particular individual will have eternal life if he perseveres. Therefore the certitude of faith is universal and absolute, but the certitude of hope is particular and conditional.<sup>65</sup> St. Thomas could not agree with this explanation. In fact he stated explicitly that it could not stand, and therefore we must seek another. According to the above explanation, we must conclude that faith and hope are neither diverse habits nor do they exist in different faculties of the soul, since the universal and particular do not diversify essences or habits. It was this apparent falsity which led St. Thomas to formulate his own more profound solution. For its negative influence upon the thought of St. Thomas this theory of the school of Abelard is important.

It became necessary to re-examine the concept of certitude. In a broad sense, certitude is nothing other than the determination of the intellect to one thing. Properly speaking, however, it connotes the firmness of the adherence of the intellective power to its intelligible object.<sup>66</sup> Moreover, certitude is twofold, the certitude of judgment (*certitudo cognitionis*) and the certitude of inclination (*certitudo ordinis*).<sup>67</sup> From the point of view in which certitude is found in a subject it is either essential or participated.<sup>68</sup> Thus, essentially, it is found in the intellective

<sup>65</sup> *III Sent.*, d. 26, q. 2, a. 4: *Quidem dixerunt quod spes non habet aliam certitudinem nisi a fide; sed in hoc differunt quod certitudo fidei est in universalis, sicut quod quilibet bonus habebit vitam aeternam; certitudo autem spei est in particulari, sicut quod iste, si bene facit, habebit vitam aeternam.* Et ideo certitudo fidei est universalis et absoluta, certitudo autem spei particularis est et conditionata. (We have seen this doctrine proposed by the theologians of the school of Abelard.)

<sup>66</sup> *III Sent.*, d. 23, q. 2, a. 2, 3; d. 26, q. 2, a. 4.

<sup>67</sup> *Q. D. De Ver.*, q. 6, a. 3: *Duplex est certitudo: scilicet cognitionis, et ordinis.*

<sup>68</sup> *II-II*, q. 18, a. 4: *Certitudo invenitur in aliquo dupliciter, scilicet essentialiter et participative.*

power, while in a participated manner it is found in everything that is moved in an infallible manner toward its end by the intellective power. The certitude of judgment, therefore, is had when the judgment coincides perfectly with reality as found in the thing judged. This estimation or judgment is drawn chiefly from the causes of the object, and for that reason the name of certitude is applied to the order of cause to effect. Thus we say that the order of cause to effect is certain when the cause infallibly produces the effect.<sup>69</sup> Accordingly, nature itself can be said to act in a certain manner, moved, so to speak, by the divine intellect which moves everything with certainty towards its end. The influence of St. Albert is clearly evident in this reasoning.

It was precisely the predication of intellectual or judicial certitude to hope which led to this solution. Since it is impossible to find this type of certitude in the appetite, it was necessary to apply to that faculty the certitude of inclination. All order between any act or motion and its end, however, is from the intellect directing the action, whether that intellect be conjoined, as in agents acting through the will, or remote, as in agents operating through nature (*per naturam*).<sup>70</sup> However, every tendency to an end is determined by some preceding intellect. Thus it is that nature acts with certainty, as it were, moved by the divine intellect which moves everything in a certain manner (*certitudinaliter*) towards its end.<sup>71</sup> Accordingly we can rightly attribute certitude to the operation of nature and, in fact, to the operation of anything that acts after the manner of nature. In this way, therefore, since virtues are habits and operate like a second nature they also participate

<sup>69</sup> *Q. D. De Ver.*, q. 6, a. 3.

<sup>70</sup> *III Sent.*, d. 26, q. 2, a. 4: *Omnis operatio et motus cujuscumque tendentis in finem est ex cognitione dirigente, vel conjuncta, sicut in agentibus per voluntatem, vel remota, sicut in agentibus per naturam.*

<sup>71</sup> *Summa Theol.*, q. 22, a. 1: *Bonum ordinis in rebus creatis existens a Deo creatum est. Cum autem Deus sit causa rerum per suum intellectum, et sic cuiuslibet sui effectus oportet rationem in ipso praeeexistere; necesse est quod ratio ordinis rerum in finem in mente divina praeeexistat.*

this certitude.<sup>72</sup> This flows from the determination of divine Wisdom instituting nature. Therefore, the certitude of hope and the other virtues must not be looked for in a knowledge of the object, or of proper principles, but rather in the infallible inclination in the act.<sup>73</sup> And so the determination of the act of a virtue towards the end of that virtue constitutes the certitude known as the certitude of virtue. It is truly a determination to one thing, not however an intellectual or judicial determination, although it is derived in some way from that. In this way we attribute to hope the certitude of nature,<sup>74</sup> since every habit implies a disposition in relation to a thing's nature, and to its operation and end.<sup>75</sup> It should be noted here that this determination of act to end does not imply the act of attaining the end itself. Thus, it could happen that, although the determination existed, the end would not be attained. It might be impeded accidentally by an extrinsic force.<sup>76</sup> In this way St. Thomas has definitely destroyed the force of the objection which denies the certitude of hope because some fail to attain the end. This attainment of the end, in fact, is in no way included in the order to act to end. That is the certitude of event while this is the certitude of order. The certitude of hope, then, refers to the determination towards the end.<sup>77</sup>

However, it does not seem fitting that hope, which, alone among all the virtues, claims certitude as an integral part of its definition, should have no certitude other than this which is common to all virtues. Thus, the Angelic Doctor pushed his inquiry further. Searching into the specific reasons for hope,

<sup>72</sup> *III Sent.*, d. 26, q. 2, a. 4, ad 1um.

<sup>73</sup> *Q. D. De Spe*, a. 1, ad 10um: *Et ideo certitudo spei et aliarum virtutum non est referenda ad cognitionem objecti vel principiorum proprium sed ad infallibilem inclinationem in actu.*

<sup>74</sup> *III Sent.*, d. 26, q. 2, a. 4: *Unde etiam ipsa certitudo inclinationis naturae spes dicitur.*

<sup>75</sup> *Summa Theol.*, I-II: *Habitus importat dispositionem quamdam in ordine ad naturam rei, et operationem vel finem ejus.*

<sup>76</sup> *III Sent.*, d. 26, q. 2, a. 4, ad 4um.

<sup>77</sup> *III Sent.*, d. 26, q. 2, a. 1: *Unde cum certitudo spei sit de bono expectato, importat determinationem in bonem.*

he concluded that the certitude of hope is caused by divine bounty ordering us towards the end, and also by the inclination of all the other virtues, and even by the inclination of the habit itself.<sup>78</sup> Therefore the certitude of hope includes the certitude of all the other infused virtues. Since all of the virtues operate after the manner of nature, each one possesses the certitude of virtue. Now these particular virtues are particular determinations towards a particular end, and so they reinforce the determination towards the general end, eternal life, by keeping the creature properly inclined towards each particular end.<sup>79</sup> Thus there is less probability of sin which would destroy charity (which gives hope its extrinsic form) and consequently weaken that virtue together with its determination or certitude. In this way it is possible to see clearly the connection between the certitude of the other infused virtues and that of hope.

## 2. *Summa Theologica*

Finally, the certitude of hope includes the certitude of divine ordination. This is that certitude which is peculiar to hope, and by which it differs from the certitude of other infused virtues. It is of importance to note here that this certitude of divine ordination was enunciated by St. Thomas at the end of his treatment of the subject in the *Commentary on the Sentences*. In the beginning of that treatment, he states that some theologians maintained that all certitude in hope is derived from faith. Then he proclaimed that this could not be true, and accordingly went on to explain the certitude of the order of nature in hope. Now, however, he adds this other, the certitude of divine ordination. What did he wish to signify by this? Certainly he did not intend to signify the certitude of virtue which is derived from divine wisdom through the certitude of nature. There remains only the divine ordination to supernatural life

<sup>78</sup> *Ibid.*, a. 4: Ideo certitudo spei causatur ex liberalitate divina ordinante nos in finem et etiam ex inclinatione omnium aliarum virtutum et etiam ex inclinatione ipsius habitus.

<sup>79</sup> *Q. D. De Virt.*, a. 10, ad 14um: Virtus enim infusa facit quod nullo modo obediatur concupiscentiis peccati; et facit hoc infallibiliter ipsa manente.

through faith, hope and charity, by means of grace and merit. However, since charity follows hope in the order of generation, we can dismiss it from this consideration. Thus we are confronted with the ordination of hope through faith by means of grace and merit. This would seem to be a return to the old theory which St. Thomas explicitly abrogated, namely that of a participation of the certitude of faith. But this is not true. The certitude of divine ordination is a clear statement of that certitude proper to hope. Certainly hope depends upon faith since nothing is desired or hoped for unless it is first known. It should be noted, however, that the Angelic Doctor first clarified the nature of the certitude of hope before stating this theory. The certitude of hope pertains to the act of the appetite and is in no way confused with the certitude of the intellect. Thus the certitudes of faith and hope are not univocal but analogous. However, the intellectual virtue of faith not only believes truth but also directs the other faculties according to that truth. Thus, it can truly be said that the certitude of hope is derived from the certitude of faith inasmuch as a movement of a virtue in the appetite is directed by an intellectual virtue it participates something of its certitude.<sup>80</sup>

By faith we learn that we are ordained to eternal life, in fact our faith has certitude concerning this ordination. However, this certitude is still in the intellectual sphere. In hope it is reduced to the practical order by which the act of hope tends in an infallible and determined manner towards the end. This determination of the act of hope depends upon faith insofar as it is through faith that the knowledge of this ordination was communicated to us, and further inasmuch as faith directs our actions in a practical way. It should be emphasized again that there is no intention here of introducing into the sphere of hope the determination peculiar to faith. It is plainly the certitude of order and so depends immediately upon the formal

<sup>80</sup> *Q. D. De Spe*, a. 2, ad 4um: Certitudo spei derivatur a certitudine fidei; in quantum enim motus appetitivae virtutis dirigitur a virtute cognoscitiva, participat aliquid de ejus certitudine.

object of hope or the omnipotence and mercy of God.<sup>81</sup> Therefore, when we presuppose the existence of faith our hope adheres principally to the omnipotence and mercy of God by which alone we can come to eternal life. It is precisely this divine help which places our hope in the realm of possibility and further into the realm of certitude. Since it is the principal cause by which we hope, it therefore places in the act of hope the determination towards the end. This determination is of an infallible nature and for that reason is termed certitude, just as the determination of nature itself or the acquired virtues is so named. Therefore in this determination of the formal motive object (omnipotence of God) to the formal terminative object (eternal life) of hope we find that certitude peculiar to theological hope, which St. Thomas has very aptly termed the certitude of divine ordination. In giving a very brief explanation of this in the *Summa Theologica* he wished both to recognize the dependence upon faith and at the same time to distinguish his new theory from the old theory of unqualified participation of the certitude of faith. For that reason he said that "hope tends with certainty towards its end, as if participating certitude from faith, which is in the cognitive power."<sup>82</sup> It is no longer a whole-hearted and complete participation, an illicit transposition from the order of understanding and judgment to the order of the appetite. There is a relationship between these certitudes, but they are as different as the virtues of faith and hope themselves.

In the light of this solution it becomes possible to answer the formidable objections without recourse to the old theory of conditional certitude. Certitude is principally found in the reason, but it is found also in the operations of nature and virtues in a participated manner.<sup>83</sup> It was the confusion of these two orders of certitude which produced the idea of con-

<sup>81</sup> *Summa Theol.*, II-II, q. 18, a. 4, ad 2um: *De omnipotentia autem Dei et misericordia eius certus est quicumque fidem habit.*

<sup>82</sup> *Summa Theol.*, II-II, q. 18, a. 4: *Spes certitudinaliter tendit in suum finem, quasi participans certitudinem a fide, quae est in vi cognoscitiva.*

<sup>83</sup> *III Sent.*, XXVI, q. 2, a. 4, ad 1um.

ditional certitude. Therefore it should be seen that the certitude of hope is not conditional, but absolute in its order. This order of hope to attain eternal beatitude is from the formal motive object of the virtue, that is, the omnipotent help of God (*omnipotentia auxilians*), and therefore the certitude of the order of hope towards eternal beatitude is proportionate to the certitude of the divine omnipotent help. This, of course, is absolute, and accordingly renders the certitude of hope absolute. Consequently, it must be said that a theory which reduces the certitude of hope to the conditional order should be immediately rejected. Moreover this theory is in no way necessary in order to answer the objection that certitude properly speaking is in the reason while hope is in the appetite. Both of these statements can be admitted without question. Certitude is found essentially in the intellective power, but the determination of the act of hope under the omnipotent help of God is also of a certain and infallible nature. It is the certitude of an act infallibly determined towards its end, a certitude of order or inclination.

The theory of conditional certitude which has had such a long life both before the time of St. Thomas and after him, especially among theological writers since the Council of Trent, was necessarily linked with the proposition that the certitude of faith is universal and that of hope is particular. The former is universal and absolute since by faith we believe that every good person will obtain eternal life; the latter is particular and conditional because it produces a proposition of this nature: this man will have eternal life, if he does good. In the light of the Thomistic solution, such a theory becomes untenable because the certitude of hope neither deals with the knowledge of any proposition nor with the acquisition of any end. In other words it is neither a certitude of judgment nor a certitude of event. This certitude of event differs from the certitude of inclination for the former concerns the power of attaining beatitude while the latter concerns the very act itself of attaining beatitude. Theological hope is defined as a certain expectation of future

beatitude coming from grace and merits.<sup>84</sup> What relation, therefore, have grace and merit to the certitude of hope?

In the present order of providence it would be vain to expect beatitude to be awarded without merits. However it is not necessary that the merits actually precede the act of expectation, for even he who is not in the meritorious state of charity can quite laudably hope for eternal life on account of the merits which he expects to have in the future. Certainly our eternal beatitude must be merited. Accordingly, some would say that because merits are from free will, which is a contingent cause, therefore hope of eternal life cannot be certain since whatever depends upon something contingent can have certitude only when actually possessed. To this it must be answered that the certitude of inclination does not guarantee the actual attainment of the end against accidental and extrinsic impediments. Therefore as long as we are in this life there remains the possibility of an accidental impediment so that the object of hope, which itself is certain, may never be attained.<sup>85</sup> For that reason the gift of fear of separation is joined to hope, but in the future, when no accidental impediment can intervene, there will be no fear of separation and indeed no hope, for that which was hoped for will be possessed. Thus the fact that merit depends upon the contingency of the free will does not destroy the certitude of hope, which depends upon the nature of merit but not upon the freedom of the will.<sup>86</sup>

The office of supernatural grace seems to place another difficulty in the way of the certitude of hope. Assuredly no one will have eternal life unless he possess charity and sanctifying grace, but we do not know whether we possess these now, or will have

<sup>84</sup> Peter Lombard, *III Sent.*, d. 26.

<sup>85</sup> *III Sent.*, d. 26, q. 2, a. 4, ad 4um: *Quamdiu in hac vita sumus potest esse accidentale impedimentum ne spes quae de se certitudinem habet, finem suum consequatur.*

<sup>86</sup> *Summa Theol.*, II-II, q. 18, a. 4, ad 3um: *Dicendum quod hoc quod aliqui habentes spem, deficiant a consecutione beatitudinis, contingit ex defectu liberi arbitrii ponentis obstaculum peccati, non autem ex defectu divinae potentiae vel misericordiae, cui spes innititur. Unde hoc non praejudicat certitudini spei.*

them at the end. Hence there arises a doubt, but it is a doubt concerning a fact, that is, whether we will or will not have grace and charity at death. Nevertheless we do know that charity, grace and merit which we expect to have will lead to eternal life in a most certain manner.<sup>87</sup> For that reason it is not a case of the existence of grace in the soul at any given time, but rather the intrinsic force of grace itself that enters into a consideration of the certitude of hope.

Another problem which confronts a consideration of this subject is the difficulty raised concerning hope that is formed by charity in comparison to that which exists in an imperfect state without charity. Does the loss of charity destroy the certitude of hope and, if it does not, does it diminish it? In order to answer this it is necessary to consider two things, the effect of the loss of charity upon hope, and the various certitudes included in hope. In the first place, the differences between formed and unformed hope is the difference between virtue in a perfect and an imperfect state because of an extrinsic defect. Thus hope without charity is a weakened virtue precisely in regard to its determination as a habit. If its determination is weakened, the certitude of that determination is proportionately weakened. Accordingly, that certitude of hope which pertains to the virtue in its nature of a habit is greater in one who possesses charity than in one who is without charity. This is dependent merely upon the relatively perfect or imperfect state of the virtue. Moreover, insofar as the inclination of the habit is concerned, the certitude of hope is greater in one who possesses formed hope than in a predestined who is in the state of unformed hope.<sup>88</sup> However, this is considering that certitude which proceeds from the inclination of the habit. Insofar as the

<sup>87</sup> *III Sent.*, d. 26, q. 2, a. 4, ad 5um: *Dicendum quod licet nesciam utrum finaliter habiturus sim caritatem, tamen scio quod caritas et merita quae in proposito habeo ad vitam aeternam certitudinaliter perducunt.*

<sup>88</sup> *III Sent.*, d. 26, q. 2, a. 4um: *Ideo sciendum est quod certitudo spei, quantum ad inclinationem habitus, est major in habente spem formatam, etiam praescito ad mortem, quam in praedestinato habente spem informem; sed in quantum includit certitudinem quae est ex Dei ordinatione et ex meritis quae sunt in proposito, est aequalis in utroque.*

certitude of divine ordination is concerned certitude is equal in all, whether or not their hope is formed by charity, because we do not hope for eternal life in the strength of merits now possessed but rather upon the strength of those which we expect to have at the end of life.<sup>89</sup>

In view of these considerations we are now in a position to see more clearly the precise difference between the certitudes of faith and hope. The fundamental difference, of course, springs from the diverse natures of the faculties in which they are subjected, for the certitude of faith is a determination of the intellect to truth, while the certitude of hope is a determination of the appetite to good. This must always remain a primary guiding principle in any theological consideration of this subject. But further consideration brings to light another difference, i. e., that the certitude of faith cannot be found wanting, while that of hope can accidentally (*per accidens*) be found wanting. Moreover, the certitude of faith concerns a complexity of things, but the certitude of hope concerns a singular thing which is the object of the will. A fourth difference reveals itself in the opposites of these two, for doubt is opposed to the certitude of faith while diffidence or hesitation is opposed to the certitude of hope.<sup>90</sup> This difference springs immediately from the first mentioned, that of the diverse subjects of inherence. Thus the certitude of faith, which is fundamentally a judicial certitude, is quite naturally opposed by the state of doubt; the certitude of hope, on the other hand, is a certitude of inclination and consists in the infallible determination between the act and the end, or between the formal motive object (*formale quo*) and the formal terminative object (*formale quod*), and consequently is opposed by hesitation which militates against determination.

<sup>89</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>90</sup> *III Sent.*, d. 26, q. 2, a. 4: *Ex praedictis patet quod certitudo fidei et spei in quatuor differunt. Primo, in hoc quod certitudo fidei est intellectus, certitudo autem spei est affectus. Secundo, quia certitudo fidei non potest dificere, sed certitudo spei per accidens deficit. Tertio, quia certitudo fidei est de complexo, certitudo spei de incomplexo quod est objectum appetitus. Quarto, quia certitudini fidei opponitur dubitatio, spei autem certitudini opponitur diffidentia vel haesitatio.*

Finally we will consider the relation between the gift of fear and the certitude of hope in the theology of St. Thomas. Filial fear and hope are closely connected and, in fact, perfect one another.<sup>91</sup> Moreover, it is precisely in regard to the certitude of hope that fear seems to perfect the virtue since that certitude is caused by the omnipotent help of God, and through filial fear we fear that this help will be withdrawn from us.<sup>92</sup> Therefore, while hope increases, fear also increases because inasmuch as one expects with greater certainty to obtain some good through the help of another, so much the more does he fear to offend him or to separate from him.<sup>93</sup> Thus the possibility of an accidental extrinsic impediment causes us to fear separation from the divine help, through which alone hope is certain. Hence the certitude of hope is strengthened, at least in a negative way, by the gift of fear. This close relationship, then, might well be the reason why, in the *Summa Theologica*, the tract on the gift of fear follows immediately after the article dealing with the certitude of hope. The article serves quite logically as an introduction to the theological consideration of the gift of fear, and the tract on fear completes the doctrine on the certitude of hope.

### III. CERTITUDE OF HOPE ACCORDING TO THE COMMENTATORS

In the final analysis, it has been seen that St. Thomas attributed a threefold certitude to theological hope. It includes the certitude proceeding from the virtue itself in its nature of habit, the certitude of all the other infused virtues, and the certitude of divine ordination. The first two are derived from the certitude of the order of the virtue, while the latter depends upon the order of faith in the intellect. Thus, fundamentally, there are two distinct certitudes of inclination in hope, namely,

<sup>91</sup> *Summa Theol.*, II-II, q. 9, ad 1um: *Timor filialis et spes sibi invicem cohaerent, et se invicem perficiunt.*

<sup>92</sup> *Ibid.*: *Per timorem filiale timemus ad hoc auxilio nos subtrahere.*

<sup>93</sup> *Summa Theol.*, II-II, q. 19, a. 10, ad 2um: *Ea crescente crescit timor filialis, quia quanto aliquis certius expectat alicujus boni consecutionem per auxilium alterius, tanto magis vertatur eum offendere, vel ab eo separari.*

that participated from divine Wisdom through the certitude of virtue, and that participated from the human intellect elevated to the supernatural order by theological faith.

The first of these is admitted without question by the commentators, many of whom, in fact, satisfy themselves with a re-statement of the precise words of St. Thomas.<sup>94</sup> Likewise all held tenaciously to the idea of participation through faith.<sup>95</sup> However, the differences and the difficulties arose when they attempted to explain this participation. Some, indeed, returned finally to the old pre-Thomistic theory of conditional certitude.<sup>96</sup>

St. Thomas successfully isolated the certitude of hope from the web of conflicting theories, but after his death many theologians returned again to the confusion of the centuries which preceded the Angelic Doctor. They resumed again the old objection that faith and hope differ only as the universal and the particular, and consequently denied not only the distinct certitude of hope, but the very existence of the habit itself as an entity distinct from faith and charity.<sup>97</sup> The chaos which resulted occasioned the magnificent defense of Thomistic doctrine by John Capreolus (*Princeps Thomistarum*). A little later, Francisco de Vitoria led a Thomistic revival in the Dominican convent of San Esteban in Salamanca, and returned to the Thomistic theory concerning the certitude of hope. The next important influence in this subject was the Council of Trent. Since then modern theologians generally, and even some commentators on St. Thomas, have returned either to the old

<sup>94</sup> Dionysius Carthusianus, *III Sent.*, d. 26, q. 1: *Quumque virtus operetur instar naturae, inclinando in finem determinatum, ideo dicitur certior arte, quemadmodum et natura, inclinat infallibiliter ex impressione primae naturae: sicut certitudo convenit spei.* Sylvius and Gotti describe this as natural instinct; thus Gotti, in *II-II*, q. 18, a. 4: *Tertiam, qua id certum dicitur, quod vel naturae instinctu, vel ex animi inclinatione fere semper uno modo fit.*

<sup>95</sup> Sylvius in *II-II*, q. 18, a. 4: *Spes nostra habeat certitudinem ex fide participatam; Salmanticensis, Trac. XVIII, Dub. III: Certitudo spei debet esse participium fidei.* De Vitoria, in *II-II*, q. 18, a. 4: *Spes participat certitudinem a fide.*

<sup>96</sup> *Ibid.*: *Certitudinem absolutam excludere dubitationem, non autem conditionatam, cuiusmodi est certitudo spei;* Billuart, *Trac. De Spe*, art. 3: *Certitudo spei in viatoribus non est absoluta, sed conditionata.*

<sup>97</sup> Scotus, *III Sent.*, d. 26, q. 1.

conditional certitude or to the distinction that hope is uncertain considered from the point of view of the subject hoping.<sup>98</sup> This return of modern scholars to the old theories arises in part from a misunderstanding of the words of the Council of Trent.<sup>99</sup> Paradoxically enough, however, the most profound explanations of the Thomistic solution were written after the Council of Trent by Dominic Banez, the Salmanticenses, and John of St. Thomas.

### 1. John Capreolus

The confusion of the theologians immediately following St. Thomas occasioned the *Defensiones Theologiae Divi Thomae Aquinatis*. In this work, Capreolus laid the ground work for further correct Thomistic study of the certitude of hope. Scotus had denied that faith and hope were formally distinct habits, and consequently placed despair in opposition to faith. This was very fundamental. Capreolus, however, pointed out the difference between infidelity and despair, by showing that the former pertains to the intellect while the latter pertains to the will. Moreover, the intellect is concerned with universals, while the appetite moves towards particular things.<sup>100</sup> Thus it could happen that one who has a true estimation of the universal truth of faith might lack a proper estimation in a particular application. In other words, one could have faith, but lack hope, or one could be in despair, which is opposed to hope, without being in a state of infidelity, which is opposed to faith.

Hence the true Thomistic doctrine concerning the relation of faith and hope was enunciated, and upon this rests the explanation of the certitude of hope which is derived in some way through faith. By faith we believe universal truths. However, these universal truths contain particulars; thus by another act

<sup>98</sup> Gotti, in II-II, q. 18, a. 4: *Quod si interdum a certitudine deficit . . . , hoc est ex parte subjecti.*

<sup>99</sup> Conc. Trid. Sess. VI, Cap. 13, Denz. 806: *Nemo sibi certi aliquid absoluta certitudine polliciatur, tametsi in Dei auxilio firmissimam spem collocare et reponere omnes debent.*

<sup>100</sup> *Summa Theol.*, II-II, q. 20, a. 2.

of the reason the universal principle is applied to the particular. This last act, according to Capreolus, is not an act of theological faith.<sup>101</sup> Hence for hope there are required two preceding acts of the intellect, one the act of theological faith, and another which applies this universal belief to a particular person. Capreolus does not say to which virtue this latter act pertains, but he definitely gave the impetus for the further explanations of later scholars.<sup>102</sup>

## 2. Francis de Vitoria

With this foundation laid by Capreolus, the doctrine was further elucidated by the great Spanish Thomist, Francis de Vitoria. After explaining the notion of that certitude in the will which is by way of participation, he asserted that hope is certain because of the infallible judgments of hope.<sup>103</sup> This is not an attempt to place an act of judgment in the appetite. By the "judgments of hope" was meant those judgments upon which the virtue of hope is founded. In the first place, there must be a certain judgment to the effect that what is hoped for can actually be obtained (*debeo judicare certo quod id quod spero, consequi possum*). Vitoria considered two judgments. The one is necessary and of faith.<sup>104</sup> This is the judgment that beatitude is possible through grace and merit. Moreover, this is that judgment upon which rests the certitude participated through faith. However, he offers no further explanation of the precise manner of this participation. The other judgment which he considered is, "I shall be saved" (*ego salvabor*). Concerning this he expressly states that it is not the foundation

<sup>101</sup> Capreolus, *In III Sent.*: Ista particularis credulitas non est actus fidei theologicae, sed aestimatio quaedam aliunde procedens.

<sup>102</sup> *Ibid.*: Ex quo patet quod spes non est habitus creditus sed appetitus, cuius actus ex duplice credulitate vel aestimatione procedit, una universalis, quae est actus fidei, et alia particulari, quae non est actus fidei, sed solius intellectus, vel virtutis cognoscitivae.

<sup>103</sup> De Vitoria, *In II-II*, q. 18, a. 4: Spes est certa, quia certitudinaliter movetur appetitus in beatitudinem per spem, per judicia infallibilia spei.

<sup>104</sup> *Ibid.*

for the certitude of hope.<sup>105</sup> However he maintains that it is lawful and even meritorious to maintain this judgment provided one propose to live a good life; but it would be presumptuous if one persevered in sin.

Vitoria most certainly did not maintain that the certitude of hope is conditional, but his explanation of the judgment upon which it rests might have given rise to the rebirth of that theory in the minds of succeeding scholars who failed to distinguish between the certitude itself and Vitoria's explanation of the fundamental judgment.<sup>106</sup>

Cardinal Cajetan who lived at the same time as Vitoria did not expressly consider our problem. One year before the death of Vitoria the Council of Trent convened, and the particular heresies of the Protestant reformers had made it imperative for the fathers of the council to discuss the certitude of hope. With a view to forestalling further error they chose to use the term "most firm" in place of "certain" when speaking of hope. Hence, the thirteenth chapter of the sixth session has been subject to much misinterpretation, especially in regard to the certitude of hope. However, some scholars understood the pronouncements correctly, and these were greatly aided in their explanation of the certitude of hope by the words of the Council, which once again brought into prominence the relation of merit to this certitude.

### 3. Dominic Banez

One of the first to see and explain the complete agreement between the words of the Council and the Thomistic solution was Dominic Banez of the Salamanca school founded by Vitoria. Banez, it is true, did not continue the development of the idea expounded by Capreolus and Vitoria. On the contrary, he concerned himself mainly with the conclusions of the Council and a clarification of the relation of merits to the certitude. In

<sup>105</sup> De Vitoria, *In II-II*, q. 18, a. 4: *Spes non est certa ab illo iudicio, ego salvabo.*

<sup>106</sup> *Ibid.* s *Spes habet illud fundamentum certum, quod iste est possibilis beatitudo ex meritis et gratia, et quod si est bonus, consequenter vitam aeternam.*

this respect, his work is of great value since it enabled other scholars to proceed with the development of the explanation in the true light of the pronouncement of the Council. There are three fundamental conclusions. First, it must be held by faith that hope not only concerns divine grace, and mercy, but also the effects produced in us by it through which we merit glory. Secondly, it must also be held by faith that one, even though in the justifying state of charity, can fail through sin to obtain beatitude, unless he is the recipient of a very special privilege from God. Lastly, our hope is wholly (*simpliciter*) infallible, firm, and safe, and it is so described in the holy writings and in the doctrine of the church.

In support of this conclusion he points out that because hope rests upon the divine promise and the power and the mercy of God, it cannot fail us any more than faith, on the testimony of which it is founded. Moreover, hope cannot fail from the point of view of merits upon which it also rests. But since merits can be considered either as proceeding from the grace of God or from the free will, this statement must be correctly understood. Hope, indeed, does not rest upon merits inasmuch as these depend upon us, but rather inasmuch as they are gifts of God and depend upon His grace. Thus we place hope in merits insofar as they are instruments of divine mercy, because the principal cause of our hope is God alone. Therefore, the cause of salvation for which we hope will be the grace of God and merits, insofar as they are from grace. So, from Banez we have a clear statement of the fundamental verities that hope is founded upon the testimony of faith and proceeds from the grace of God and merits.<sup>107</sup>

Speaking of the possibility of merits failing from the point of view of the subject (*ex parte subjecti*), he shows that this does not prejudice the certitude of hope. No one will deny that our faith is most certain, nevertheless it can be lost.<sup>108</sup> The same

<sup>107</sup> Banez, *In II-II*, 2a 2ae, q. 18, a. 4: *Hinc ergo est, quod perditio nostra nobis imputetur solis: salus autem gratia Dei, et meritis prout sunt ex gratia.*

<sup>108</sup> *Ibid.*: *Fides est certissima, tamen amittitur ab hominibus.*

can be said of hope. In order to confirm this point he uses the example of one who receives legitimate money from a king, for which in return the king promises to give him a city, but the man loses the money. He was not deceived in his hope in the word of the king, nor was it the money given which caused his failure to acquire the city. He himself destroyed his hope by negligently losing the money. The comparison, of course, is made with the promise of God to be obtained through grace and merit. The example is defective since we are never certain of the possession of grace, as the man was of the money. However, it does show clearly that its author was in complete accord with the traditional Thomistic doctrine.

#### 4. Salmanticenses

In their commentary entitled *Cursus Salmanticensis in Summa S. Thomae*, the Carmelite Fathers of the reform of St. Teresa made a genuine contribution to the explanation of the Thomistic solution. In the light of the declarations of the Council of Trent, they returned to the consideration of the dependence upon faith, which we have seen before in the writings of Capreolus and Vitoria. Affirming, in the first place, that the certitude of hope and that of faith were not univocal but analogical, they went on to show, as did Vitoria, that the certitude of hope does not depend upon the judgment, "I shall pursue beatitude" (*consequar beatitudinem*), but upon one of this nature, "I propose to obtain salvation with the grace of God" (*praetendo cum Dei gratia consequi salutem*). That such a judgment is correct can easily be shown since it takes into consideration both the terminative object (*formale quod*) and the motive object (*formale quo*) of hope.<sup>109</sup> The final conclusion, that the certitude of hope is absolute in its order, is even more important since it at once shows a thorough understanding of the doctrine of St. Thomas and the Council of Trent, and is a conclusive repudiation of the errors into which

<sup>109</sup> Salmanticenses, Trac. VIII, dub. III: *Siquidem afferunt objectum terminativum, et motivum hujus virtutis.*

modern theologians have fallen with regard to the certitude of hope.<sup>110</sup> Thus, the theory of those who maintain the necessity of an absolute or conditional judgment concerning the attainment or fruition of beatitude was definitely rejected.

In order to explain the dependence of the certitude of hope on faith these scholars distinguished three acts of the intellect: two speculative acts, one general and the other particular, and one practical act. The general speculative act (*speculativum in communi*) is that by which we believe, for example, that God prepares and offers aid to salvation to all. This act of faith is without doubt presupposed to the movement of hope, and the certitude of hope rests upon it, although in an inadequate manner. The particular speculative act (*speculativum in particulari*) is that which determines, for example, that "I will obtain salvation." It is immediately evident, since this can be false, that it neither pertains to faith nor is required for hope. The third, or practical, act of the intellect, is one whose truth is not concerned immediately with the object, but rather with the conformity to the rule of right reason. It can be explained thus: presupposing the divine promises, one hopes, through the help of God, to pursue salvation. This act, which proceeds from faith inasmuch as it is a practical virtue, directs and immediately occasions the act of hope. Moreover, this act, like any dictate of prudence, is of infallible practical truth, and is in every way certain, since faith contains truth even in a greater way than prudence. Therefore the movement of hope which follows it, participates from it a firm and determined inclination to beatitude.<sup>111</sup> This determined inclination is the certitude of hope. Thus the virtue of hope, and consequently its certitude, depends upon two acts of the intellect, one a speculative act and the other a practical act. The practical act immediately

<sup>110</sup> *Ibid.*: Certitude spei esse absolutam; quoniam praedicta certitudo, ut pertinet ad voluntatem, nihil aliud est quam firmitas, et determinatio affectus ad beatitudinem.

<sup>111</sup> Salmanticenses, Tract. VIII, Dub. III: Qui actus est infallibilis veritatis practicae, et omnio certus, sicut quodlibet dictamen prudentiae, quam alitiori modo continet fides. Unde motus spei, qui immediate illum consequitur, participat ab eo certitudinem in firma et determinata habitudine inclinationis ad beatitudinem.

occasions the act of hope, while the speculative act is presupposed just as a general statement from which a particular is drawn is presupposed to that particular.

### 5. John of Saint Thomas

Probably the most profound explanation of this Thomistic doctrine is to be found in the writing of the great Portuguese scholar, John of St. Thomas. In his treatment of the subject, we see all the various elements and aspects of the problem brought together and given their proper relationship to one another. Thus, the importance of the consideration of grace and merit, which was stressed in the work of Banez, is brought into relationship with the concept of participation through faith, which was considered by Capreolus, Vitoria, and the Salmantenses. This synthesis of the Thomistic doctrine is especially important since it was made after, and in the light of, the declarations of the Council of Trent, which almost all modern writers of theological manuals misinterpret, to the detriment of the doctrine of St. Thomas.

John of St. Thomas distinguished certitude in a threefold manner: objectively, formally, and by way of participation. Objectively, it is found in things themselves inasmuch as there is an infallible connection of one with the other. This objective certitude is found in hope considered from the part of God, by whose infallible help hope moves. Formally speaking, certitude is in the intellect, but this cannot be predicated of hope. Certitude by way of participation is in the will, inasmuch as this faculty is moved to its end by infallible means and motive.<sup>112</sup> This is a most profound statement because the word "means" includes both the grace of God and merit, while the word "motive" refers to the influence of faith upon hope. Therefore, an explanation of that statement will be an explanation of the entire problem.

<sup>112</sup> John of St. Thomas, *In II-II*, d. V, a. 3: *Certitudo cum sit firmitas quaedam, et infallibilis securitas, potest sumi tripliciter, vel objective . . . formaliter . . . vel participative in voluntate, quatenus infallibili medio, et motivo movetur ad finem.*

It should be understood that this certitude by way of participation is a practical and not a speculative certitude. Moreover, it consists in this, that it has a certain and sure rule, which is to say that the will had sufficient motive so that it should not hesitate, but should tend towards the end efficaciously and correctly. For just as there is in the intellect a determination towards assent, when that faculty is perfectly convinced, so also there is a determination in the appetite when there exists sufficient motive for tending towards the end. However, all the sufficiency and certainty of this motive depends upon the certitude of the means sufficient to acquire the end, because the difficulties must be conquered through the certitude of the means. Thus, it depends upon the means whether or not the object of hope appears as a possible good. Moreover, faith *teaches* that this certitude in theological hope concerning the means will not be found wanting on the part of God. However, considered from the part of the subject, faith does not teach that any particular person will not be found wanting, but nevertheless rightly *rules* so that the peccable subject will not despair and thus impede the means, which are sufficient in themselves to conquer the difficulties. Therefore, from the point of view of the means, hope always has certitude sufficient to tend efficaciously towards the end. It is true that one can discard these means by sin, but the certitude of hope does not depend upon the subject but upon the means.<sup>113</sup> For that reason, hope is most certain because grace and merit, which are the means, are infallibly determined towards the end of the virtue.

In the first place, then, faith is a speculative habit, and upon its certitude all other certitude in the Christian life must ultimately depend. But faith, by extension, is also a practical virtue, and it is in this respect that faith immediately influences hope. The certitude of faith, considered as a practical virtue, is a practical certitude, not a speculative certitude.<sup>114</sup> Thus

<sup>113</sup> John of St. Thomas, *In II-II*, d. V, a. 3: *Firmitas spei, et ejus dictam non fundatur in eo, quod tenet se ex parte subjecti, sed ex parte mediorum.*

<sup>114</sup> John of St. Thomas, *In II-II*, d. V, a. 3: *Secunda certitudo (quae datur a*

although hope is ultimately founded upon the speculative certitude of faith, nevertheless it participates certitude from that virtue principally inasmuch as faith is a practical virtue. So, the certitude of hope, even from this point of view, is a practical certitude, a certitude of order or inclination, and not a participated speculative certitude.

This explanation likewise answers forever the difficulty in regard to despair and infidelity. Some argued that despair would not only destroy hope, to which it is opposed, but would also destroy faith. Accordingly, faith and hope are not distinct virtues. The response to this is clear from the above explanation. Despair is opposed to faith insofar as that virtue is a practical rule of action, but it does not destroy that universal belief which is fundamental and essential to faith. The latter is destroyed by infidelity. Thus, infidelity is opposed to the fundamental cause of the certitude of hope, while despair is opposed to the immediate cause.<sup>115</sup>

Thus, from the works of the commentators, culminating in the work of John of St. Thomas, we have a clear and full explanation of St. Thomas' profound solution, which moreover was confirmed rather than denied by the Council of Trent. Nevertheless, by misinterpreting the words of the Council, and by misunderstanding the explanations of the earlier commentators, many later commentators as well as most of the modern authors have lost sight of the true Thomistic solution and have returned to the old theory of conditional certitude.<sup>116</sup>

The doctrine of these modern commentators differs from the pre-Thomistic theory in this, that they concede to hope that

fide) est quasi practica, quasi fides judicat prudenter, et recte procedere ad sperandum.

<sup>115</sup> *Summa Theol.*, II-II, q. 20, a. 2, ad 1um: Unde motus spei afferi potest, non solum sublata universalis aestimatione fidei (i. e. by infidelity), quae est sicut causa prima certitudinis spei, sed etiam sublata aestimatione particulari (i. e. by despair), quae est sicut secunda causa.

<sup>116</sup> Gotti, *In II-II*, q. 18, a. 4: certitudinem triplicem esse posse: nempe conditionatam . . . absolutam . . . tertiam, qua id certam dicitur, quod vel natura instinctu, vel ex animi inclinationi fere semper uno modo fit. . . . Primam igitur certitudinis speciem convenire spei, certum est.

certitude which it has by its very nature as a habit. However, when they come to consider the participation through faith they relapse into confusion. Failing to distinguish between faith as a speculative virtue and faith as a practical virtue, they confuse the certitude of inclination in hope with the certitude of judgment and that of event. Thus, instead of an absolute certitude of inclination they attribute to hope a conditional certitude of event. But there is really no question of the certitude of event in hope. No one (except through special revelation) is absolutely certain of obtaining salvation. That point is clear. However, we are absolutely certain through faith that the means by which we hope to obtain salvation are ordained to that end. It is this absolute and infallible ordination which precisely constitutes the *absolute and infallible certitude of hope*, which St. Thomas very aptly termed the "certitude of divine ordination."

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## BOOK REVIEWS

*The Meeting of East and West.* By F. S. C. NORTHROP. Macmillan Company, New York, 1946. Pp. 531.

### I

The modern age is top-heavily interested in technique. Explicitly, there are contemporary formulae like Bridgman's Operationalism in the order of knowing, Instrumentalism in the order of doing, and the Labor value-theory in the order of making. In more general coordinates, ever since Descartes and even before, in spirits like Occam's, man has been in search of method. The extreme forms which this trend has reached in our own day can be measured, if additional sampling is really needed, by the current view of philosophy as logic.

In a deep sense, the whole history of philosophy is a story of method. But in pre-modern times, men were wise enough to see that method and matter must be taken together and that to take method out of this context would be to study a sheer vacuum. All available physico-mathematical measurement, when applied to a violin, could never tell us what music is; we must make the instrument play. The Greeks, like Pythagoras and Plato, when they used mathematical procedures, believed that numbers were more than abstractions and hence that methodology involved more than the merely logical order. The problem of the universals in the middle ages was both a logical and an ontological problem. When this debate was ended, method and matter were united but not identified in the hierarchy of the real. Being, as Aquinas so vigorously insisted, is intrinsically intelligible; *ens et verum convertuntur*.

Today, being is viewed as intelligible in terms of outside relations, and method has become detached as a machine with a crankshaft to make being intelligible. No longer do we have being as self-evident, as co-equal with truth. Man is on a treadmill; we need a method to study the bridge between method, when re-applied to matter, and the matter itself. Our machine is in constant breakdowns, always needing an  $(n+1)$ th method to study the  $n$ th. Once we deny the self-evidence that being is intrinsically intelligible, we can never get back to the inner, ultimate natures of things, no matter how refined our method may be. Ultimately and basically the universe thus becomes an indifferent *tabula rasa* for man. Sanities like truth and certitude, meaning and value, which alone can rescue modern man from his intellectual anarchy and save our culture, are entombed.

Prof. Northrop, in his brilliantly written book, makes the proposal of a mere matterless method as a philosophy of the real and as the basis for the meeting between East and West. Nowhere conceding the relation between self-evidence and intelligibility, he is willing to admit that the content of thought may undergo radical, continuous change like the universe of Heraclitus. The constant in such change is mere method. The so-called scientific procedure is elevated to a philosophical principle into which, it would seem, the theoretical component of knowledge, emphasized by Western thought, and the intuitive component, of the East, can be compatibly distributed. In the broad bosom of the scientific method, it appears, the intellectual problems of man and his cultures are to be resolved.

But how can mere method establish agreement among men and how can it ever enter into communion with the content that men live by, in, and for? How, moreover, can method ever enter into contact with anything outside its own self?

## II

The method employed by Prof. Northrop himself, in developing his central thesis, is an historical one. He discusses the chief components of various nationalities and cultures, drawing in the end inductive generalizations to exemplify his general theme. He then proposes a method for harmonizing the diverging national and cultural aspects of the knowledge problem.

Mexico is examined and depicted as a mixture of various world views. On the one hand, there is a genus of art, philosophy, and institution which reflects "the Spanish and Mexican soul whose essence is passion . . ." (p. 55) In this view is seen the intuitive, aesthetic component of thought. Expressive of this spirit is the painting of José Orozco whose "most striking, important, and universal symbol is fire." (p. 53) Phenomenology has been able to take root in South America, and a peculiar aversion has been shown to the Kantian formalism, the businessman's culture and the "life under the elms" which appeal in the United States. But running through Mexico, on the other hand, is a positivist current deriving from the intellectual influences of the French encyclopedists and from the political power of the Diaz government. From this stream of thought comes the force of the anti-clericalism and the communism which run counter to the traditional passionate, intuitive outlook of the Mexican. Mexico thus suggests at the very outset the two components of thought, the theoretical and the aesthetic, that will later break more and more into the clear.

In the United States, the theoretical component of thought has been exaggerated. No philosopher has influenced America's thinking more than John Locke. According to his well-known doctrine, material substances exist but they are not attained in knowledge. On the surging tide of physics, as

developed by Galilei and Newton, Locke had to affirm that the world was a colorless, odorless mechanism of atoms and that the so-called secondary qualities were in the mind. He argued toward what Prof. Northrop presents as a three-termed relation: unqualified physical objects in public, mathematical space; the individual observer; and appearances (secondary qualities), dependent partially on the observer and partially on the object world. Mental substance thus came to be viewed as that which, when acted upon by this public world, is conscious of pains, smells, sounds, and the like. Such was Locke's system, cascading down the course of modern times from the physics of his friend Newton and from Galilei who had written that "if the animate and sensitive body were removed, heat would remain nothing more than a simple word."

The consequences of this new view were epoch-making in the practical order. If the public character of the world remains ultimately unknowable in itself, as Locke said of material substances, then each individual with his "sensed particulars" becomes a little world of his own. There is a basis for toleration (as opposed to the divine right of kings) and a basis for popular democracy (as opposed to Calvinistic theocracy). It was these political consequences of Locke's doctrine which provided the pattern for American democracy. It is a political atomism, based on "scientifically grounded principles." Religion, in the Lockean universe, becomes an introspective, private thing. A person is a mental substance. Since there are no prescribed social, public duties, law is a mere convention. And this view, in the opinion of Prof. Northrop, has been the dominant legal philosophy in the United States.

But the contradiction in Locke's doctrine came inevitably to the fore. Our only source of knowledge is sense data, Locke said, but if these data are subjective, how can we even know that there is a public world? Berkeley forthwith denied such a world in his notion of *esse est percipi*. Hume argued that even the person, the agent of the *percipi*, is but an association of sense data. Thus the stage is set for modern materialism, positivism, psychophysics, and atheism. "Certainly if nothing exists but sense data and their associations, all this follows." (p. 116)

The American outlook has always been tinged by Kantian formalism and by the economic theories of Adam Smith and W. S. Jevons. All of these translate Locke's thought or its consequences. Like Locke, these philosophies instance the speculative, theoretical component of knowledge which Prof. Northrop discovers in American culture.

A similar trend toward theory but with a different background is found in British culture. Its political philosophy was formulated by the Aristotelian, Richard Hooker, and also, to some extent, by Locke and Bentham. The British view has thus attempted to reconcile Aristotle with Locke, social consciousness and respect for law with the subjectivism of Lockean

democracy. But the elections of July 1945 indicate that the British have decided this *rapprochement* to be impossible and hence that Locke and Aristotle must be "transcended." British culture has, because of its Aristotelian and Lockean character, obviously been steeped in a theoretic factor of knowledge.

German culture has been expressed in modern times by Kant, Fichte, and Hegel. Fichte attempted to bridge the breach between Kant's moral dogmatism and the skepticism of his critical philosophy. This attempt ended with the whole structure of knowledge and belief resting on moral rather than on critical grounds. The voluntarism was so extreme that culture acquired a primacy over nature in Fichte's system and the whole universe, in Hegel's thought, became one of dynamic tension. In German culture is thus found both the theoretic and the non-rational, aesthetic component of knowledge, but the theoretic is still in the ascendancy.

In Marxian Communism, we likewise find the theoretical component in the foreground. But it was the merit of Marx to emphasize that no *Lebensanchauung* can be correct until it pays satisfactory attention to man's material, bodily side. It was the error of Marx to go beyond the scientific and to hold that the universe is in dialectical, autodynamic—one might even say—vitalistic development.

In discussing Roman Catholic culture and Greek science, Prof. Northrop argues that Aristotle and the medieval Aristotelians employed a theoretic approach in their search for the scientific grounds of theology. Prof. Northrop's treatment of Thomism will be discussed in another section.

All evidence, provided by Prof. Northrop, depicts Western culture as a whole to be characterized by emphasis on the theoretical approach to reality and neglect of the immediately felt, intuitive, aesthetic factors of knowledge.

In Oriental thought, this relationship is reversed. Content must be experienced to be known. Chinese language, for instance, is a picture-system, directly representing thought. In the writings of the great sage, Confucius, there is no order in presentation, merely a series of disconnected, intuitive statements. Oriental art, by and large, grasps the immediately apprehended.

Self and object in Oriental thought are really parts of a single aesthetic continuum in which "the blueness of the sky is sensed with the same immediacy and simultaneity as the introspected pain of the observer." (p. 332) Language brings out the differentiations rather than the indeterminate character of this continuum which obtains. For the Oriental, this indeterminate character constitutes the loftiest form of reality. Buddhism in fact is a philosophy of negations. Nirvana is "the undifferentiated or indeterminate aesthetic continuum." (p. 350) The aim of life is to become self-less. "The Oriental asserts the primary factor in human nature and the nature of all things to be something which neither the formal methods

of science and philosophy nor the determinate qualities can convey; and uses logically formulated doctrines, without contradiction, either positively to lead one toward the primary indescribable factor or else negatively to designate what the primary factor in the nature of things is not." (p. 365) The notion of the indeterminate will help to understand why the Oriental will compromise; why he will not commit himself to explicit promises and policies; and why he has such a strong sense of the nation and the family. There is a continuum which engulfs the individual and makes it desirable to seek indeterminacy and solidarity.

### III

Against the backdrop of this contrast between the immediately felt, aesthetic factor of knowledge which obtains in the East and the theoretic, speculative component of Western knowledge, Prof. Northrop projects a solution: "*The aesthetic, intuitive, purely empirically given component in man and nature is related to the theoretically designated and indirectly verified component*, not as traditional Western science and philosophy suppose by a three-termed relation of appearance but instead *by the two-termed relation of epistemic correlation.*" (p. 443) By substituting the "two-termed relation" for the "three-termed relation," Prof. Northrop believes himself to escape from the difficulties occasioned by Locke's system. His two-termed relation is that of attempting to bring the immediately felt data of experience into conformity with a logical framework, antedating the experience which confirms it and hence only indirectly verified by the experience itself.

This is, in fact, the method of contemporary physics, which no longer frets over the distinction between appearance and reality but dismisses any mention of quality as a meaningless question, or, in the words of Prof. Bridgman, a verbalism. It is a method which puts observer and object on the same level, each containing both immediate and theoretic components. Thus, "the event which is knowledge is the purely naturalistic interaction between one factor in the aesthetically immediate-theoretically designated complex of things and other such factors." (p. 454) In such a framework, the problem of quality and the reality of substance are never posed.

There is no hierarchy in Prof. Northrop's universe. It is equipotential. Knowing involves no vital becoming of another object but a purely inertial, continuously-modulated relation, "a purely naturalistic interaction,"—contemplated apparently by a third observer who is contemplated by a fourth and so on. "In fact, any complete thing whatever must be regarded as made up of (a) the ineffable, emotional aesthetic materials of the equally ineffable and emotional aesthetic continuum common to oneself and all

things, and (b) the unseen theoretic component which can be adequately designated only by thought and postulationally prescribed theory checked through its deductive consequences. Thus to be any complete concrete thing is to be not merely an immediately experienced, aesthetically and emotionally felt thing, but also to be what hypothetically conceived and experimentally verified theory designates. It is to be recalled that not merely in mathematical physics but in the unseen immortal soul and the unseen God the Father of the theistic religions, but even in the ordinarily common-sense beliefs in external tables and chairs and persons as existing independently of one's awareness and sense impressions of them, the inferred postulated and indirectly verified theoretic component is present." (pp. 450-451)

Prof. Northrop believes that he has lowered the barrier between East and West. In the Occidental world, the theoretic component has been unduly stressed; in the East, the immediate, intuitive, aesthetic has been exaggerated. The solution accords to each factor its proper place. "*That conception of good conduct and the good state is the correct one, valid for everybody, which rests upon the conception of man and nature as determined by immediate apprehension with respect to the aesthetic component and by the methods of natural science with respect to the theoretic component; procedures which, when correctly applied, give the same results for one person that they give for another.*" (p. 470)

#### IV

Prof. Northrop, a widely read and apparently careful scholar, has made some serious misinterpretations of Thomas Aquinas, whose thought must be weighted against the inductive conclusion that the West has exaggerated the theoretic component of knowledge and whose philosophy must be considered in the light of Prof. Northrop's basic solution of the East-West problem. Thomistic metaphysics, it is stated, rests on the empirical physics of Aristotle which, when exploded, brought with it the blow-up of the whole Scholastic ontology. (p. 265) Aristotle's empirical physics is simply no longer scientifically accurate, it is said. However, this attitude is in accord with neither the letter nor the spirit of Aquinas. The empirical physics of Aristotle and of Thomas was neither cosmology nor metaphysics, as a careful reading in either of these two authors will attest. Aquinas may have used what we now consider to be empirical physics by way of illustration but he did not use it by way of proof. In fact, when dealing with the Aristotelian astronomy of eccentrics and epicycles which Duhem depicts as an example of what we now call the scientific method, Aquinas was quick to point out that by some other hypothesis, yet unprojected, the facts in question might be explained. The Aristotelian hypothesis could

thus be only provisionally entertained. Far different is the Thomistic (and realistic) attitude toward truly philosophical truths. The principle of finality, the immortality of the human soul, God's existence and nature as known to reason, these and other such questions were not mere provisional theories. Aquinas insisted that in necessary proof the conclusion could not be otherwise than it is. His (and Aristotle's) empirical physics can well be rejected; but the philosophical physics or cosmology and the metaphysics remain. In this light, and in the light of additional evidence readily discernible to any genuine student of Aquinas, Prof. Northrop has misunderstood the relation of science and philosophy in traditional thought. What Prof. Northrop wishes is a so-called "scientifically grounded philosophy." He is willing to concede that his proposed system must be continually revamped as scientific theories come and go.

It is also incorrect to state that, for Aquinas and Aristotle, mathematics was an empirical natural science concerned with prime matter, "an empirical natural science just like physics, astronomy, and biology." (p. 267) Aquinas expressly states that mathematics abstracts from the domain of empirical reality, viz., "sensible nature and motion." (*de Coelo et Mundo*, III, 3). In the same discussion, he clearly differentiates between what he calls "natural" and mathematical science. Thomistically, it is a misunderstanding to speak of a being as having a potentiality only "logically," (p. 269) and it is even worse to say that for Aristotle and Aquinas "God is identified with the rational form of the universe." (p. 270) Prof. Northrop states that "what St. Thomas did was to take the conception of man and nature precisely in the form which Greek science, as made philosophically articulate by Aristotle, indicated it to possess, and to identify the traditional words of Christian doctrine such as 'soul,' 'God,' 'perfection,' 'grace,' and 'revelation' with certain factors in this generally accepted and, for its time, scientifically verified theory." (p. 279) There are at least five misconceptions, in this statement, as any Thomist would recognize. Again, one might ask where Aquinas ever spoke of "reality, composed of both prime matter and the rational principle, which is the Unmoved Mover . . ."? (p. 279) It is no wonder that Prof. Northrop concludes that Thomism is outmoded. If "Einstein's theory of relativity is simple in comparison with the abstractness, the technicalities, the distinctions, and the ramifications of the theology of St. Thomas" (p. 286), it can only be replied that in comparison to the "five men" who are able to understand Einstein, thousands on thousands of seminarians are able to understand the thought of Aquinas.

Apparently Prof. Northrop has crossed a bridge too quickly. Since he draws his judgment of the Western world from analysis of historical systems, mistakes in fact, like those above indicated, can be (and as the following will show actually are) very crucial against the whole thesis of this book.

## V

Prof. Northrop's solution is that of "scientific method itself, when this method is analyzed . . ." (p. 443) The two-termed epistemic correlation is the purified procedure of Galilei and Newton. Prof. Northrop persistently proposes a "scientifically grounded philosophy." The dominant need of our time, he states, is a philosophy of man and nature in the light of contemporary empirical knowledge, as though this knowledge can validate philosophy. (pp. 298-299) It is in the constant confusion of science and philosophy that Prof. Northrop's thesis is inadequate. Not only is this confusion based on gratuitous assumptions which have been repeatedly refuted by sound reason. History, from which Prof. Northrop so abundantly draws, might well make us question the whole underlying principle of science's autonomy rather than make us take it for granted. For not since Rome's fall has the West been threatened *from the inside* as it has in an epoch where the scientific method has had so much to say.

More appropriate criticism of Prof. Northrop's solution can be found in the explosive force of its inorganic, eclectic character. The intuitive tendencies of Oriental thought are *toto coelo* different from the abstract theorizing of Western empirical science. How then are the twain to meet? If we apply the method of modern physics to immediate experience, we lose the character of immediacy. Physics can never deal with the immediacies of experience. Unable to appreciate the way in which (by abstraction) man's mind identifies itself with the directly given, thinkers like Russell, Carnap, and Eddington have proposed that even "common-sense objects," like tables, are logical constructs. We experience, if we apply the method of physics, our own experiences, and we experience the experience of experience. Stebbing has shown that Carnap's logically constructed world ends in solipsism. If Bridgman's system is universally applied, we wind up by operating on operations, or, in Joad's words applied to British "scientism," describing descriptions. If scientific method alone is true, then we have the subjectivism which not only divides East from West but divides all men from one another.

Prof. Northrop's system attempts to evade the subjectivity of traditional Western science by the so-called "two-termed epistemic correlation" in lieu of the triad suggested by Lockean theory. Before assessing the notion of Prof. Northrop on this point, the concepts of *immediate* and *theoretical* need further exploring.

The immediate component of man and nature is empirically and directly given. The theoretic component, however, is not a mere theory in the traditional scientific sense. It is not a mere idea but exists in the nature of things, being "ultimate, real, and irreducible." (p. 484) On the other hand, the immediate component of things is likewise ultimate. It is in-

effable, emotionally moving, aesthetically vivid. (p. 462) The two components in nature and in man are united by the two-termed relation of epistemic correlation. But if the immediate is *ineffable*, how can such a component ever relate to a theoretic component? If the theoretic component does not deal with the immediate, then it would bear on a vacuum as opposed to experience and experienced things. Thus either we have an eclecticism based on the *ipse dixit* of Prof. Northrop or we still have the two worlds which he set out to bring to understanding and unity.

Knowledge for Prof. Northrop becomes a purely extra-mental interaction between two realities which are not distinct in the hierarchy of being and knowing but are on the same level as bodies that obey inertia. Despite his preference for the scientific method which deals with inertial realities and must necessarily regard man as completely determined from without, Prof. Northrop is not willing to admit that the mind is a blank tablet. It is difficult to reconcile this view of man with the necessity in Prof. Northrop's system, for a two-termed epistemic correlation in which man, if this is truly the expurgated edition of the Galilei-Newtonian method, becomes an observer, merely *passive*.

Prof. Northrop's *deus ex machina* does not escape the solipsism of Russell and Carnap; or else it makes the immediate something truly ineffable, incapable of being represented within the frame of the two-termed correlation and having the practical consequence that the problem of world unity remains, in Kipling's famous phrasing, exactly where it was before this enquiry. We do not integrate by eclecticism nor by proposing that the immediate be made mediate, that is, capable of representation within the system of epistemic correlations.

## VI

Prof. Northrop has written a long and, on the whole, admirable, interesting, scholarly, and—for most men—a life-time's work. Indeed, the beauty in the coherence of thought and the felicity of phrase tends to lull the reader's critical attitude. In discussing Aquinas, Prof. Northrop made two misconceptions which are truly focal for his thesis. First, he badly confused the relation of science and philosophy in the spirit and letter of Aquinas. Secondly, he erred in his conclusion that Thomism exaggerates the theoretic component of man and nature. In reality, Aquinas made distinctions which immunize him to Prof. Northrop's charges.

Gilson has recently shown how the real importance of Aquinas in the medieval schools was his assertion of the reality and relations of existential being, being with reference to existence. Existence is the integrating force of concrete reality. In the stimulating thesis of Gabriel Marcel who has reaffirmed many traditional notions from the general contour of modern existentialism, essence becomes incarnate in existence. Essence suggests

the ideational, logical, and—one might say—theoretic component of things. It is by existence that essence acquires fullness and actuality.

In the *ens ut ens* which Aquinas recognized in reality, there is room for the two-fold philosophy that must be affirmed when East meets West in world understanding. There is the *immediate* component of existential character and the *theoretic* component of the essence which has such a character, theoretic not in the sense of a so-called scientific theory, only indirectly and provisionally verified, but in the sense of directly leading man to the inescapable certitudes of metaphysics and morality.

This book has been hailed as a monumental work. If we accept its central thesis and its accent on science, it may well be a monument in the graveyard of Western culture. But on the other hand, there is a faint interlinear glimmer at times of that dualism which perennial philosophy finds figured in the relation of essence and existence—a dualism which alone accounts for the immediate-theoretic contrast and union, a dualism which alone guarantees that diversity and unity that make cultures organic, progressive, and generally open to outside influences.

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*Prévoir et Savoir.* By YVES SIMON. Editions de l'Arbre. Montreal, 1944.

Pp. 205.

The subtitle describes this little and highly interesting volume as "Studies of the Idea of Necessity in Scientific Thought and in Philosophy." These studies comprise a main part on the Theory of Determinism (106 pp.) and several shorter essays on Science and Systematics, The School of Vienna, Epistemological Pluralism, the Object of Physical Knowledge, and the Knowledge of the Soul. These latter essays, although deserving consideration, are, however, of minor importance compared with the main part; they are also partly of a more critical nature and must be passed over in this report.

The study on determinism starts with an analysis of the notion of chance. Common-sense views as a chance-event any which is contrary to expectation, as that which could not have been foreseen. There are, however, events which may be foreseen and none the less must be labelled accidental or fortuitous. An observer at a street corner may foresee that two cars moving towards each other at a right angle must collide; the accident is nevertheless due to chance. Chance is not defined in terms of the unforeseen or the unpredictable, but by the non-unified plurality of the

causal lines of which the event is the result. The author quotes approvingly Cournot: "Events resulting from the combination or the coincidence of other events which belong to series independent of one another are those one calls fortuitous or products of chance." The common-sense notion is dominated by practical considerations. The predictability of an event does not influence its relations with its real causes, but it modifies profoundly its human significance. Predictable events become objects of human prudence; unpredictable events cannot be controlled. The common-sense opinion is in need of philosophical correction.

Any theory of indetermination, says the author in the chapter on the "Philosophical Equivocations Concerning Determinism," must presuppose determinism, because it would otherwise deny ultimately the rationality of the universe and therefore its intelligibility. The chance-event must be viewed as inevitable as soon as the causal lines are given, the meeting of which constitutes the chance-event. This necessity, however, is not "essential" but "historical," not one of right, but solely of fact. It is correct to say that a chance-event has no cause; it has several causes and the plurality of causes is irreducible. Such a plurality has unity only in our mind, not in reality. The chance-event is inexplicable, irrational, unintelligible; it is because of this that rationalism denies emphatically the reality of chance. Explication rests on identity, but the chance-event is not identical with any of its causes in virtue of the latter's plurality. The plurality of causes is unified only on the level of the First Cause which "organizes chance." The argument is continued in the chapter "Causality and Identity": it is impossible to reduce the world totally to a unity because it is only partially and relatively one, hence only partially and relatively intelligible; there being no real distinction between the unity and intelligibility of being. It is here where the fundamental importance of the notion of potentiality, active and passive, becomes evident. Becoming is effected by an agent different from that which becomes: whatever is moved is moved by another, the emphasis being on *other*. What there is of identity between the cause and the caused can be recognized only insofar the diversity or "alterity" is recognized first. The principle of change must be complemented by the two others, the one which affirms that *omne agens agit sibi simile*, and the other that *omne agens agit propter finem*. The aspects of diversity and identity which coexist in the causal relation can be safeguarded only if these three principles are taken in consideration. Hence, it is clear that the notion of cause is fundamentally an ontological notion; in non-ontological knowledge, when one passes to the level of positive science, this notion suffers divers "recastings," according to the plurality of the procedures employed. On the level of science, the notion remains, so to speak, only in a weakened form.

The confrontation of "the Ideal of Science and the Real World" makes

ample use of statements made by eminent scientists and culminates in a penetrating analysis of the classical illustration of chance, namely the throwing of dice. For there to be an equiprobability for each possible event, that is, for each of the six faces of the die, it is necessary not only that the die be regular but also that the throwing be irregular. "A badly assured cause is needed to give to all possible eventualities an equal physical assurance." This analysis leads to that of the "Indeterminist Crisis" arising from the recent developments in "microphysics." The transition from the simple to the very great number renders necessary the substitution of the statistical for the causal law.

The closing paragraph of this study deserves particular attention because here the author points out a mistake all too frequently made not only by the general public, but also by the philosopher analysing and criticizing the notions of science. Science rests on the one hand on its positive data, on the other on a certain ontology it implies. But, there is a third factor which the author aptly calls the "cosmic image." Every age is characterized, and this is particularly true of the great epochs of science, by the predominance of a certain cosmic image. Linnean biology is characterized by the image of a system of perduring models, whereas the age of evolution is dominated by the idea of models in an insensible movement. It is an error to confuse with the philosophy immanent in science this cosmic image which accompanies science in the subjectivity of the scientist. The two things must be sharply distinguished.

(This reviewer would like to add that the study of the "cosmic images" governing the mentality of the scientist at a definite historical age is one of the most important and one of the most neglected tasks of a comprehensive history of ideas. Professor Simon will surely agree that his characterization of the two examples he mentions is incomplete and that even in the biological "cosmic image" of Linnaeus' or Lamarck's age, there enter other elements besides those he points out.)

This book is not easy to read. Yet, it ought to be studied by anyone concerned with the philosophy of science and of nature. Unfortunately, the number of misprints is rather great, and there is one page which is thus rendered most difficult to understand. Professor Simon's book ought to be made accessible in English, at least that first part of it which this reviewer has tried to summarize.

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*Signs, Language and Behavior.* By CHARLES MORRIS. Prentice-Hall, Inc. New York. 1946.

This work on semantics in terms of behavioristic pragmatism, by a professor of philosophy at the University of Chicago and one of the moving spirits in the recent "Unified Science" movement, is an expansion of the author's earlier publication, *Foundations of the Theory of Signs*.

The thirty-two page bibliography lists works of a very late date showing the general semantic trend of the mid-twentieth century to be in accord with Mr. Morris' instrumentalist theory. Extensive chapter-notes, appendix, and glossary help the reader to translate that theory, presented as it is in a kind of esoteric Esperanto, into readable English.

The new Morris code, like that of Dewey and others now in process of manufacture, has been created to defend the instrumentalist notion that the Darwinian biology is of paramount significance for psychology. Any page turned to is decipherable into that *idée fixe* of Dewey and his school that language is refined animal sign-behavior. The key hypothesis—which Mr. Morris uses as a modern philosopher's stone for testing his various statements about language—that the dog-buzzer-food conditioned reflex situation is the embryonic cell from which language came, is developed by such cipher and jargon as seems to this Chicago professor to bring about a connection in semantic terms between sub-human and human sign-behavior. But since the manufactured descriptive, from "ascriptor" through "denotatum," "formator," "iconic sign," "lansign-system," and the rest down to "valuatum," can be decoded only through the old familiar common word of current usage (which is as little like animal sign-behavior of Mr. Morris' pre-human sign-language as possible), this reviewer must wonder how long the language-behaviorist will continue to fool himself and others. Furthermore, his argument is a special form of the logical fallacy *petitio principii*, where two equally unproved assumptions are used circularly to prove each other. The language behaviorist's vicious circle—with the revolving ideas that animal sign-behavior is pre-linguistic and that language is a development of the former—is widened by appealing to the extremely complex relationships in the semantic situation itself.

What has happened, of course, is that the behaviorist has semanticised animal responses to stimuli, and in this way believes he has linked the latter to language behavior, which is interpreted in turn as mere organic response. For instance, when he states that the "T-Ascriptor" ("T" is for "true" but the behaviorist shies at the overt word) can be both "true" and "unreliable" (since the buzzer by which a dog has been conditioned to expect food may sound when there is no food and thus be true for the conditioning but not reliable for the food-presence), we see that his forced semantic interpretation of the buzzer-signal is read back

into our language behavior in an attempt to destroy its human and spiritual qualities. Without commenting on his use of a conditioned animal reflex effected by a human agent to show what he holds a pre-language type of signaling, it is enough to say that though the human agent has a notion of the signal factor as a separate and independent entity the dog has no such notion.

The dog's failure to differentiate the two factors in the reflex-arc situation, a failure on which the whole logical fabric of the language behaviorist depends, tells us something about the dog, perhaps. It certainly tells us nothing at all about language, which—as segregated for study—consists precisely as a set of verbal symbols in isolation from their denotations, but whose connotations retain the ideas of those denoted objects. The buzzer can be, to us examining this special experiment, used analogically with language (though its "connotation" is as forced as its "denotation") because we can separate the two language aspects in actual language reference; but all forms of human signaling outside the language system—from traffic lights or shaking one's fist to Haydn's Hundredth Symphony or the equations of higher mathematics—are called "language" only analogically or metaphorically. Mr. Morris, however, in the half-human, half-animal example upon which he rests so heavily, having semanticized the buzzer declares (page 29) that the challenge to the "mentalist" (his term) is to show that the dog has an idea distinct from the food. The challenge is, on the contrary, for the behaviorist to show that the buzzer has any marks of a pre-language at all. The contention that it has such a status, as here developed, is as unwarranted psychologically as it is logically.

The instrumentalists' psychology which holds that mind is always particular reactions in a particular organism cannot make a case for language compatible with its general theory to the extent even that it made a case for human wills and purposes as expressed in social institutions, after William James. A generous critic of instrumentalism (E. H. Hollands) said in the early days of the movement that, though it made so much of the social, instrumentalism was really incapable of recognizing it. Taking the school system as an example he said that, while it made use of physical things and human acts, it was maintained and kept going just by the common recognition of an end as valuable, of which recognition the instrumentalist took no account. Developed social control, the critic went on, involves a factor at once independent of the particular case of control, which cannot be described as fact, event, or thing in the physical world, and which shows incontrovertibly that nature is much more than its first appearance as physical. Instrumentalism in its current and desperate attempt to account for language, which is a form of developed social control far more elementary and basic than that of educational or other cultural institutions, is using, as we see in this book, ciphers instead of

words of jargon instead of idiom; and the fact is eloquent of the behaviorist's well-grounded suspicion that in an honest semantic theory he will meet his Waterloo. But he is going strong in America as of today; the first thing that strikes the eye in the present work is the notice on the cover, which is repeated in the author's Preface, that Mr. Morris received Fellowships from both the Gruggenheim and the Rockefeller Foundations, enabling him to write this book amplifying his theory of signs; and he was given an additional money grant for aid in preparing the manuscript for the printer by that effete organization of organizations, the American Council of Learned Societies. All of which is "sign" enough of the poverty of our modern culture, in which the philosopher is classified by the Morris system as "an engine of symbolic synthesis." (p. 234) But this is apparently the ideal of the Age of Technocracy.

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*Religion of A Scientist.* Selections from Gustav Th. Fechner, ed. and transl. by WALTER LOWRIE. Pantheon Books, New York, 1946. Pp. 281.

Gustav T. Fechner, 1801—1887, is known today mainly as the originator of quantifying psychology, the science he himself named "psychophysics." Even though Fechner's ideas and his approach have been partly abandoned, partly thoroughly transformed, he is nevertheless recognized as the father of experimental psychology. His mind, however, was a very broad one and his interests were manifold. He started as a physicist, but was always, in the depths of his soul, a speculative thinker, endeavoring to make clear to himself and to exhibit to others the structure of the universe, the meaning of existence, the nature of ultimate problems as he conceived them. He was not a man to build a system; perhaps there is no such thing as a system of Fechner's philosophy. He was, in a way, deeply religious and fundamentally an optimist.

The editor of the present volume, known for his many translations of and writings on Kierkegaard, believes that Fechner's ideas might be of interest and become helpful also today. The selected passages he has included in his book are chosen exclusively from the viewpoint of religious significance. He views Fechner as basically Christian, although it is generally assumed that Fechner's religious principles were of a pantheistic nature.

To make the reader acquainted with his hero, Mr. Lowrie has supplied a preface and an introduction. He believes that Fechner's ideas may be presented without taking account of his scientific, especially his psycho-

logical work. It might, however, have been advisable to consider these latter investigations to some extent, since the views underlying them are linked very closely to Fechner's philosophy, particularly as concerns the mind-body problem. The introduction surveys Fechner's life and philosophical evolution. There is one amazing mistake; the author speaks of Feuchtersleben's little treatise which was in fact the first to deal systematically with "mental hygiene." It was published in 1838. Dr. Lowrie remarks that this book had a definite influence on Kant's views; but, Kant died in 1801.

Selections and anthologies are always of dubious value in presenting an author's ideas. There is, further, the danger that the editor, unconsciously, limits his choice to such passages as serve to confirm his personal interpretation of the man he presents, and that he omits other parts that would expose even those chosen in a quite different light. Moreover, to select passages from an author whose scope was rather wide so that only parts are reproduced dealing with one particular, albeit important, aspect is equally a source of possible misunderstanding.

Apart from these general objections, little can be said against the procedure of the editor. If one wishes to look at Fechner mainly as a religious thinker, the passages here reproduced are rather representative.

It is another question whether Fechner deserves to be represented to the reader. It is, indeed, interesting to see a man living in the age of triumphant and promising scientific development, himself a scientist and surrounded by an atmosphere of predominant materialism, maintain and even intensify his metaphysical and religious outlook. To that extent this book may have some message for our own times. On the other hand, it is doubtful whether the particular approach will appeal to the modern mind. In any case, the editor has made accessible to the average reader the knowledge of a man who managed to preserve his optimistic outlook, notwithstanding serious difficulties and sufferings, and who never ceased to search for a deeper and higher meaning beneath and beyond the world as common-sense and science views it.

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